The psychology of scams: Provoking and committing errors of judgement by Lea, Stephen E. G. et al.




The psychology of scams: 
Provoking and committing 
errors of judgement 
Prepared for the Office of Fair Trading by the 
University of Exeter School of Psychology 
 















© Crown copyright 2009 
This publication (excluding the OFT logo) may be reproduced free of charge in 
any format or medium provided that it is reproduced accurately and not used in 
a misleading context. The material must be acknowledged as crown copyright 
and the title of the publication specified. 
CONTENTS 
Chapter Page 
1 Executive summary 5 
2 Introduction 12 
3 Previous research on the psychology of scams 17 
4 A new theoretical approach: Scam response as an error  
     of judgement 24 
5 A strategy for researching errors of judgement in falling  
    for scams 35 
6 Study One: extended interviews with scam victims 37 
7 Study Two: text mining of a sample of scam  
     communication materials 52 
8 Profiles of different scam types 66 
9 Study Three: a comparison of susceptibility to errors of  
     judgement in victims and non-victims of scams 116 
10  Study Four: an experiment with a scam simulation 123 
11 General conclusions 134 
12 Implications for policy and practice 140 
13 References 143 
Annexes 
A Literature review on the psychology of scams  151 
B Study One: Details of the interview method 177 
C Study One: Further details from the analysis of interview  
     transcripts 179 
D Study Two: Details of  methods used for text mining  
     analysis of scam materials and results 183 
E Study Three:  Details of method 230 
F Study Three: Text of the questionnaires 233 
G Study Three: Tests of the significance of group  
     differences in questionnaire responses 249 
H Study Four: Text of the letter inviting participation in  
     study 4b  252 
I Study Four: Questionnaire used in both studies 4a and  
     4b  254 
J Study Four: Results of factor analyses of responses to  
     the questionnaire items 256 
K Study Four: Tests of the significance of group  









1 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
 
1.1 According to the Office of Fair Trading (2006), 3.2 million adults in the 
UK fall victim to mass marketed scams every year, and collectively lose 
£3.5 billion. Victims of scams are often labelled as 'greedy' or 'gullible' 
and elicit the reaction, 'How on earth could anyone fall for that?'  
However, such labels are unhelpful and superficial generalisations that 
presume all of us are perfectly rational consumers, ignoring the fact that 
all of us are vulnerable to a persuasive approach at one time or another. 
Clearly, responding to a scam is an error of judgement – so our research 
sought to identify the main categories of decision error that typify 
victim responses, and to understand the psychology of persuasion 
employed by scammers to try to provoke such errors. 
1.2 Although scams are by definition illegal and illegitimate as the 'product' 
being sold is non-existent, worthless, or of little value, the way in which 
they are marketed has much in common with legitimate products. A 
successful scam involves all the standard elements of the 'marketing 
mix' and the building of a relationship between marketer and customer 
– that is, between scammer and victim.     
Previous research 
1.3 Existing empirical research on scams is scarce, descriptive, and of 
limited quality in terms of identifying underlying psychological 
processes. We therefore sought to test a broad variety of potential 
psychological processes underlying victim responses to scams through 
four studies involving (i) in-depth interviews with scam victims, (ii) text 
mining of a large number of real examples of scam materials, (iii) two 
questionnaire studies targeted at members of the general public, and (iv) 
a behavioural experiment, which tried to get people's responses to a 
simulated prize draw pitch scam, delivered through the mail in the same 









Psychological reasons for responding to scams  
1.4 The present research suggests that the psychological reasons for 
responding to scams involve a mixture of cognitive and motivational 
processes. Whilst different kinds of scam do exploit different 
vulnerabilities to some extent, there are similarities between scams in 
their content and the use of persuasive techniques. The greatest and 
most consistent emphasis was on:  
• appeals to trust and authority: people tend to obey authorities so  
scammers use, and victims fall for, cues that make the offer look like 
a legitimate one being made by a reliable official institution or 
established reputable business;  
• visceral triggers: scams exploit basic human desires and needs – such 
as greed, fear, avoidance of physical pain, or the desire to be liked – 
in order to provoke intuitive reactions and reduce the motivation of 
people to process the content of the scam message deeply. For 
example, scammers use triggers that make potential victims focus on 
the huge prizes or benefits on offer. 
1.5 There are also a number of other error-inducing processes that emerged, 
including:  
• Scarcity cues. Scams are often personalised to create the impression 
that the offer is unique to the recipient. They also emphasise the 
urgency of a response to reduce the potential victim's motivation to 
process the scam content objectively; 
• Induction of behavioural commitment. Scammers ask their potential 
victims to make small steps of compliance to draw them in, and 
thereby cause victims to feel committed to continue sending money; 
• The disproportionate relation between the size of the alleged reward 
and the cost of trying to obtain it. Scam victims are led to focus on 






amount of money they have to send in order to obtain their windfall; 
a phenomenon called 'phantom fixation'. The high value reward 
(often life-changing, medically, financially, emotionally or physically) 
that scam victims thought they could get by responding, makes the 
money to be paid look rather small by comparison;   
• Lack of emotional control. Compared to non-victims, scam victims 
report being less able to regulate and resist emotions associated with 
scam offers. They seem to be unduly open to persuasion, or perhaps 
unduly undiscriminating about who they allow to persuade them.  
This creates an extra vulnerability in those who are socially isolated, 
because social networks often induce us to regulate our emotions 
when we otherwise might not. 
Other key findings 
1.6 Some of the psychological processes we identified as contributing to 
falling for a scam were to be expected, on the basis either of previous 
research literature, or common sense. Some others were less 
predictable.  
1.7 For example, it was striking how some scam victims kept their decision 
to respond private and avoided speaking about it with family members 
or friends. It was almost as if with some part of their minds, they knew 
that what they were doing was unwise, and they feared the 
confirmation of that that another person would have offered. Indeed to 
some extent they hide their response to the scam from their more 
rational selves. 
1.8 Another counter-intuitive finding is that scam victims often have better 
than average background knowledge in the area of the scam content. 
For example, it seems that people with experience of playing legitimate 
prize draws and lotteries are more likely to fall for a scam in this area 
than people with less knowledge and experience in this field. This also 
applies to those with some knowledge of investments. Such knowledge 







1.9 Nor did we expect to find that scam victims report that they put more 
cognitive effort into analysing scam content than non-victims. This 
contradicts the intuitive suggestion that people fall victim to scams 
because they invest too little cognitive energy in investigating their 
content, and thus overlook potential information that might betray the 
scam. This may, however, reflect the victim being 'drawn in' to the 
scam whilst non-victims include many people who discard scams 
without giving them a second glance.    
1.10 From the victim interviews it was clear that some people viewed 
responding to a scam as taking a long-odds gamble: they recognised 
that there was something wrong with the offer, but the size of the 
possible prize or reward (relative to the initial outlay) induced them to 
give it a try on the off-chance that it might be genuine.  
Psychological harm to victims 
1.11 Scams cause psychological as well as financial harm to victims. Victims 
not only suffer a financial loss, but also a loss of self-esteem because 
they blame themselves for having been so 'stupid' to fall for the scam. 
Some of the victims we interviewed appeared to have been seriously 
damaged by their experience. 
Vulnerability to repeat scam victimisation 
1.12 Our research suggests that there is a minority of people who are 
particularly vulnerable to scams. In particular, people who reported 
having previously responded to a scam were consistently more likely to 
show interest in responding again. Though a minority, it is not a small 
minority; depending on how it is assessed, it could be between 10 per 
cent and 20 per cent of the population. Furthermore, the research 
suggests that the vulnerability is not specific to the persuasive 
techniques most characteristic of current common mass marketed 






techniques, which scammers do not currently use very much, which 
would put people further at risk if they were introduced. 
1.13 People who show above average vulnerability to scams do not seem to 
be in general poor decision-makers, for example they may have 
successful business or professional careers. They simply seem to be 
unduly open to persuasion, or perhaps unduly undiscriminating about 
who they allow to persuade them.   
1.14 The existence of individual differences in general persuadability throws 
some light on the fact that some people become 'chronic' or serial scam 
victims: it would not be surprising to find that such victims are 
exceptionally highly persuadable – though that is unlikely to be the 
complete explanation of chronic victimhood, as other factors such as 
cognitive impairment are likely to be of some relevance. 
Implications for consumer education  
1.15   The fact that, despite differences of emphasis and content, all types of 
scam communication covered by this research seem to have a number 
of important psychological features in common, suggests that some 
people can be educated to recognise and resist them. 
1.16 Either by modelling themselves on legitimate equivalents, or by copying 
earlier scams, scammers produce material that 'looks right'. This does 
mean that the public can learn about particular kinds of scam, and 
successfully avoid them, but that fact carries a vulnerability: a creative 
new scam message is likely to be disproportionately successful.   
1.17   The likely existence of a subset of the population with enhanced 
vulnerability to scams is both a problem and an opportunity from a 
consumer education point of view. It is a problem in that it suggests 
that a high proportion of any general awareness campaign will be 
wasted on people who are relatively unlikely ever to fall for a scam. It is 
an opportunity in that if the more vulnerable group can be identified – or 
can be encouraged to self-identify – educational material can be 






1.18   Previous research on fraud has mainly focussed on motivational 
processes. The present research suggests that victim responses to scam 
communications could be understood more fully by integrating 
motivational and cognitive processes, and therefore that counter-
measures need to involve both kinds of process. 
1.19   Not all potential errors of judgement are equally involved in falling for a 
scam, and public education campaigns need to focus on those that 
seem to be ubiquitous. These are appeals to trust and authority, and the 
clouding of sensible decision-making by the offer of huge rewards.   
1.20   Non-victims often discard scams virtually unread. The most effective 
education strategy may therefore be to help potential victims recognise 
scams at a glance. Much effort in scam prevention has already focused 
on trying to educate potential victims to detect these 'scam alerts' or 
warning signs.  
1.21   Other recent research suggests that making people focus on potential 
losses reduces their tendency to selectively process only information 
that is consistent with the decision they have begun to form to respond 
to a scam. So awareness raising campaigns should encourage people to 
approach unsolicited communications with the question, 'How much 
could I lose here?' rather than 'What's in this for me?' They would then 
be much more likely to look for reasons why they should not respond to 
the scam, instead of looking for reasons why they should.   
1.22   At least some responses to scams seem to be driven by the victim's 
interpretation of the situation as a long-odds gamble – it is probably no 
good, but it is worth a small punt. Awareness raising campaigns should 
emphasise that no-one ever wins against a scammer.   
1.23   The research suggest that victims are often acting against their own 
better judgement: with some part of their minds they recognise a scam 
for what it is. Awareness raising campaigns could emphasis that, if you 
think an offer might be a scam, it almost certainly is – your gut instinct 







Filtering scam communications 
1.24   The word-level text mining of scam communications suggests that the 
content of scams in general, and each particular type of scam, can be 
recognised with fair accuracy by relatively crude word-counting 
procedures. This offers possibilities for automatic scam elimination, at 








2.1 A 'Scam' is 'a trick, a ruse; a swindle, a racket' (Oxford English 
Dictionary). Scam, as it is used currently, is both more specific and more 
general than its nearest synonym, 'Fraud'. Scams have often come to 
refer to a particular kind of fraudulent or misleading practice, 
characterised by widely disseminated initial approaches at long distance 
to people not known to the perpetrator ('scammer'); the scammer 
expects a low rate of return on the offer but is able to make a profit 
because the approach has low cost.  
2.2 According to the definition adopted by the Office of Fair Trading ('OFT') 
(2006) a mass marketed scam is 'a misleading or deceptive business 
practice where you receive an unsolicited or uninvited contact (for 
example by email, letter, phone, or advertisement) and false promises 
are made to con you out of money'. The scam will not work unless the 
victim makes some kind of response. Examples of common scams 
include bogus lotteries, deceptive prize draws and sweepstakes, fake 
psychics, 'miracle' health cures, foreign money making ('advance fee') 
offers and 'get-rich-quick' schemes. It is this kind of mass marketed 
scam that is the subject of the present research.   
2.3 Our aim in the present research was to improve our understanding of 
why people fall victim to scams, and of the psychology employed by the 
scammers to influence consumer behaviour. We started with the basic 
question of why so many people, so often, react to completely worthless 
scam offers. According to the OFT (2006), 3.2 million people in the UK 
fall victim to scams, and lose more than £3.5 billion every year. Why 
does this happen? Why do some scam victims even react repeatedly so 
that some of them lose their entire life savings as well as their 
psychological health? However, as well as understanding scams better, 
we also want to help combat them more effectively. So we also want to 
know how an improved understanding of the psychology of scams can 
play a part in reducing the damage that scams do, for example by 








2.4 Although scams are by definition illegal and illegitimate, it will be a 
recurrent theme of this report that they have much in common with the 
marketing of legitimate products. The product being sold is non-existent, 
worthless or at best of very little value, but there is no reason why that 
should make any difference to the means by which it is sold. A 
successful scam involves all the standard elements of the 'marketing 
mix' (McCarthy, 1960), Product, Price, Place and Promotion. It also 
involves the building of a relationship between marketer and customer 
(Berry, 1983) – that is, between scammer and victim. There may even 
be an element of repeat selling; certainly OFT experience strongly 
suggests that anyone who has been a victim of one scam is more likely 
to be approached by other scammers in future (as their name will be 
placed on a so-called 'suckers list'), and in a complex scam, there may 
be many points at which the victim has to take a positive decision in 
order for the scam to move forward.  Most crucially, however, at some 
point the client has to decide to 'buy' the non-existent or worthless 
product or service on offer. He or she has to decide to comply with the 
scam. 
2.5 The available research on scams is, for the most part, fragmented, 
descriptive, and non-psychological. Some of it focuses on technical 
issues (for example, what types of media are used and how technical 
solutions can be used to counteract scams). Some is essentially 
descriptive, gathering demographic information about how often people 
react, how much money they lose, and which subtypes of the population 
are more or less prone to react. Some simply transfers older theories on 
the psychology of persuasion in general (for example, Cialdini, 1984-
2007) or fraud in particular to the more specific field of scams.  
2.6 Our intention in the present research project has been to set up a general 
theoretical framework specifically aimed at explaining psychologically 
why people respond to scams, and to test it empirically in a variety of 
ways. Specifically, we propose that, on the one hand to respond to a 
scam is an error of judgement, and on the other hand, scammers aim to 







2.7 The idea of an error of judgement springs from the theory of rational 
decision making. From its foundations in nineteenth century psychology, 
economic theory gradually developed the idea of the perfectly rational 
decision maker, who would always take the best possible decision in the 
light of all the information available. This theory was raised to new 
heights by the publication of a seminal work that applied it in new ways, 
Von Neumann and Morgenstern's (1944) Theory of games and economic 
behaviour. But von Neumann and Morgenstern's work also made it clear 
that rational decision making depended on a series of assertions that 
could be tested empirically. The modern disciplines of decision-making, 
economic psychology and behavioural economics, which provide a rich 
source of data about such errors, have been largely built on testing that 
theory and showing that it is not always an accurate or complete 
description of individual behaviours. Nonetheless, the idea of rational 
decision making remains important. It provides a standard against which 
real decisions can be assessed, and a way of classifying the tendencies 
shown in real decisions. Deviations from rational decision making can 
therefore be seen as errors of judgement. Although some decision errors 
are small scale and evanescent, others are not: they are reliable and 
large enough to account for major macroeconomic phenomena such as 
the systematic underinvestment in pensions that characterises modern 
economies (see also Thaler & Sunstein, 2008, chaps 6, 7).  
2.8 Our focus on falling for a scam as an error of judgement addresses one 
of the most mystifying features of the scam phenomenon. The existence 
of scams and scammers is well known. A retrospective account of 
someone responding to a scam, especially if given briefly, very often 
elicits the reaction, 'How on earth could anyone fall for that?' – because 
on rational analysis, it must have been obvious that the scam was just 
that, a scam. But the assumption that people's decisions and choices are 
reliably rational is at best a crude approximation that applies only on the 
average. Furthermore, as defenders of rationality theory have often 
argued, anyone who shows systematic deviations from rational choice is 
vulnerable to exploitation (for example, see the 'money pump' argument 






Suppes, 1955). Seen in this light, a modest probability of falling for a 
scam is no longer an inexplicable exception to the general tendency of 
human choice, but rather an inevitable by-product of the processes that 
enable normal economic life to continue. 
2.9 However the wide range of errors of judgement that have been studied 
means that merely labelling response to a scam as such an error is 
vacuous. What we need to do is to identify the categories of error that 
typify scam responses, and to understand the ways in which scammers 
try to provoke such errors.  Whilst our research therefore seeks to 
identify behavioural issues that create errors in judgement, we recognise 
that there are other potential sources of such errors.  
2.10 The present research programme began with a review of the existing 
research literature. A report of that review is attached as Annexe A, but 
its conclusions are summarised in Section 3. In the light of previous 
research, we developed our own theoretical understanding of the 
psychology of falling for scams, summarised in Section 4, and a research 
strategy, which is presented in Section 5. Four major studies followed, 
using different techniques; one of them was in two parts. These are 
described in Sections 6-10.  
2.11 Study 1 involved in depth interviews, mainly with victims of scams, 
though a handful of the interviews were with people who were closely 
involved with scams but not actual victims ('near victims' or relatives of 
victims). This study enabled us to probe in depth the psychological 
processes and impacts of becoming a scam victim.  The interview 
transcripts were initially studied by thematic analysis, extracting the 
main ideas that people were expressing, and then by text mining, that is, 
computer-aided analysis of the text materials to build up a picture of 
their content by counting words and concepts.   
2.12 Study 2 also involved text mining, but in this study we analysed a large 
body of examples of scam communications (primarily mailings but also 
some emails and website material) made available to us by the OFT.  
This study enabled us to look at the psychology of scams from the point 






seemed to be trying to do with the effects the scams seemed, from 
Study 1, to be having. 
2.13 Study 3 involved two questionnaire studies targeted at members of the 
general public: Study 3A used members of a volunteer participant panel, 
to ensure a high response rate, and Study 3B used people recruited by a 
house-to-house mail drop, to get a more representative sample. These 
studies enabled us to probe people's attitudes to scams, and what they 
think will make them more likely to fall for a scam. 
2.14 Study 4 was a behavioural experiment, which tried to get people's 
responses to a simulated prize draw scam, delivered through the mail in 
the same way as a real scam. For ethical and legal reasons we could not 
actually ask people for money and we had to reveal that the supposed 
scam was in fact a simulation. Nevertheless, by presenting the 
simulation in different ways, we were able to get closer to the process 
of responding to an actual scam, and to look more directly at some of 






3 PREVIOUS RESEARCH ON THE PSYCHOLOGY OF SCAMS 
3.1 Empirical research on scamming is scarce, descriptive, and of limited 
quality in terms of identifying underlying psychological processes. Many 
articles that seek to say something about the psychology of scams just 
rely on information about the general psychology of fraud, and adapt this 
knowledge theoretically to the more recent problem of mass marketed 
scamming, without carrying out any new data collection. Nonetheless, 
the existing literature provides essential context and theoretical 
background for the present research. 
3.2 The formal similarity between a scam and a legitimate marketing offer 
means that the previous literature can conveniently be considered within 
the context of 'communication theory'. Any communication event 
involves Source, Medium, Message and Recipient factors. Because 
scamming is an illegal activity, it is hard to reach or study source factors 
(these would include, for example, the motivation and plans of the 
scammer). While there has been considerable research on some 
particular media (most notably the internet), most of this has been of a 
largely technical nature, targeted for example at finding technical means 
of blocking scam and spam email. Most available research therefore 
focuses on message and recipient factors and our own research plan 
follows this tradition. All these factors inevitably interact: in particular, it 
is widely accepted (indeed, it is almost a tautology) that the peculiarities 
of scam message content represent the scam sources' implicit 
hypotheses about the characteristics and psychological processes of 
scam recipients. 
Source factors 
3.3 In one of the few attempts to comment on the scammers, Duffield and 
Grabosky (2001) and Grabosky and Duffield (2001) offer a theoretical 
analysis in which they claim to identify some psychological correlates of 
fraud offending. However, scamming (which they call 'mass market 
fraud') is only one of four categories of offence that they consider. The 
authors conclude that modern media and internet technology facilitate 






her victims, and thus seeing the situation from the victims' point of 
view. Psychological research on prosocial and antisocial behaviour (for 
example, Batson, 1998) has revealed that immediate visual contact 
increases feelings of empathy, which reduces individuals' tendency to be 
aggressive towards people and increases individuals' tendency to be 
prosocial (see also Milgram, 1965). In the case of internet scamming, 
the distant technology prevents the emergence of empathy and 
perspective taking, which facilitates the scammer cheating their victims 
(he or she feels less empathy for the victim causing less feelings of guilt 
for betraying them). These processes seem equally likely to apply to 
other forms of distance communication such as postal scam mailings. 
Message factors 
3.4 From his perspective as a prosecutor at the US Department of Justice, 
Rusch (1999) argues that internet scammers use what he calls 'social 
engineering techniques' to persuade people to comply, in a way that is 
typical of traditional fraud. To understand these techniques, he suggests 
using social psychology, and in particular Cialdini's (1984/2007) analysis 
of persuasion and influence. Rusch focuses on three core social 
psychological topics as aids to understanding scam messages and how 
they work. The topics he explores in detail are:  
• the contrast between central (logical and systematic) and peripheral 
(emotional and superficial) routes to persuasion, with the fraudster 
necessarily relying on peripheral routes, for example by stirring up 
strong emotions, such as excitement or fear, at the beginning of an 
interaction; 
• attitudes and beliefs. Rusch sweeps a number of possible effects 
together here, including the scammers' tendency to demean their 
victims, and the victims' tendency to focus on the apparent honesty 
of the scammer rather than analysing what they were being told;  
• persuasion and influence techniques. Here Rusch draws up a long list 






reciprocation, commitment and consistency as well as social proof 
(we discuss these psychological processes in further detail below). 
3.5 Pursuing the same general theoretical approach as Rusch (1999), 
Langenderfer and Shimp (2001) carried out a survey of expert opinion, 
to present a 'tentative theory of scamming vulnerability […] for future 
empirical investigation'. With regard to affective processes, they argue 
that scammers use what Loewenstein (1996), in an influential paper on 
decision errors, has called viscerally oriented rewards. These are rewards 
for which the victim is likely to have a very high motivation, either 
chronically or aroused by the scam message. The obvious examples are 
money, sex, anxiety and pain, though scams may also exploit strong 
emotions like pity by references to political, natural or personal disasters 
(this is commonly done in the so-called 419 advance fee frauds, for 
example). So scam messages address basic needs such as greed, 
anxiety, or physical pain (for example, by falsely claiming that the 
recipient has won a large cash prize in a lottery or by appearing to ask 
for money in order to offer a 'cure' to an arthritis sufferer who suffers 
from severe physical pain). 
3.6 Langenderfer and Shimp (2001) argue that under conditions of high 
visceral influence the mechanisms of people's decision-making change, 
making it less likely that clues to the scam status of a message ('scam 
alerts') will be noticed. For example, 'miracle' health product scams 
often claim that they can help the potential victim to alleviate pain, a 
direct offer of a viscerally related reward. The aim is that the victim's 
pre-existing pain and the associated motivation to reduce it will override 
caution and prevent the scam being detected. Our previous research has 
consistently shown that the arousal of such strong motives will tend to 
reduce rational thought and caution in information-seeking and decision-
making (for example, Fischer, et al., 2008b). 
3.7 Langenderfer and Shimp (2001) also point out that scam messages 
frequently emphasise the urgency or uniqueness of the opportunity that 
is being offered. These are of course techniques that are used in 
legitimate marketing as well, and are widely believed to be effective, 






experiments by Worchel, Lee and Adewole (1975), who found the 
desirability of cookies was maximal when they were perceived to be 
scarce due to high demand, by Lynn (1989) who manipulated the 
perceived scarcity of art prints and wine and found that it had a positive 
and significant effect on the items' desirability, and by Verhallen and 
Robben (1994) who found that scarcity and preference were positively 
correlated only for popular items, and only where the scarcity was a 
result of limited availability due to market conditions, so that supply 
could be seen to be genuinely limited.   
3.8 Urgency and uniqueness claims are ubiquitous in legitimate marketing as 
well as scams, and it can be argued that they are always on the edge of 
being deceptive, since the seller is almost certain to return to the market 
with a similar offer in future: their purpose is always to encourage the 
buyer to a decision sooner and perhaps after less consideration than s/he 
would normally take. Riquelme & Wang (2004) argue that many 
websites within legitimate commerce contain biases, which they regard 
as unintentional, that may mislead consumers to the advantage of the 
advertiser, and inducing a false sense of urgency would certainly qualify 
as such a bias.  Consumers are sensitive to the implausibility of 
uniqueness claims: Shirai and Bettman (2005) found that if consumers 
evaluated a deal they were being offered as though the same or a similar 
deal would be offered soon, the judged attractiveness of the present deal 
was lower than if they thought that the interval before the deal would be 
offered again was longer. 
3.9 Cukier, Nesselroth, and Cody (2007) and Kienpointner (2006) both 
carried out analyses of the content of 'Nigerian Scam Letters'. Cukier et 
al applied Rusch's (1999) analysis of social psychological processes of 
persuasion, but also invoked literary and anthropological sources to 
identify the common myths and plot motifs that the scam letters used.  
They looked at 111 such letters and concluded that the Nigerian letters 
are a specific and distinct genre of scam mailings. Their results strongly 
support Langenderfer and Shimp's (2001) argument that scam 
communications aim to elicit visceral rather than cognitive information 
processing. They found that key elements in the letters were 'rich 






the scammers used 'archetypical myths of windfall fortunes'. 
Specifically, the letters address feelings of greed, charity, heroism and 
other associated strong emotional cues. The authors recognised many 
'elements and motifs from the 'rags to riches' myth, which permeates 
many cultures' (p.8). In these letters, the 'hero has a quest or task to 
overcome against all odds and is aided by a supernatural agent, such as 
the fairy god-mother, or a human sidekick' (p.8). These themes are 
mostly set within stories similar to a fairytale or ideas like the American 
dream. The authors also found that most victims react to these mailings 
because of greed. The desire to get rich quickly makes the recipients fall 
for this fraud (associated with the idea of instant wealth).  
Recipient factors 
3.10 Most investigations of scam recipients can be characterised as 
differential vulnerability studies: attempts to discover which groups 
within society are most likely to fall victim to scams in general or 
particular types of scam. The most substantial evidence on the nature of 
scams and their victims comes from a series of reports commissioned by 
the American Association of Retired Persons in the 1990s (AARP 
1996abc). These focused on older victims, and on telephone scams. The 
main findings were that 56 per cent of victims of telemarketing were 
over the age of 50 years. Forty per cent reported that the reason for 
responding was that they did not know how to identify a scam 
approach, and 64 per cent said that they did not know any organisation 
that they could access for help with identifying scam approaches. 
3.11 The OFT has also published research into the prevalence and impact of 
mass marketed scams on the UK public. The research included initial 
interviews with more than 11,200 people and 1,900 detailed follow-up 
interviews with people who reported they had been a victim of a scam, 
or knew someone who had been a victim, or target of a scam. Scaling 
up from the research results leads to an estimate that nearly half of the 
UK adult population has been targeted by a scam and that every year 
one in 15 people (3.2 million adults) in the UK fall victim to a scam at a 
total annual cost of £3.5billion. Older consumers were more likely to be 






age of 65, and 24 per cent between 55-64 years old. There was, 
however, a spread of actual victims across the age ranges. Older victims 
(aged 55 and over) were likely to lose nearly twice as much per scam 
compared to younger age groups. Of those who fell for the scams, 32 
per cent said it was because of the legitimate and professional 
appearance of the marketing, 30 per cent said they were caught off 
guard, and 13 per cent because of the excitement at the prospect of 
getting a good deal or winning a prize. 
3.12 Other research with scam recipients (for example, Grimes, Hough & 
Signorella, 2007) has confirmed that there are reliable individual 
differences in vulnerability, of the sort that would be predicted from 
general research on susceptibility to interpersonal influence (for example, 
Bearden, Netemeyer & Teel, 1989). Almost all authors agree that such 
differences exist at the demographic level, with the elderly, less well 
educated, and socially isolated being particularly vulnerable. Scammers 
are often held to share these beliefs and to target their messages at 
vulnerable groups, though clearly much internet scamming is essentially 
untargeted, because of its very low costs to the scammer.  
3.13 Grimes et al (2007) report that older internet users suffer a double 
vulnerability to scams – they receive as much scam email as younger 
users despite lower internet use, and they are more likely to make 
purchases as a result of spam. The main reasons for this finding might 
lie in the fact that (a) older people have less experience with the internet 
as a medium, (b) are cognitively less able to detect typical scam 
attributes, and (c) may suffer from cognitive impairments that may 
reduce their motivational and cognitive abilities to deeply elaborate scam 
messages. Bearden et al. (1989) developed a measure that differentiates 
between individuals according to their susceptibility to social influence, 
and this has been suggested as a useful way of identifying people more 
likely to fall for scams than others.  
3.14 Research into vulnerability to internet scams suggests an interesting 
additional factor in relative vulnerability. It appears that people's 
experience with the internet, and their style of interacting with it, may 






the UK government Foresight programme, Dutton and Shepherd (2004) 
counter-intuitively propose that familiarity with the medium by which a 
scam arrives may make one more rather than less vulnerable. They 
found that trust in the internet is higher among frequent users compared 
to non-frequent users of the internet. This means that, counter-
intuitively, people who have experience with the internet may be more 
prone to fall into the trap of internet scamming than people with low 
internet experience.   
3.15 The idea that knowledge might make one vulnerable, through over-
confidence, is linked to other results that implicate Ego factors in scam 
vulnerability.  Snyder (1986) argues that victims of gambling swindles 
are especially keen to win because this would boost their Egos, for 
example, by impressing a woman, or otherwise attaining social prestige. 
This need for ego-enhancement then hinders people from detecting fraud 
in gambling offers, in Snyder's view.  Snyder concluded that people 
mostly become victims because (a) they generalise success in one area 
of their life (for example their job) to the gambling context, (b) they get 
involved by the idea of winning with low risk, and (c) their ego makes 
them vulnerable (for example, prestige and/or self-esteem). 
3.16 Finally, there is also some research on how people feel after they have 
been scammed. For example, Shichor et al (1994) investigated the 
reactions of victims of a major telephone investment scam in the US, 
and summarised their findings in three words: Anger, Disappointment 
and Disgust. In so far as these reactions are turned inwards by victims, 
they are likely to reduce the probability that people will report the fact 
that they have been scammed. From research on mood regulation (for 
example, Fischer, et al., 2008b; Jonas, et al., 2006) we know that 
people seek to alleviate negative emotional states by neglecting or 
avoiding information that might increase (or at least does not help to 
reduce) such states, and not reporting the scam might be a way of 
avoiding further thinking about being defrauded. Furthermore, Snyder 
(1986) concluded, in the context of gambling swindles, that victims do 
not want to admit that they have been defrauded, and will avoid 






4 A NEW THEORETICAL APPROACH: SCAM RESPONSE AS AN 
ERROR OF JUDGEMENT 
4.1 Decision errors result from a number of sources. In a famous paper 
about decisions under risk, Tversky and Kahneman (1974) described 
them as 'heuristics and biases'. Heuristics are simplifying rules used to 
render complex decision problems manageable. No-one could carry out 
all comparisons required to make ideally rational choices among the 
innumerable combinations of purchases that can be made in a modern 
consumer economy: the effort to do so would be literally paralysing.  
Rather than maximising their benefits, individuals must 'satisfice' 
(Simon, 1956), adopting simple strategies that usually give a good 
enough outcome. 
4.2 Using a heuristic may mean that the outcomes of a single choice are 
usually not the same as would be predicted from rational choice theory.  
Over a series of choices, however, heuristics need not produce 
outcomes that deviate systematically from the predictions of rationality.  
Indeed, there is evidence that the outcomes of some simple 'rules of 
thumb' can even be better than that of a principled rational approach 
(Gigerenzer & Goldstein, 1996). But in some cases, heuristics lead to 
systematic, predictable deviations from rational choice, which we 
describe as biases.  For example, in decisions under risk, people tend to: 
• pay too much attention both to outcomes that are absolutely sure to 
happen, and to those that are very unlikely to happen, at the expense 
of those that are moderately likely (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979); 
• neglect the impact of basic occurrence rates when estimating how 
likely it is that two things will happen together (Kahneman & Tversky, 
1973; Fiedler, Brinkmann, Betsch, & Wild, 2000); 
• under-estimate the value of outcomes that are further in the future, 
when making choices between outcomes that arrive at different times 







4.3 A particular source of bias in decision making lies in social processes, 
particularly social norms. Norms can be seen as rules of thumb based on 
social knowledge: they tell us how we 'ought' to choose, and 
furthermore how other people are likely to choose. Shared social norms 
can enable us to reach harmonious outcomes in bargaining situations, 
which may be very different from those that would be predicted by 
rational choice theory: for example, in a simple experimental procedure 
called the ultimatum bargaining game, a 'fairness' norm carried over 
from everyday life tends to operate, and it ensures that the distributions 
of outcomes are very different from those predicted by rationality 
(Thaler, 1988; Güth & Tietz, 1990). But clearly a negotiator who knows 
but does not share the norms governing the behaviour of other parties 
may be able to exploit them. 
4.4 In the next few paragraphs we summarise some of the sources of errors 
of judgement that have been studied by social and economic 
psychologists. There are many such errors, and we do not present a 
complete list here: we focus on those that have already been suggested 
as processes that scammers try to elicit, or as explanations for why 
people fall for scams, or which plausibly might serve as such 
explanations. Even this selective list of sources of error is long. The 
present research therefore seeks to narrow it down, and investigates, 
using a number of methods, which of these processes can be identified 
as most important in the explanation and prediction of why people fall 
for scams. 
4.5 Heuristics and the corresponding biases result from a fundamental 
cognitive fact, the impossibility of carrying out the processes required for 
fully rational decision making. However their existence opens the way 
for the intrusion of motivational processes into what would ideally be a 
purely cognitive operation. Accordingly, the psychological mechanisms 
underlying errors of judgement can be roughly divided into cognitive and 
motivational processes. Within both groups, some sources of error are 
more individual, others more socially induced. In Table 1, we list some of 
the many types of error that have been identified in both motivational 






there is good reason to think that they may play a part in falling for a 
scam.   





Reduced motivation for information 
processing 
Preference for confirmation 
Lack of self-control 
Mood regulation and phantom 
fixation 
Sensation seeking 
Liking and similarity 
Reciprocation 
Commitment and consistency 
Reduced cognitive abilities 
Positive illusions 









Motivational sources of error 
4.6 Common motivational errors include: 
• Visceral influences. Scammers often address basic human desires and 
needs (such as greed, fear, avoidance of physical pain, or to feel liked 
or loved). This can provoke basic visceral (intuitive) reactions and 
thus reduce individuals' motivation to process the content of a scam 
message deeply (Langenderfer & Shimp, 2001). The heuristics ('rules 
of thumb') used in the decision will therefore be simpler, and the 
probable biases larger. In particular, important cues that may be 






legitimate marketing offers) are not detected and falling for the scam 
becomes more probable. We know from previous research that the 
quality of decision-making and associated information processing is 
reduced when people are in strong motivational states (see for 
example, Frey, 1986; Schwarz, Frey, & Kumpf, 1980). People in 
such a psychological state simply do not elaborate the pros and cons 
of a decision and neglect possible shortcomings in decision 
alternatives' longer-term consequences. Finally, focusing on visceral 
needs and desires is also associated with a psychological state of 
being 'out of control', which is discussed below.   
• Reduced motivation for information processing. Scam victims are 
often found to be in a state of low motivation to process information 
thoroughly, so that specific attributes that help to distinguish scam 
messages from legitimate marketing offers are disregarded, inducing 
errors of judgement (Langenderfer & Shimp, 2001). This decreased 
motivation can derive from the specific content in scam messages, 
either by arousing visceral motives, as described above, or by using 
the devices of induced scarcity and uniqueness to place victims under 
time pressure. It can also derive from dispositional factors. An 
obvious example is chronic cognitive impairment (for example, caused 
by dementia), which makes information processing more effortful. 
Counter-intuitively, reduced motivation to adequately process 
decision-relevant information should also be found in people with high 
rather than low financial resources. Better-off people should simply 
mind less about losing £10 or £20 in the 'game' of a sweepstake or 
prize draw scam. Large-scale survey data on gambling behaviour do 
suggest that, though some forms of gambling are concentrated in 
low-income groups (for example, lottery play, see Kearney, 2005), 
higher-income people take bigger and more dangerous risks (Barry, 
Maciejewski, Desai & Potenza, 2007) which could help to explain 
why some higher income individuals are susceptible to advanced fee 
fraud, such as West African 419 scams.  
• Preference for confirmatory information. A persistent error in human 
decision making is the tendency to seek information that confirms 






wrong (Festinger, 1957; Frey, 1986; Wason, 1966). Although this 
tendency is reduced in familiar everyday tasks compared with 
abstract ones (Wason & Shapiro, 1971), it can readily be detected in 
social judgements of the same general kind as those involved in 
falling for scams (see also Fischer et al., 2005; Fischer et al., 
2008a,b,c). This information search bias has been found to reduce 
the quality of decision outcomes (Kray & Galinsky, 2003).  
Presumably its psychological basis is that it is more rewarding to find 
that one is right than to find that one is wrong.  
• Lack of self control. A survey of expert opinion by Langenderfer & 
Shimp, 2001 suggests that people who respond to scam 
communications tend to be less able to regulate their emotional 
responses. Lack of self-control is one of the best documented causes 
of non-optimal choice and errors of judgement (for example, Thaler & 
Shefrin, 1981; Baumeister, Vohs & Tice, 2007). It has been widely 
seen as responsible for the bias towards immediate rewards that is 
one of the most striking failures of rationality in human choice (see 
Ainslie, 1975). On the one hand, self-control is a personality trait 
(that is, a psychological characteristic that is relatively stable over 
time, so that some people are persistently better than others at 
exerting self-control). On the other hand, Baumeister and his 
colleagues argue that self-control is a limited resource that can be 
depleted by tasks that require self-control, such as suppressing 
emotions or actively controlling one's own attention towards specific 
stimuli (for example, Muraven & Baumeister, 2000). When this 
resource for self-control is exhausted (a process referred to as ego-
depletion; for example, Muraven & Baumeister, 2000), individuals are 
worse in controlling their emotions and hence in decision making.  It 
follows that both people with low levels of trait self-control, as well 
as people who are in a psychological state of exhaustion (ego-
depletion), should be less able to suppress their emotional reactions 
towards scam content and thus more inclined to respond to scam 
messages. Baumeister, Sparks, Stillman and Vohs (2008) argued that 
this effect applies to consumer behaviour, but so far research has not 
been carried out into whether it is involved in falling for a scam. In 






have a greater impact on people who are not integrated into social 
networks (and there is some evidence that many older scam victims 
are socially isolated). Social networks induce social norms (social 
rules) and provide a source for social comparison and social 
validation. Even in a state of reduced self-control, available social 
networks (and associated social reference points) might help a 
potential victim to decide to act with self-control. 
• Mood regulation and phantom fixation. Falling for a scam could also 
result from attempts by individuals to control their mental states.  
Scams trigger basic human needs and desires, and seem to offer the 
hope that these can be more fully met for the victim. Hence, scam 
victims might respond in order to replace a negative mood with a 
hopeful one or to increase a positive mood, an obvious example of 
this being a fake psychic mailing which promises to remove a 
person's negative energy and bring them success and happiness. 
Scammers aim to create a fixation in the victim on the offer or prize 
which is the bait. They do this by engaging the victim in imagining 
the money/cure/benefit etc, so that it becomes a specific 'phantom 
fixation' for the victim, as explored by Horvitz and Pratkanis (2002).  
The victim is thus over-motivated to obtain the alleged prize or 
reward, leading to distortions in decision-making. 
• Sensation seeking. Falling for a scam may also be induced by the 
emotional effects of the process of engaging in the scam, which may 
elicit excitement and arousal through the hope for a prize or other 
benefit. The motivation for feelings of this kind is called sensation 
seeking (Zuckerman, 1994), a concept which is used to account for 
people who engage in risky behaviour in order to increase their 
physiological and related psychological arousal (see also Fischer, et 
al., 2007); Zuckerman produced a standardised scale to measure 
people's propensity towards sensation seeking, which can be 
regarded as a personality trait. Previous research has shown that 
sensation seeking is associated with a broad variety of negative, risk-
taking, and mindless behaviours (cf. Fischer, et al., in press). With 
regard to potential scam victims, sending money and waiting for a 






reality of 'the big prize') might be very highly arousing and hence 
sought out by people scoring high on the trait of sensation seeking. 
• Liking and similarity. People tend to like people who like them. Scam 
offers which include phrases that suggest to recipients that they are 
liked by the sender should therefore have a higher probability of 
recipients responding than scam offers which do not include such 
content (see also Cukier et al., 2007). For example, the scammer 
might communicate that they are in the same economic, social, 
professional or private position (for example, have a specific similar 
health problem) as the potential victim, which can induce an 
increased liking and empathy for the scammer. In addition, scammers 
often pay compliments to their potential victims, so that they will feel 
that the scammer likes them. 
• Reciprocation. If people are given something, then they feel a strong 
inclination to give something back. Scammers can use this basic 
human tendency (for example, by providing a small gift or by making 
it appear they are bending the rules in the recipient's favour) to 
successfully pitch their scams. The theory of reciprocal concessions 
for inducing a response supports the presence of this process 
(Cialdini et al., 1975).  
• Commitment and consistency. People tend to appreciate consistency 
both in their own behaviour as well as in the behaviour and reactions 
of other people (Festinger, 1957; 1964; Frey, 1986). Consistency 
provides them with a sense of control and thus facilitates a sense of 
ability to explain and predict the world. Scams which persuade 
recipients to respond in a first instance (perhaps without requiring 
any money to be paid) make them more willing to react in a second 
instance (where scammers then ask for money). A similar effect has 
been explored by Cialdini et al (1978), who refer to it as the 'low-
ball' sales technique. Cialdini has argued strongly that the 
manipulation of peoples’ desire for consistency is an important factor 
in all persuasive communication. The desire for consistency probably 
also partly explains the 'sunk cost effect' (Arkes & Blumer, 1985), in 






decisions, despite the fact that, from the perspective of rational 
choice theory, they are irrelevant. Sunk cost effects are particularly 
relevant to some types of scam victimisation, when people fall victim 
to an extended scam, and keep sending money to the same 
scammer, feeling that they have already invested so much that they 
need to spend just a little bit more to finally obtain value for what 
they have paid out in the past. An example of this effect can be 
found in foreign lottery scams where victims are repeatedly asked for 
further payments to release their alleged winnings. 
Cognitive Sources of Error 
4.7 Common cognitive errors include: 
• Reduced cognitive abilities. Many elderly people suffer, to varying 
degrees of severity, from reduced cognitive abilities and thus 
should have a higher probability of falling victim to a scam. 
Research carried out by the OFT (research on impact of mass 
marketed scams, 2006) suggests that older people are more likely 
to be targeted by scams, but they are not more prone to falling 
victim. This could, in part, however, be a reflection of the greater 
reluctance of older scam victims to admit to being scammed. 
However, on a quantitative basis, the OFT research suggested that 
older people lose nearly twice as much money per scam compared 
to younger age groups. The reason for this somewhat unexpected 
finding might be that among the target group of elder people, there 
are those that are classified by the OFT as 'chronic scam victims'. 
These are people who repeatedly respond to scam communications 
(many of these chronic responders suffer from reduced cognitive 
abilities). Cognitive abilities are necessary to make good decisions, 
such as distinguishing typical scam attributes from non-scam 
attributes (for example, Langenderfer & Shimp, 2001).  
• Positive illusions. People tend to take too positive a view of 
themselves. They overestimate their own abilities (above-average 
effect, see the review by Alicke & Govorun, 2005), the prosperity 






2002), and their abilities to control their life and environment 
(illusion of control, see also Taylor & Brown, 1988). It follows that 
some scam victims may fall for scam messages because they 
overestimate their abilities to detect fraud, because they 
overestimate the probability of positive outcomes associated with 
the scam response; or they overestimate their control over the 
whole situation. 
• Background knowledge and overconfidence. Closely related to 
positive illusions is overconfidence, another typical error of 
judgement that is readily demonstrated experimentally (for example, 
Camerer & Lovallo, 1999). From a broad body of research we know 
that overconfidence in decision alternatives and associated 
information leads to biases in decision making and information 
search (Fischer et al., 2008b). The more knowledge people have 
about a specific area, the more they feel competent in this area. As 
a consequence, they overestimate their abilities to make good 
decisions in this area. This line of argument is also supported by 
the findings of Schulz-Hardt et al. (2008), that an increased amount 
of decision-relevant knowledge (especially when it is skewed 
towards a specific direction) makes decision-makers more selective 
in their information search, and thus leads to a reduction in the 
quality of decision outcomes (see also Kray & Galinsky, 2003). 
Research on confirmatory information search reveals that the more 
supporting information people have for a preferred position, 
standpoint or decision alternative, the more they are prone to 
overestimate the quality of information that supports that preferred 
standpoint (Schulz-Hardt et al., 2008). As a consequence, it is 
likely that people will have a higher tendency to respond to a scam 
which falls into their area of background knowledge than to one 
that does not: they are overconfident in their preliminary 
preferences (that is, to respond to the scam) and thus neglect 
inconsistent (warning) information that would help them to 
recognise the scammer's intention. This prediction has been 
confirmed: Shadel and Schweitzer-Pak (2007) found that people 
with high amounts of background knowledge in the area of the 






to fall into the trap of responding to the scam than people who 
have less background knowledge. The phenomenon identified by 
Dutton and Shepherd (2004), whereby people with more 
experience of the internet may be more vulnerable to internet 
scams, similarly strongly suggests an overconfidence effect.  
• Norm activation. Scam content often seems to be targeted to 
activate specific norms, such as the norm to help or the norm to be 
a good citizen. To follow a social norm is not in itself an error of 
judgement: the error that results in falling for a scam is 
misclassifying the situation as one where a particular norm is 
appropriate. For example, some West African advance fee scam 
offers describe a person in need (for example, an impoverished and 
orphaned child) who needs a specific amount of money to be able 
to support their siblings. This type of scam works upon the basic 
human norm to help other people (see also Batson, 1998), 
especially if they are seen as unfortunate in some way (see also 
Doob & Ecker, 1970). If this helping norm is activated, the 
probability increases that people will respond to the scam and lose 
money. 
• False consensus effect. Scammers frequently seek to make 
recipients believe that they have something in common with them 
(for example, some physical, psychological, intellectual or personal-
history-related attribute). The receiver of the scam message also 
tends to overestimate the reliability and validity of the scam 
message if it has the apparent backing of others, as well as to 
overestimate the trustworthiness of the scam source, leading to 
errors in decision (see also Cukier et al., 2007). For example, mass 
marketed fake psychic mailings often imply that the potential scam 
victim is already personally known to the sender due to para-
psychological, spiritual or esoteric abilities that the scammer claims. 
This technique has the potential to increase the probability that 







• Authority. People tend to obey authorities, even if they are not 
present in a specific situation: classic studies showed that authority 
influence can even bring people to hurt another person severely (for 
example, Milgram, 1965). The communication medium and detail 
might increase the perception of authority (especially for older 
people), for example envelopes containing scam mailings may refer 
to an 'Official Notice' or 'Important Documents' enclosed. Texts 
are often written in machine-type letters and official looking seals 
and logos are used to increase the perceived underlying authority of 
a scam. The impact of authority on psychological and behavioural 
response is located within the area of social influence (Milgram, 
1965), which is a classic social psychological domain and a major 
contributory source to the psychology of persuasive 
communication. 
• Social proof. In situations of uncertainty people tend to look to 
other people in order to define reality. Scam messages that contain 
cues of social proof (for example, text passages that claim that 
other people have already reacted or benefited from the scam offer, 
such as fake testimonials) presumably have a higher probability of 
success than scams that do not include this psychological cue – as 
the scammers themselves appear to believe, given the content of 
scam communications (see also Cukier et al., 2007). Many scams, 
for example those offering 'miracle' health cures or 'get-rich-quick' 
opportunities, use fake testimonials from 'satisfied customers' as 
cues of social proof. 
• Altercasting. Source credibility theory includes demonstration of the 
effect of 'Altercasting', in which one person places another in a 
role, by themselves taking up the complementary role (Pratkanis & 
Gliner, 2004). Scammers take up roles to cause their victims to act 
from complementary roles, for example they may act as 
dependants, causing victims to act as protectors, or act as a 
'friend' causing a friendship response. The authority effect 
discussed above similarly works via altercasting, in that the 
victim's response will be according to the social role appropriate in 






5 A STRATEGY FOR RESEARCHING ERRORS OF JUDGEMENT 
IN FALLING FOR SCAMS 
 
5.1 Thus our basic assumptions are (a) that falling for a scam comes down 
to errors in decision-making, and (b) that scammers create situations 
(with their scam offers) that increase the likelihood of poor decision-
making.  As outlined in Section 4, a multitude of cognitive and 
motivational psychological processes could be responsible for poor 
decision-making in the context of scam offers. We have therefore 
integrated these potential psychological processes into a model of the 
psychology of scams, and sought to test, in the present series of 
studies, the relative importance of these processes associated with 
falling victim to a scam communication.  Our four studies, which we 
described briefly earlier, had different roles to play in testing the model. 
5.2 The relative importance of different kinds of errors of judgement, as they 
are seen by scam victims, could be discerned from the victims' self-
reports in the semi-structured interviews of Study 1. They were 
considered both through broad thematic analysis of the interview 
transcripts, and by 'text-mining' (detailed quantitative analysis of the 
words and ideas found in the transcripts). 
5.3 The text mining of the 583 examples of scam communications that took 
place in Study 2 enabled us to find out whether the scammers indeed 
use words and phrases that create psychological situations that increase 
the likelihood for decision errors (Study 2), and if so, which kinds of 
errors they were most often trying to elicit. 
5.4 The two quasi-experimental questionnaire studies that made up Studies 
3A and 3B enabled us to directly compare scam victims to non-victims 
with regard to relevant misleading psychological processes in scam-
relevant decision-making. 
5.5 Interview analyses, text-mining procedures, and quasi-experiments are all 
essentially retrospective procedures, so they are not capable of 
determining cause and effect. Accordingly, in Study 4 we aimed to use 






content of some experimental simulations of scams, and measured 






6 STUDY ONE: EXTENDED INTERVIEWS WITH SCAM VICTIMS 
6.1 To collect self-report data on the psychological processes that might 
have led scam victims to respond to scam offers we conducted semi-
structured interviews with 25 scam victims and five 'near scam' victims.  
Further details of the interview procedure are given in Annexe B. The 
interview transcripts were analysed thematically and by text-mining. 
Method 
6.2 We interviewed 30 people, from across the UK. All were recruited on the 
basis that they self-identified as scam victims.  They were recruited by 
media advertising, from people who had approached the OFT or 
Consumer Direct (a telephone consumer advice service managed by the 
OFT) to complain about scams, and through the first batch of 
questionnaires (Study 3A below). All participants received £50 for 
participation in the interviews. All interviews were conducted by a 
researcher who was experienced in conducting one-to-one interviews on 
sensitive topics. 
6.3 Most of the interviewees clearly were scam victims. However, as 
expected, in the course of the interviews it emerged that some of them 
(a total of seven) were either non-victims or marginal victims. Of these, 
two were relatives of victims, not victims themselves; two believed on 
reasonable grounds that they had spotted a scam in time to prevent loss, 
though in fact they did lose money; and the remaining three must be 
seen as non-victims by the scammers, as although they were deceived, 
they did not in fact lose any money.   
6.4 The interview transcripts were analysed by a combination of top-down, 
meaning-based and bottom-up, word-based, analyses – thematic 
analysis and text mining respectively. Both analysis methods focused on 
the interviews of the 25 participants who had actually lost money in a 
scam. In the text-mining analysis, the words most frequently mentioned 
were extracted, and were also combined into psychologically-meaningful 
categories. The categories used were related to the kinds of errors of 






Results of text-mining 
6.5 Most frequently mentioned words. Overall, we identified 42 frequently-
occurring words (based on the frequency they were mentioned, ignoring 
filler words such as is, the, and, etc). The most often mentioned word 
(money) was mentioned 381 times, and occurred in 23 out of the 25 
interview transcripts analysed. Further details of the most frequently 
used single words are given in Annexe C.  
6.6 Categories. Although the words used varied between interviews, the 
categories they fell into were more consistent. Several categories 
occurred in every interview: these were cost-benefit considerations (that 
is, mainly words related to the size of the prize or reward, such as 
'money', 'pay' or 'prize'), trust and security (that is words that suggest 
the scammer to be a trustworthy business partner, such as 'information' 
or 'company'), 'get in contact' (that is words that promote getting in 
contact with the scammers, such as 'telephone', 'contact' or 'call') , and 
personal approach (that is words and phrases that imply that the 
scammers already know the potential victim, such as 'name' or 
'address').  
6.7 Other high incidence categories were behavioural commitment (88 per 
cent; that is words that imply a specific behaviour, which the potential 
victim should show towards the scammers; for example, words like 
'ring' or 'letter'), social relations and social proof (88 per cent; that is 
words that imply that other people also have been contacted and are 
satisfied with the scam offer; for example, words like 'people' or 
'friends'), payment (84 per cent; that is words that refer to payment 
modalities; for example, 'cheque'), and self-talk/self-blame (64 per cent).  
6.8 Generally speaking, a more detailed idea of the kind of discourse 
occurring in interviews can be gained by looking at the rates of co-
occurrence of categories. However, in the present case the main 
categories were so ubiquitous that co-occurrence rates showed very 






Results of a thematic analysis 
6.9 There was a rich amount of information in the transcripts, about a wide 
range of scam-types, including several types of lottery and prize draw 
scams, several 'get rich quick' and work from home scams, bogus 
weight loss products, and bogus racing tipsters.  Interviewees covered a 
wide range of victim personalities and life circumstances. The interview 
transcripts were submitted to thematic analysis (Braun & Clarke, 2006), 
and this revealed the following psychological processes that had led 
these scam victims to respond to the scam offer. As in the theoretical 
discussion above, we have divided them into motivational and cognitive 
processes. In reporting the thematic analysis, we rely heavily on 
quotations from the interviewees: for the purposes of this report, we 
have removed obvious speech errors and hesitations from these so that 
the speakers' meanings emerge more clearly, although the verbatim 
records were used in the analysis. 
Identified motivational processes 
Visceral processes (emotional triggers)  
6.10 Participants spoke about processes such as greed, vulnerability or 
desperation which led them to respond to the scam communications. 
This is exactly what is meant by visceral processes: appeals to strong 
motivational forces which reduce the depth at which people process a 
message, so they grab at the superficially attractive even when a little 
careful thought would have exposed it as the scam it was. For the most 
part people talked about strong money motivation, though whether they 
described it in self condemning terms (as greed) or in a way that gave 
them more self-justification (as a desperate need for money) varied:  
'I think I was tempted with the large amount of money, which was 
rather foolish, looking back, but I was tempted with that, and that 
was really what drew me, probably my greed.'  
'It just happened to come at a time when I was very vulnerable … It 






problems […] initially I wasn't going to, definitely I wasn't going to 
initially. I think it's pure desperation that made me do it. […] I 
suppose it does give you hope, it's the hope thing. You know, when 
you've got to hang on another couple of months and everything's 
going to be all right again.'   
'It's a desperation moment.'  
6.11 A common pattern of results in the interviews was that scam victims 
mentioned that they just did not care about the small amount of money 
they were asked to send in order to get a much bigger alleged prize or 
reward back. So simply the relation between input and output led to 
decision errors. Typical quotes for that tendency are the following: 
'I could afford to pay just a reasonably small amount and the 
maximum [prize] was, as I say, five thousand eight hundred and 
something, so then, as I could afford it, I thought 'Well what shall I 
do?' you know 'What do I do, I'll just spend it somewhere else, I 
might as well just spend it there.''  
'… so I'm going to go ahead and send the twelve quid because - 
even though I know this is not going to happen [meaning he knows 
he isn't going to get the prize money] - it's quite a small risk 
compared to the five thousand eight hundred quid that they're […] 
saying I've won'.   
'This was 'wow, this is going to work!' […] even if they were a 
hundred pounds, I think I still would have bought them.'   
Reduced motivation for information processing 
6.12 The most obvious way in which motivation for information processing 
was reduced was through induced scarcity. Some scam victims reported 
that they had the feeling that they had been offered something really 
scarce and unique, and that this impression led them to respond to the 
scammers. It is nearly always the case that the scam approaches seek to 
engender a sense of urgency in victims, and they often succeed. Typical 






[The scammers said] 'the deadline had already expired, but they 
were being nice to me and they were going to let me have a little 
longer over the deadline, because they hadn't sold up all their 
allocation. If I'd been able to take longer, before I had to finish the 
deal, yes, I would have made more extensive enquiries'.  
'If I'd taken time, I would've thought myself out of it' and 'the guy 
was almost casual like, you know, great, we'll take your money, but 
you need to be quick and if you don't get it back quickly, we'll return 
your cheque, because we won't be needing your money - it will be 
going out to those that are lucky enough to have their cheques 
received and become part of the action.'   
[The scammers said] 'this is the time to get in, and you know, 
you've really got to take the choice – your chance and jump in now, 
otherwise you'll miss it'. 
6.13 Another way scammers induced a state of reduced motivation for 
information processing was through the persistence of their approaches. 
A number of interviewees spoke of being bombarded with either letters 
or e-mails, and one even said:  
'Every other day, I got it through and I used to delete it and then I 
was just sitting there and I thought 'Oh, I'll just do it this time and I'll 
see what it's all about and…' Researcher: 'so almost like curiosity'   
Interviewee: 'It probably was curiosity, just to see what actually 
happened, because I kept getting it through and through, for ages 
and ages and ages.' 
And another,  
after 'numerous, numerous disappointments', she puts most of them 
in the bin now, but 'if it looks different […] then I think, Oh go on, 
I'll give it a go. I'm thinking 'what a fool', you know you're a fool, 
it's only rubbish again and I sort of think Oh God, not another one, 






The effect of an extremely large number of letters, announcing that 
he'd won a prize, on an elderly interviewee was to leave him very 
confused: 
'I must have written him I don't know how many… apart from 
placing the orders - but I don't get anywhere. I've finished now, I'm 
not getting any more, well I can't, I can't go on like this can I?' 
Mood regulation: Future reference points 
6.14 It is apparent from some of the interviews that the scam content put the 
interviewees into some kind of future state with positive emotional 
connotations. For example, prize draw pitch, sweepstake and lottery 
scammers use phrases like 'Imagine the positive feelings you will have 
when the money goes into your account' or 'Imagine which future 
dreams you can fulfil with the money you have won.'  
Typical quotes were: 
'I've got two sons, one is an invalid […] unfortunately, he's grown 
up, he's married with two children, got his own house and he's a 
complete invalid, confined to his house, so that would've made a 
great difference […] it would have been a real use to us. […] it could 
have helped our children and especially our invalid son, put them into 
easy street.'   
'It was the end of all my financial worries, if you like. […] then I 
could have said to the missus […] 'Right, pack the fostering in, we'll 
go buy a little house in Scotland and we're going.''  
'That amount of money gives you dreams, and you don't want them 
taken from you.'   
Commitment: Personal relationships and sunk costs  
6.15 A number of interview participants appeared to have felt some kind of 






induced by the scam having victims respond by telephone thereby opting 
into the correspondence or 'relationship' themselves.  
'I think the key thing is - if it was just […] ring this number, and 
somebody said 'I've got a great deal' - its like never in a month of 
Sundays. I think it was the fact that I signed up for something, the 
relationship, as it was, seemed to be going okay … when I'd rung up 
with a couple of questions […] people had answered the phone and 
given me answers and that went on for two or three months.'  
'I was phoning them (the scammers) all the time and they were 
phoning me back too. I was sort of playing it along, I was attempting 
to play them at the same game, so to speak, you know, phoning 
them and discussing with them – a little bit of a ding dong battle, a 
bit of cross banter.'  
'When you went on to a different person you'd put the phone down 
and then, you know, a couple of days would go by and you'd think 
about it all and you'd think 'Well, I'll, I'll ring […] the lottery', see? 
Well this is maybe twenty-four hours or so after, so you ring the 
lottery number.'  
'I did ring the number he gave me and I had to pay […] I think it was 
about fifteen hundred quid, I think to a Mrs Somebody up in London 
area […] I rang the woman.'   
6.16 Sunk cost effects also occurred. Some scam victims reported that they 
'threw good money after bad'. In other words, responses to the 
scammers were made because an amount of money has already been 
paid before:  
'I've already spent that, so […] there's no way I could get that back, 
so I'm going to go ahead and send the twelve quid.'   
'I didn't want to let the chance go, and yet I did, because I was - in 
my own mind I was in between the two, you know. I – I wanted it 






it' (talking about the time after he'd paid the scammers some money, 
before paying more).  
'He just wouldn't let go. […] It had built his hopes up so much and 
he was scared of them being dashed' (wife, of victim, after one 
amount of money was paid, husband wanting to pay a second 
amount).   
Identified Cognitive Processes 
Positive illusions: Illusions of control and avoidance of regret  
6.17 Many of the scam victims we interviewed indicated that they believed 
themselves to be protected against scam fraud by the law and 
government to an extent that was in fact unrealistic or simply 
impossible. These kinds of irrational beliefs often result from 
overestimations of controllability (positive illusion of control). That is, 
individuals experience more control over their environment than is 
actually the case (see also Taylor & Brown, 1988). Typical quotes in 
that direction were the following:  
'If they'd said I'd won something, and my name and address was 
there, and I didn't get anything, I could have gone to the Consumer 
Council or something, couldn't I, and complained about it, because it 
was a lie.'   
[…] 'legally bound to pay what they'd said they were going to pay. I 
said to my wife 'If I don't get this, I'm going to take them to Court', 
but I've got nobody to take to Court'.  
'Part of me thought well, it doesn't matter if it all goes pear shaped, 
I've got their address, I've got the telephone number, […] I've got 
nothing to worry about. I was absolutely gob smacked, but there's 
nothing you can do about it, because it's like 'well, what evidence 
have you got?''  
6.18 There was also a recurrent theme of simple overconfidence, an example 






confident that they would be able to detect a scam offer. It has been 
argued that scammers' techniques are seen to include encouraging this 
confidence in their own ability by getting the victim to convince 
themselves that they have researched and made a good decision 
(Pratkanis & Shadel, 2005; pp 95-103). 
6.19 Another theme that can be interpreted in terms of positive illusion is a 
'Regret' effect: Scam victims mentioned that they would have 
experienced feelings of regret and would never know if they might have 
won or been onto a good thing, if they did not respond to the scam 
offer. This can be seen as an example of the optimism bias, because it 
depends upon an unwillingness to discard the belief that the positive 
outcome could occur. Typical examples of regret discourse include:  
'I was trying really to not let this slip through my fingers, I suppose.'  
'[…] at least I've tried it and I won't keep thinking this will be a good 
way to earn money. Although I hesitated, in the end I felt, well, I've 
got to try it'. 
'It looked such a good thing on paper that I thought, well I've got to 
do it … it just hit you, you know.'  
'The prospect of a very high return rate, in a short period of time. 
They sold it high and at the time, naively I thought this was too good 
an offer to miss.'  
'It really was a sort of a bit of bait that you couldn't really resist.'   
'… and I should have kicked it out the door, but I didn't know, I 
wouldn't have known whether I'd lost the money or not, I would 
have said to my self, should I have had that money?' 
6.20 In addition, the high quality of the scam communications themselves (in 
terms of their presentation and design), organisation and persuasive 
abilities of the scammers on the telephone, induced interviewees to 
believe in the reliability and authority of the scam offers. Typical 






'I was a bit too trusting.' 
'It all looked so realistic, and they were so plausible.'   
'I think the real clincher was the fact that they gave us the 
information and [said] 'just look for yourself.'  I think they wanted 
me to – well, if he's going to be interested, he's going to have a look 
on the website. […] it looks a genuine website and I thought 'Oh 
that's just what they told me.''  
'The quality of the paper that it was written on made it look genuine 
[…] this was a nice envelope, a nice written letter, so it I suppose it 
had that feeling, I suppose in a way they drew me into opening the 
letter.' 
Background knowledge and overconfidence  
6.21 One of the most important antecedents featured in the interviews was 
previous knowledge about the area of scam. Counter-intuitively, but as 
predicted from the overconfidence effect, the background knowledge 
scam victims had about a specific area (for example, investment 
decisions) often led to them falling for a scam that addressed that 
specific area. Typical quotes in the interviews supporting this 
psychological process were the following:  
'I dealt with, as I say, the London Stock Exchange and Brokers in 
this country, and it didn't occur to me that [name of scammer] 
would be any other.'  
'I don't think I had doubts at the time, mainly because they were 
telling me about, as I say, the alternative […] fuel - I've been in the 
industry a number of years […]'   
'I have a little bit of knowledge about those things and there are 






Social influence and avoidance of social influence  
6.22 There is evidence from the interviews of social influence on 
interviewees' behaviour. Some scam victims reported that they 
responded because they believed in the (presumably faked) testimonials 
of other people. In an interesting inversion, many of the victims reported 
that they kept their tentative decision to respond in private in order not 
to be blamed or prevented from doing so by others (avoidance of social 
influence). Typical quotes for that process are the following:  
'I think I was attracted by the fact that it seems to be a popular 
thing to do' (work from home schemes).   
'All these people, that are saying that they'd made money out of it, 
can't be wrong.'  
'… and because it was a real person – well, I don't know if it was a 
real person – that was saying her story, and when I was reading that 
I was thinking 'Gosh, that's me''.  
'I didn't tell my husband […] he would probably have said 'Don't be 
such a damn fool', […] I didn't want him sticking his oar in.'  
Conclusions from interview analysis 
Text mining 
6.23 The text-mining analysis of the interview transcripts revealed frequently 
mentioned words that could be categorised with good agreement into 
conceptual groups corresponding to the sorts of psychological processes 
that are known to induce errors of judgement. Of these, quantitatively 
the most important in relation to falling for a scam were: 
• positive visceral cues, such as cost-benefit considerations, and 







• behavioural commitments (that is, triggered small steps towards the 
scammers, for example, by making a telephone call or sending a 
reply to a letter);  
• trust and security cues (which make the respondent believe that the 
scam is reliable and trustworthy); 
• social proof (that is, pretending that other 'happy' customers have 
already responded to the scam offer).  
6.24 All of these are readily related to particular categories of errors of 
judgement as outlined in Section 4 of this report. However, at this level 
of analysis, only a minority of categories of error are reflected in the 
results.   
6.25 In Study 2 (see Section 7) we used parallel techniques to investigate 
whether we find an emphasis within the scam communications 
themselves on the psychological cues for inducing the same subset of 
errors. In other words, we investigate whether the scammers include 
words that increase the likelihood of the particular decision errors that 
victims feel were salient in inducing them to fall for a scam. As a result 
of the text-mining of examples of scam communications we indeed 
found that scammers use most of the categories we found in the scam 
victims' interviews. This overlap could be found for the categories 
behavioural commitment, trust and security cues, and social proof. We 
did not find this overlap for positive visceral cues (although we see a 
partial overlap with the category 'personal approach', which is supposed 
to elicit positive emotions by cues of familiarity in the scam 
communication). 
6.26 The text-mining results of the interview transcripts also remind us that, 
in addition to reflecting on the behaviour of falling victim to a scam, the 
interviewees also discussed the consequences of becoming a scam 
victim. Thus we also found it necessary to introduce a category 'self-
talk', which mainly contained words relating to negative psychological 
impacts of falling for the scam, such as self-blame. This clearly shows 






esteem, because they blame themselves for having been so 'stupid' to 
fall for the scam. In other words, scams harm their victims not just 
economically but also psychologically. Some of the interviewees 
appeared to have been seriously damaged by their experience. 
Thematic analyses 
6.27 As with the text-mining, the thematic analysis of the interview texts 
revealed some but not all of the errors of judgement, and corresponding 
psychological processes, that we had expected might underlie falling for 
a scam. Unsurprisingly, qualitative analysis allowed a more detailed, 
though necessarily more subjective, picture to emerge, with a wider 
range of sources of errors of judgement implicated. However, it remained 
true that some sources of error were not observed to any noticeable 
extent, and others occurred only in specialised forms. The themes that 
seemed most important included the following: 
Motivational processes 
6.28 Langenderfer and Shimp's (2001) intuition that scammers use 
motivational manipulations to reduce the depth at which people process 
their communications is strongly supported. Scam communications 
addressed visceral processes, such as greed and anxiety; references to 
scarcity in the scam communications led victims to believe that it was a 
unique offer and reduced their motivation to think about it carefully; they 
often put the potential victims into positive future states; and they made 
them feel that they had made a commitment that they didn't want to 
turn back on (for example, by making a telephone call or responding to a 
specific e-mail address) or that would be lost if they didn't continue to 
comply (for example, victims decided to send more money, having sent 
some already, because otherwise the first amount would be wasted). 
Cognitive processes  
6.29 Both individual and social cognitions were involved in the interviewees' 
responses to the scam. At the individual level, positive illusions seem to 






some illusion of control, in that they felt that law enforcement agencies 
would protect their interests to an extent that was in fact unrealistic or 
simply impossible. Unrealistic optimism was a pervasive theme: the high 
value (often life-changing, medically, financially, emotionally or 
physically) that scam victims thought they could get by responding, 
made the money to be paid look rather small by comparison. The factors 
that seemed to be in play here were quite similar to those found in 
people's response to high value, low stake gambles such as genuine 
lotteries. In addition, several victims reported that they would have felt 
regret if they had not responded. And so far from serving as a protection 
against exploitation, pre-existing background knowledge about the area 
of scam content increased people's vulnerability, making victims 
overconfident in their own ability to judge that the scam offer was a real 
worthwhile offer. 
6.30 Errors of social cognition also played their part, but they operated with a 
complexity that we had not anticipated. Scam victims often felt that 
social proof (such as faked testimonials) increased the subjective validity 
of the scam approaches, and they reported increased trust in the scam 
because they believed that others had also responded to this offer. On 
the other hand people reported that they had hidden their decision to 
respond from other people, so in one sense they were seeking to avoid 
(benign) social influence.  
Conclusions 
6.31 In conclusion, overall, the interview results are readily interpreted in 
terms of a psychology of scams based on our established understanding 
of decision errors. Although a considerable range of errors of judgement 
are reflected in the interview material, both the text mining and the 
thematic analysis show that a number of them are particularly 
significant. These include the arousal of visceral motivations (emotional 
triggers); a range of effects relating to undue optimism and 
overconfidence, including the impacts of the sheer size of prize offered 
and of the victim's prior knowledge of the area in which the scam was 






6.32 Two aspects of the results, though not inconsistent with an analysis of 
why people fall for scams in terms of decision errors, raise new issues.  
First, a theme that emerged strongly was the size of the reward or prize 
for the scam, and its disproportion to the apparent cost of responding.  
The discourse, and the kinds of decision error, elicited by this factor had 
strong echoes of the what is found in the psychology of lotteries and 
other high prize, low win-probability gambling (see, for example, Thaler 
and Ziemba (1988); Rogers, 1998; Rogers & Webley, 2001). Secondly, 
our examination of social influence showed evidence of states of internal 
conflict in scam victims, where at one level they recognise the deceptive 
nature of the scam, and at another level, they are determined to persist 
in the behaviour that leads to loss. This raises the general point of 
people being 'in two minds' about the scam. At some level they suspect 
it is a scam so they do things that hide that knowledge from themselves 
or from others. This allies strongly with one of the most important 
classes of integrative theories of errors of judgement, the 'multiple self' 
models, which are particularly deployed in the intertemporal choice 
literature (for example, the 'planner/doer' model; see Thaler & Shefrin, 






7 STUDY TWO: TEXT MINING OF A SAMPLE OF SCAM 
COMMUNICATION MATERIALS 
7.1 The text-mining analysis in Study 1 started from the words that scam 
victims use in talking about their experience. The aim of Study 2 was to 
look at the words used in the scam communications themselves, to see 
whether they were mirrored in the discourse of the victims. We also 
wanted to investigate whether scammers use specific words and triggers 
that might create (or aim to create) a psychological situation 
characterised by increased probabilities of decision errors, and if they do 
so, whether the errors they are seeking to trigger are the ones that, 
according to our data, victims are most likely to make. These questions 
can be asked both in general and in connection with particular types of 
mass marketed scams.   
Method 
7.2 A large corpus of 583 scam communications (primarily mailings but also 
some emails and website content) was made available by the OFT. They 
represented 10 different types of scam communication: advance fee 
('419') scams (62 mailings and emails), international sweepstake scams 
(223 mailings), fake clairvoyants (46 mailings),  prize draw pitch scams 
(83 mailings), 'get rich quick' scams (20 mailings), bogus investment 
scams (6 mailings), bogus lottery scams (68 mailings and emails), 
'miracle' cures (11 mailings and website content), premium rate prize 
draw scams (35 mailings and inserts), and bogus racing tipsters (29 
mailings). The text mining software recognised words that were 
mentioned more than 10 times within at least 10 per cent of the 
documents of that subcategory. Two raters categorised all identified 
words by discussion into meaningful broader categories.  
7.3 The data were analysed in three ways:  
• an unweighted overall analysis, in which all 583 scam 








• a weighted overall analysis, in which all 583 scam communications 
were again used, but the ones from the less common types were 
weighted more heavily to get a more balanced picture 
• separate analyses of each type of scam. 
7.4 All the analyses were carried out for individual words used.  For the 
unweighted overall analysis and the subcategory analysis, words were 
also sorted into categories corresponding to key concepts, chosen partly 
by inspection of the frequent words, but also on the basis of the kinds of 
errors of judgement that might be relevant to falling for a scam, as 
outlined in Section 4 of this report. Category names were largely based 
on the conclusions from Section 4. 
7.5 Further details of the three analysis methods are given in Annexe D. 
Results and discussion 
Overall analyses 
7.6 Tables 2a and 2b show the results of the overall word-level analyses, 
reporting the words that occurred most frequently in each analysis.  
Although there are some differences (partly explicable in terms of the 
very high representation of international sweepstake scam mailings in 
the sample) the two types of analysis show general agreement about the 
main features of the content of the scam communications. Clearly, 
however, a number of the commonest words are near synonyms, and 
these had very high co-occurrence rates. It follows that the concept-level 
analysis is more likely to be illuminating, and the broad similarity 
between the unweighted and weighted analyses seen in Tables 2a and 
2b gives some reassurance that, although categorisation can only be 
applied to the unweighted sample of scam communications, the analysis 






Table 2a Study 2: 20 most frequently occurring words in scam 
communication materials, across the entire corpus of 
communications regardless of type  
 Word Rank Frequency  
 prize 1 3942  
 cheque 2 2597  
 cash 3 2314  
 money 4 2063  
 winner 5 1849  
 form 6 1695  
 number 7 1592  
 order 8 1380  
 time 9 1374  
 payment 10 1288  
 claim 11 1253  
 amount 12 1122  
 document 13 1087  
 return 14 1041  
 date 15 987  
 address 16 951  
 life 17 870  
 fee 18 810  
 information 19 790  








Table 2b  Study 2: Ranks of frequencies of occurrence of scam 
types (20 most frequently occurring words), adjusting for the 
different numbers of scams of different types available 
 Word Rank  
 money 1  
 cash 2  
 offer 3  
 cheque 4  
 guarantee 5  
 life 6  
 information 7  
 pay 8  
 order 9  
 prize 10  
 return 11  
 claim 12  
 payment 13  
 risk 14  
 bank 15  
 amount 16  
 letter 17  
 sum 18  
 time 19  
 work 20  
 
7.7 The words placed in each category are listed in Annexe D. The 
commonest categories were:  
• behavioural commitment (occurring in 98 per cent of documents 
[scam communication materials]): words related to the need for the 







• size of prize (97 per cent): words concerning the relationship 
between financial input and output, making the input appear 
negligible. 
• trust and security (97 per cent): words aimed to increase subjective 
trust in the scam offer, for example, by referring to authorities and 
official institutions.  
• Induced scarcity (97 per cent): words relating to the time-limited 
nature of the offer, the uniqueness of the opportunity. 
• emotional triggers (93 per cent): words likely to elicit visceral 
processing, for example, by referring to positive emotional 
experiences in the future when the recipient receives his or her prize 
or product. 
• sunk cost effect (64 per cent): words relating to the risk of loss if 
further action is not taken. 
• overconfidence (54 per cent): words apparently aimed to induce an 
unreasonable degree of confidence in the recipient. 
• regret effect (52 per cent): words referring to negative feelings 
recipients would have if they did not claim the prize or offer.  
7.8 Co-occurrence rates were almost entirely predictable from the 
occurrence rates for the individual concepts (see Figure 1). This implies 
that there are no important clusterings of these categories: they seem to 











Figure 1: Study 2 
Web graph for co-occurrence of concepts in the data-mining of scam materials, 
all categories, showing the 10 most frequently occurring concepts only.  It can 
be seen that the co-occurrence frequencies (shown by thickness of lines) are 
closely predicted by the concept frequencies (shown by size of dots).  This 
pattern implies that there are no strong clustering of concepts, so that the 






7.9 There is a striking correspondence between this list of categories and the 
types of errors of judgement that were mentioned by interviewees in 
Study 1. The obvious inference is that scammers are targeting potential 
victims' weaknesses with depressing accuracy. However, there are two 
alternative interpretations. It could be that the victims of current scams 
are just that subset of the population who are vulnerable to the particular 
kinds of triggers that scammers are currently using; or it could be that 
people would be vulnerable to any manipulation whatever, and so they 
report being affected by the manipulations that are most prevalent in 






when examining correlational data, and can only be resolved by a more 
experimental approach, as is attempted in Study 3 and more fully in 
Study 4. 
Subcategories of scam 
7.10 Table 3 shows all the words that occurred within the top 20, counting 
the number of documents in which the word occurred at least once 
rather than total occurrences, in at least one of the 10 types of scam.  
There were 126 such words, indicating quite wide divergence in content 
between the scam types. The actual numbers of documents of each 
scam type within which each of these words occurred are tabulated in 
Annexe D.  A small set of words were found within the top twenty for 
at least half the scam types: money (in 9 out of 10), cash, cheque, 
information and winner(s) (all in 9 out of 10). On the other hand, a total 
of 79 words were found in the top 20 for only one scam type. Table 3 
separates these 'unique' words for each type of scam from the 
'common' words, those that occurred within the top 20 for more than 
one type of scam. Of course, the 'unique' words may not have been 
truly unique, since they may have occurred at low frequencies in other 
scam types. 
7.11 Nonetheless, Table 3 provides a convenient thumbnail sketch both of the 
general content of the scam communications and of the specific content 
of each type. It seems likely that if an incoming scam communication 
could be filtered for these words (as is practical automatically for email), 
it could not just be recognised as a scam, but placed within a particular 
scam type with a fair degree of confidence.  However the present 
research does not allow us to say what the false positive rate of such a 
filter would be, and bearing in mind that scammers use many techniques 







Table 3  Study 2: 'Common' and 'Unique' words among the 20 most 
common words for each scam type   
'Common' words were those that were in the top 20 for more than one scam 
type, 'Unique' words those that were in the top 20 for one type only.  For some 
types more than 20 words are included because several words had tied 






'Common' words (in order of the 
number of scam types they are 
found in) 
'Unique' words (in order of the 
number of documents within this 
scam type they are found in) 
advance fee 
scams (62) 
Money, information, work, call, 
address, fund, bank, name, sum, 
investment, business 
Account, kin, death, friend, 
person, details, country, 





Money, cash, cheque, winner(s), 
prize, order, form, return, 
payment, amount, document, 
reply, signature, official, 
envelope, entry 






Money, cheque, life, offer, 
return, guarantee, sum, 
problems, game(s), envelope, 
chance 
Luck, happiness, people, help, 
change, future, secret, person, 




Money, cheque, information, 
winner(s), prize, order, form, 
claim, return, guarantee, 
payment, amount, document, 
reply, signature, official, game(s) 






Money, cash, cheque, 
information, order, life, offer, 
work, home, cost, contact, 
opportunity, company/ies, 
business, pay 
Start, hours, income, job, car, 






Table 3  Study 2: 'Common' and 'Unique' words among the 20 most 
common words for each scam type   
'Common' words were those that were in the top 20 for more than one scam 
type, 'Unique' words those that were in the top 20 for one type only.  For some 
types more than 20 words are included because several words had tied 






'Common' words (in order of the 
number of scam types they are 
found in) 
'Unique' words (in order of the 
number of documents within this 






Money, cash, information, life, 
work, call, price, bank, profit, 
investment, home, risk, 
company/ies, pay 
Letter, millionaire, report, 
market, investors, share, stock, 




Money, cash, winner(s), prize, 
address, claim, payment, 
number, fund, telephone, 
contact, promotion(s) 
Fax, batch, lottery, agent, 
program, congratulations, 





Money, order, life, offer, work, 
guarantee, price, time, problems, 
results, risk 
Effects, refund, trial, body, 
health, loss, capsules, doctors, 




Cash, cheque, winner(s), prize, 
call, address, form, claim, 
number, name, telephone, cost, 
promotion(s), entry 
Awards, code, allocation, 





Money, information, winner(s), 
offer, price, time, profit, results, 
opportunity, chance 
Horse, bet, service, racing, 
clients, members, questions, 
rate, bookmakers, race (10) 
 
7.12 A total of 31 concepts were used to group the words within the various 
scam types (however one of these was 'content-specific information', 






categories were required for each type of scam. With this higher level 
analysis, more of the content could be seen as common between types: 
the total number of concepts that were unique to a single type was 15, 
and the number of such unique concepts required varied from zero to 
four across the scam types. Table 4 lists the common and unique 
concepts found in each type of scam; a full listing of the proportions of 
scam communication materials of each type involving each type of 






Table 4  Study 2: 'Common' and 'Unique' concepts found in 
more than 25 per cent of documents for each scam type 
'Common' concepts were those found in over 25 per cent of documents 
of more than one scam type 'Unique' concepts those that were in over 25 
per cent of documents for one type only.   
Scam type  'Common' concepts (in order of 
the number of scam types where 
they occur) 
'Unique' concepts (in 
order of the number 
of documents within 





benefit, authority, commitment, 
transaction/trading, social, 






benefit, contact, authority, 
payment, emotion, commitment, 
content, personal 






benefit, payment, emotion, 
commitment, social, life/well-
being/health, positive future, 








benefit, contact, authority, 
payment, emotion, commitment, 
personal approach/selection, terms 
and conditions 
none 
get rich quick 
scams  





contact, payment, emotion, 













Table 4  Study 2: 'Common' and 'Unique' concepts found in 
more than 25 per cent of documents for each scam type 
'Common' concepts were those found in over 25 per cent of documents 
of more than one scam type 'Unique' concepts those that were in over 25 
per cent of documents for one type only.   
Scam type  'Common' concepts (in order of 
the number of scam types where 
they occur) 
'Unique' concepts (in 
order of the number 
of documents within 





benefit, authority, emotion, 
content, life/well-being/health, 
positive future 
timescale of benefit, 
weight, sexuality 
premium rate 
prize scams  
benefit, contact, content competition, effort 
Bogus racing 
tipster scams  





Concepts are abbreviated as follows: 
 
Benefit: Size of prize or other benefit 
Authority: Authority, trust, security 
Contact: Get in touch / contact modalities  
Payment: payment modalities 
Emotion: emotional triggers 
Commitment: behavioural commitment  
Content: specific information about the field of the scam (differs between 
types) 







7.13 The four concepts that emerge in almost every example of almost every 
type of scam are: 
• the size of prize or other benefit 
• contact methods and triggers to get in touch 
• authority, trust, and security 
• payment methods. 
7.14 The emphasis on the size of prize or other benefit, and on authority, 
trust,  and security are clearly aspects of the persuasive communication.  
But the emphasis on contact modalities and triggers to get in touch, and 
on payment modalities have a more pragmatic intent: once a recipient 
has decided to respond to a scam, that decision still has to be turned 
into a specific form of practical action in order for the person to become 
a victim.  In a search for the techniques of persuasion used by 
scammers, there is a risk of over-interpreting what are purely practical 
aspects of the communication. 
7.15 Despite a high degree of commonality in the content of the different 
kinds of scam, there are also some obvious differences. The focus on 
the individual recipient as having been selected as a winner is specific to 
the deceptive lottery-sweepstake-prize draw pitch group. While it is more 
or less essential to such scams, there is no reason why personalisation 
could not be used in many other types, but in the sample used here it 
rarely was. Advance fee scams and clairvoyants/psychics rely more 
heavily than other types on social relationships, though of rather 
different kinds in the two cases: in advance fee scams, the scammer 
often tries to build a relationship of apparent mutual co-operation with 
the victim, whereas fake clairvoyants and other psychics tend to try to 
build a relationship of emotional dependence in which they play on the 
good or bad outcomes for the victim that they can foresee (or even bring 
about). Although appeals to authority are common to many kinds of 
scam, they do not play such an important role in fake clairvoyant, get 
rich quick, bogus investment or premium rate prize draw scams. The 






rate prize draw scams, where it is indeed not needed – victims are 
encouraged to respond by making the phone call or sending a text, 
which in fact constitutes payment, though in the nature of the scam, 
this is not made explicit. Some scam types seem to need more 
explanation of the content than others, where recipients' familiarity can 
safely be assumed.   
7.16 As with the word-level analysis, at the conceptual level much of the 
unique content of particular scam types seems to be contingent on what 
they are about rather than representing persuasive techniques unique to 
a particular scam type. However there was some indication of such 
specialisation. For example, requests to maintain confidentiality (which 
would prevent victims from being warned about a scam) are 
characteristic of advance fee scams, while scarcity and uniqueness 
appeals are characteristic of fake clairvoyant scams.   
7.17 These differences in content between scam types suggest that there is 
in some sense a culture among scammers, as there is among legitimate 
advertisers. Either by modelling themselves on legitimate equivalents, or 
by copying earlier scams, scammers produce material that 'looks right'.  
This does mean that the public can learn about particular kinds of scam, 
and successfully avoid them, but that fact carries a vulnerability: a 
creative new scam message is likely to be disproportionately successful.  
It is notable that most of our interviewees reported that they were aware 
of the dangers of scams before they became victims, but they were not 
aware of the particular type of scam that they fell for. 
7.18 The word-level text mining does suggest that the content of scams in 
general, and each particular kind of scam, can be recognised with fair 
accuracy by relatively crude word-counting procedures. This implies that, 
properly used, current spam mail filtering procedures probably could 
remove many scam messages, at least from the email stream. It is 
possible that websites linked to scam communications could also be 
recognized and blocked algorithmically. Obviously tests would be needed 
to establish the false positive rates of such filters, but the content of 
scams does seem to be sufficiently stereotyped for there to be a 






8 PROFILES OF DIFFERENT SCAM TYPES 
 
8.1 Putting the results of Studies 1 and 2 together, as well as a further 
review of the corpus of scam material provided by the OFT, we can now 
provide pen pictures of some of the commonest types of scam. We 
focus especially on the specific psychological techniques that seem to be 
being used in these types. As will quickly become evident, all types of 
scam have something in common, and features that we describe as 
typical of one type may well turn up in others from time to time. But 
despite this overlap, the most typical examples of different kinds of 
scam do differ, and some kinds of scam have quite distinct 
'personalities'. Our assignments of psychological techniques to scam 
types are necessarily subjective, and would need to be confirmed by 
more extensive research, but they are sufficient to give an idea of the 














Advance fee ('419') scams: What are they? 
8.2 Consumers receive a letter, fax or email from someone who says they 
need help in transferring money overseas, usually US$10-20 million.  
Typically, the writer claims to be a senior government official, an 
accountant with a state owned corporation, or perhaps a relative or 
lawyer of a deposed or dead politician.  
8.3 The writer will tell the recipient he needs to transfer his cash to a bank 
in their country, and that if the recipient lets him use his or her bank 
account they can keep a big slice for themselves, usually 25 or 30 per 
cent. 
8.4 If the recipient replies and gives banking and personal details, they will 
be sent fake bank statements and similar documents all intended to 
prove that the money exists and is heading their way. The scammers will 
use the information given them to empty the victim's bank account or 
might convince them to send cash up front by money transfer.  
8.5 There are other variations on advance fee scams, such as where the 
scammer poses as a charitable organisation soliciting donations to help 
the victims of a natural disaster, regional conflict, or epidemic or where a 
scammer poses as a terminally ill mother, poor university student, or 
other down-on-their-luck person and simply begs the victim for money 
for college tuition, to sponsor their children, or a similar ruse. 
Psychological techniques 
8.6 Although Advance Fee scam communications are very common (the OFT 
research on the impact of mass marketed scams, 2006, estimates that 
70,000 UK consumers fall victim to such scams every year), we did not 
have any interviewees who had fallen victim to this kind of scam.  
However, the psychological techniques involved are visible from the 
text-mining analysis of the materials that people are sent, and the 
accounts of victims that have already been published. Three techniques 







• triggering visceral processing by reference to a large sum of money 
and by a personalised approach; 
 
• norm activation through an appeal for help; 
 
• perception of authority.  
 
Triggering visceral processing by reference to a large sum of 
money 
8.7 As in almost every kind of scam, a key part of the process is to focus 
victims' attention on a very large sum of money, so as to cut out a more 
considered appraisal that would lead them to recognise the inherent 
implausibility of the offer. In Advance Fee scams, the sums are invariably 
enormous, and the wording is designed to re-emphasise just how huge 
they are: 
'Approximately five years ago, an investor, now deceased invested a 
total of US$12.5M (Twelve Million, five hundred thousand United 
State Dollars.' 
'… over 10 million United States Dollars'. 
'… an abandoned sum of $15 million U.S.A. dollars (fifteen million 
U.S.A. dollars)'. 
8.8 In addition, Advance Fee scams often try to make out that the victim 
has been personally selected to receive the benefit of the supposed 
transaction, and also to give the help that it requires: 
'I came to know of you in my private search for a reliable and 
reputable person to handle the confidential transaction.' 






'Having made a very frenetic and exhaustive search for any family 
member that would lay claim to this fund, I decided to take my 
chance with you.' 
Norm activation through an appeal for help 
8.9 In Advance Fee scams, the scammers represent themselves as needing 
the help of the victim in some way. The circumstances causing the sum 
of money to be available are usually such as to excite some feeling of 
sympathy, such as a death, government persecution, or loss of a 
position. In some cases the scammer represents themselves as being in 
trouble or danger: 
'I am writing from the hospital, therefore this mail is very urgent as 
you can see that I am going home. I was told by the doctor that I 
was poisoned and got my liver damaged and can only live for some 
months.' 
'Sarah is an orphan, I adopted her and she is only 17 years old now. 
I want you to take her along with you to your country...'. 
'Here, is my reason for contacting you, I need to bring my family and 
that of Mr. Olds out of Zimbabwe as soon as possible before any 
more harm is done to them.' 
'I solicit the assistance of men and women of good will to help me, 
so that I can transfer this money out of here for charity and if 
possible receive medical treatment as soon as possible and without 
delay before this cancer will take my life.' 
So text-mining reveals that in this kind of scam, unlike others, words 
like 'kin', 'death', 'friend', and 'person' occur frequently. 
 
Perception of authority 
8.10 Almost invariably, the person who ostensibly requires the victim's help is 






authority or at least in a position where they would be able to facilitate 
the alleged offer, as people tend to obey authorities: 
'I work as a senior investment consultant for the …. Investment Ltd.' 
'I am Chen Hsui Fei, Principal Assurance manager for the  …. 
Commercial Bank.' 
'I am Ben Coroma, the Head of file Department in …. development 
bank.' 
'I am Barister Nestor Ninko.' [misspelling in original] 
8.11 Other notable features of many Advance fee scams are the stressing of 
urgency of response (thereby reducing the motivation for information 
processing) – for example: 'I urgently hope to get your response as soon 
as possible'; 'We would like to get your decision to this proposal as soon 
as possible'; 'we should act swiftly on this' and the stressing of the 
need to keep the offer confidential, most probably to stop the intended 
victim talking to family and friends who might convince them it was a 
scam (avoidance of social influence) – for example 'Please be informed 
that this is very confidential and should be a top secret'; 'we are 
convinced that there is no risk element, as long as both maintain strict 














International sweepstake scams: What are they? 
8.12 Consumers will receive an official looking letter notifying them that they 
have already won a large cash prize in a sweepstake contest. The 
misleading impression is given that to claim the 'prize' the recipient must 
either send a 'processing' fee or purchase some merchandise. In the 
small print on the reverse of the notification, the 'Official Rules' will 
explain that the recipient is only being offered the opportunity to enter a 
sweepstakes with a very small chance of winning the major cash payout 
and can enter for free, or that the recipient is simply paying for a 'report' 
that collates details of current sweepstake promotions. 
Psychological techniques 
8.13 Three main psychological techniques can be seen in these scam 
communications: 
• perception of authority; 
 
• triggering visceral processing by reference to a large sum of money 
and by a personalised approach;  
 
• reducing motivation for information processing, by stressing the 
urgency to respond. 
 
Perception of authority 
8.14 The most striking feature of these scams is their effort to emulate 
official or financial communications in the belief that people tend to obey 
perceived authority – which indeed goes so far that people familiar with 
real official communications would probably be made suspicious. The 
letters are littered with coats of arms, official seals, variations of 
typeface, serial numbers filled in different colours and sizes, watermarks, 
vouchers in the form of cheques, barcodes, computer readable numbers, 
mimeographed signatures, imitated rubber stampings, convoluted 
phrasing (for example 'This original document can serve as proof of non-






'Privileged Privacy Rights Contract Document') and every kind of official-
sounding verbiage (for example 'This Leaf Is Officially Affixed To Serve 
As Record of Identification…; 'Official claims entry document'; and 'This 
is an official awards communication'). 
Text-mining reveals the frequency with which words like 'document', 
'signature', and 'official' are used. 
 
Triggering visceral processing by reference to a large sum of 
money and by a personalised approach 
8.15 In common with many kinds of scam, very large sums are mentioned, 
and indeed often put on cheque-like forms: examples are £5,500, 
£30,000, £264,000, £711,000, £1,125,000, £1,500,000. In addition, 
however, there is characteristic use of terms designed to induce 
certainty such as 'approved', 'now established', 'guaranteed', 'you are 
100 per cent guaranteed to receive', 'confirmed winner', 'verified and 
confirmed' 'Everything is cleared by corporate officers for immediate 
shipment to claimant' and 'Please try to be present when an authorised 
government delivery courier arrives'. 
8.16 As well as the use of large sums, these scams are almost always 
personalised, with frequent use of the recipient's name and of 'you' 
throughout the scam text linked to the winning of monies.  
Reducing motivation for information processing, by stressing 
the urgency to respond 
8.17 Almost every example of this kind of scam contains text like the 
following: 
'… don't wait'. 
'… without any further delay'. 







'It is vital to have this matter finalized within the next 14 days.' 
'… within 10-12 days of receipt'. 
'Please reply immediately.' 















Fake clairvoyant scams: What are they? 
8.18 Consumers receive a letter from a so-called psychic or clairvoyant 
promising to change the course of their life forever such as bringing 
good fortune - for a fee. Sometimes these mailings are aggressive in 
tone, saying something bad will happen to the recipient or their relatives 
if they do not send money to purchase a lucky talisman, crystal, amulet 
or a set of numbers. Although they are sent out in their thousands, the 
mailings are personalised to make it look as if the recipient has been 
specifically chosen and is personally known to the sender. 
Psychological techniques 
8.19 Four psychological techniques are particularly evident in these scam 
communications: 
• reducing motivation for information processing, by stressing the 
urgency to respond; 
 
• triggering visceral processing; unusually, in these scams the 
technique is sometimes by inducing fear, though reference to large 
sums of money are also common, and personalised approaches are 
also evident; 
 
• perception of authority; 
 
• liking and similarity. 
 
Reducing motivation for information processing, by stressing 
the urgency to respond 
8.20 Clairvoyant scam communications often contain phrasing designed to set 
up deadlines for action. Often this is used as a headline, and then 
reinforced in the body of the letter, for example: 






'… money for you… between 24 February and 23 April'. 
'What I have just discovered while reading your birth date urged me 
to trigger the 'RED ALERT PLAN' VERY URGENTLY.' 
'In exactly 29 days, you will be given an exceptional opportunity to 
change your life.' 
Triggering visceral processing  
8.21 Unlike most scams, which tend to work by offering people a dream 
positive outcome, a significant proportion of clairvoyant scams contain 
what are in effect threats – though sometimes the threat is of losing a 
large sum that the victim does not actually have, and will 'lose' only in 
the sense of not gaining it from the supposed clairvoyant benefactor. 
8.22 Outright threats do occur, for example: 
'You could be severely abused over the next few days and 
WITHOUT MY PROTECTION you could unknowingly become the 
victim of this time-space gap.' 
'Some people around you are not trustworthy.' 
'When the fateful date arrives… no one can predict what will happen 
to you.' 
As in the first example, these are invariably accompanied by a promise 
that the 'clairvoyant' will avert the danger – for a suitable sum.   
8.23 Alternatively, the clairvoyant holds out the possibility of a large gain: 
'Would a 'helping hand' or 10,000 to 100,000 Pounds be of any 
interest to you?' 
'Order form for an immediate return of luck that should trigger a 






'You have the possibility of living a completely new life… filled with 
comfort, luxury, abundance, money, encounters, beauty, love and 
maybe even receiving a double fortune of £1,200,000.00.' 
8.24 Most of these promised gains revolve around games of chance, because 
the 'clairvoyant' claims to be able to relieve psychic forces that are 
causing the victim to suffer bad luck. The text mining analysis picks up 
these themes, with a high frequency of words like 'offer', 'game(s)', 
'chance', and 'luck'. 
8.25 The theme of current bad luck is a common one, and it is clear from the 
content of the scam communications that the scammers are hoping to 
find victims whose lives are currently disappointing or sad. That can be 
seen in one of our interviews: 
'I had a problem with my pension I was getting because I was sixty, 
and I had so many problems what with my mum dying and one thing 
and another, and we lost our holiday because we didn't have 
insurance for my mum and then I saw it advertised … and she 
started sending me papers and I sent twenty pounds first of all; I 
thought that's not too bad, you know; and then next month another 
one came in – thirty pounds – and then it gets to forty pounds you 
know.' 
'And it felt like you were getting something in return when you sent 
that?' 
'Not really, no. Just bits and pieces, all sheets of paper full of what 
she wrote to tell me I would be having: getting extra money coming 
in and one thing and another, and what will happen on certain dates 
of the month, forecasting about January up to July; she's saying I'm 
going to be happy and I'm going to get all these extra benefits and 
everything and certain days some money will come through the post 







Perception of authority   
8.26 A few fake clairvoyant scam letters include some of the same symbols 
of authority that scams such as deceptive international sweepstakes 
use. More frequent, however, is the use of the jargon of supposed 
psychic and occult activity. Text-mining detects heavy use of concepts 
such as spirituality and religion, esoteric symbols, supernatural objects, 
astrology and occultism. For example: 
'The planets in your Astral Theme … have created a time-space gap 
in your Astral Sky.' 
'You are a Solitary Cosmic Soul … the 3 of us are going to create a 
Telepathic Chain of Influence'. 
'The Circle of Three Moons generates phenomenal luck …' 
8.27 In addition, however, fake clairvoyant scams invariably claim to come 
from an individual psychic, usually identified with a photograph 
(sometimes benign, sometimes sinister) and a series of supposed 
qualifications. Examples of such alleged qualifications include: 
'Extra-Lucid Clairvoyant'     
'clairvoyant cosmologists' 
'birth medium and parapsychologist' 
'International Medium, Confirmed parapsychologist' 
'Medium of international standing' 
'Experts in Telepathic Research and Analysis'. 
Liking and similarity 
8.28 A particular characteristic of clairvoyant scam communications is the 
attempt to claim personal knowledge of the victim and to be acting out 






heavily personalised with the use of victims' names. Text-mining 
analysis detects concepts such as benefit, well-being and health, and 
positive futures, with words such as 'life', 'happiness', 'help', 'secret', 
'friend' and 'gift' being common.  Examples include: 
'I wanted to warn you immediately… Trust me, for I want only your 
happiness.' 
'I have been in close telepathic contact with you.' 
8.29 Some even claim a relationship with the victim: 
'My nephew… called me three weeks ago and told me, 'Aunt Rose, 













Prize draw pitch scams: What are they? 
8.30 Consumers receive mailings notifying them of a large cash prize win. The 
mailings give the impression that to receive the prize, the consumer has 
to make a purchase of a product from an accompanying catalogue. In 
fact the recipient is only being offered the opportunity to enter a prize 
draw pitch with a very small chance of winning the major cash prize and 
can in fact enter without placing any order.    
Psychological techniques 
8.31 These scams are very similar to the international sweepstake scams 




• triggering visceral processing by reference to a large sum of money 
and by a personalised approach; 
 
• reducing motivation for information processing, by stressing the 
urgency to respond. 
 
Authority 
8.32 Although there is substantial overlap with the international sweepstake 
scams, and some of these scam communications do seem to be 
emulating official or financial communications, the kind of authority 
being claimed is sometimes subtly different – leaning towards language 
that might be used in a legitimate lottery, for example. But some of the 
same sorts of language that appear in the international sweepstake scam 
communications are used, for example 'Confidential letter', 'Solemn 
Declaration of Official Prize Delivery', 'Official Department'; 'Official 
Procedure'; 'It's now official, you really have won...' and so forth. Text-
mining reveals the frequency with which words like 'guarantee', 






Triggering visceral processing by reference to a large sum of 
money and by a personalised approach 
8.33 Compared with the international sweepstake scams, these scam 
communications do not use such huge sums of money; indeed, in our 
sample corpus, a substantial proportion used the same supposed prize 
amount of £10,000, and most of the others used lower sums. Although 
the sums are not so vast, they are still heavily emphasised, and text-
mining of the content of the scam mailings reveals the heavy use of 
terms like 'money', 'cheque', 'winner', 'prize', and 'payment'. 
8.34 The same characteristic use of terms designed to induce certainty is 
found as in the international sweepstake scams, with words like 'Unique 
confirmed winner', 'without the slightest doubt', 'undeniable and definite 
proof', 'you have already won' 'definitely intended for you', and 'your 
recognised status as WINNER has been formally and fully validated'.  
One victim said: 
'I had this letter come through and it quite categorically stated that 
they were congratulating me on being the sole winning, sole holder 
of the winning number and I had won five thousand eight hundred 
quid, all right, so I thought well and I read it and read it and read it 
and I thought there is no way they worded this in a round about sort 
of way or incorrectly so it it's got to mean what they actually say 
and they're saying that I've won this five thousand eight hundred 
quid - so I thought okay.' 
8.35 Personalisation is again a common theme, with the potential victim's 
name being entered into the scam text at every opportunity. 
Reducing motivation for information processing, by stressing 
the urgency to respond 
8.36 The attempts to induce urgency are almost more clamorous than in other 






'If you do not reply you will definitely lose your prize – Reply awaited 
within 8 days.' 













Get rich quick scams: What are they? 
8.38 There are at least two kinds of these scams. 
8.39 In the first, a homeworking or business opportunity is advertised in a 
local newspaper, shop windows, lamp posts, on the internet or in a 
letter which claims to offer a quick way to make money without having 
any qualifications, skills or expertise. This could, for example, allegedly 
involve taking advantage of a money making system or business 
opportunity that will quickly generate a large income, or involve 'stuffing 
envelopes' from home in return for a payment per envelope. The catch is 
that before starting any work the victim has to pay money up front.  
After this money has been paid the victim finds that there is no real 
work and they may, for example, be told to place similar advertisements 
to attract other people into the scam. Or they may find that the claims 
made about income earned from a money making scheme are completely 
unrealistic. 
8.40 The second kind are pyramid selling schemes. Consumers are asked to 
pay to become a member and are promised large commission earnings if 
they recruit others to the scheme. But, in order for every member to 
make money, there would need to be an endless supply of newcomers.  
Psychological techniques 
8.41 We can see at least three major psychological techniques at play here, 
through victim interviews and analysis of the corpus of scam 
communications: 
• triggering visceral processing by emphasising a high reward for little 
effort; 
 
• liking and similarity; 
 








Triggering visceral processing by emphasising a high reward 
for little effort 
8.42 Like most kinds of scam, these scam communications often try to 
narrow people's thought processes. As Table 3 shows, frequent words 
in the scam materials include 'money', 'cash', 'cheque', 'offer' and 
'opportunity'. 
8.43 With some money making scams the visceral effect of the huge rates of 
return offered shuts down the victim's broader processing:  
'You could make a small fortune… in your morning coffee break.' 
'He got paid over £76,000 for just 98 minutes work.' 
'You will earn £50,000 in the next 60 days.' 
'I banked over £506,297.98 in just 5 days.' 
'Your private gold-mine… to provide each of our members with 
£1,000,000'. 
'How do you fancy retiring on £200,000+ per year.' 
8.44 However, with some work from home scams the headlines do not 
involve staggeringly high sums of money: 
'Earn £130 per hundred.' 
'Earn £1.30 per envelope' (a different scheme, though the identity of 
rates is not a coincidence). 
'Well paid work you can do at home.' 







In this kind of homeworking scam, what is appealing to the victim is not 
a huge headline sum but rather the possibility of getting a surprisingly 
good rate of return under conditions where it would normally be hard to 
work at all. The return does not need to be extraordinarily high, and 
indeed it might be counterproductive for the scammer if it was. Unlike, 
for example, prize draw pitch scams, the offer being made in this type 
of homeworking scam is not intrinsically implausible - they are being 
offered pay for work done, superficially a reasonable proposition. 
Accordingly, the visceral cues are not as strong. This can be seen in one 
of our interviews: 
 
'Well, basically you get loads of e-mails through the internet saying 
earn money, work from home; I'm always trying to find different 
ways to earn more money but I don't really like laying anything out 
because, obviously you know they are scams.  So there was this one 
which said …free data entry, start earning dollars from day one, 
really easy to do … really easy step by step instructions, start 
earning money straight away, all you do is fill in coupons for 
companies and I thought, ‘Oh, this sounds quite good…’.  So I joined 
up, paid £17.50 and I got this set of instructions which was like 
twenty-five pages long, where you had to set up all these different 
accounts to be able to do what you're meant to do, which is like 
data entry work okay… Basically all it was … you then made an ad 
up, put it on another website and asked somebody to give you thirty-
two pounds for the privilege of doing it and then send them all the 
details that you had got from this company… it was like a pyramid 
thing… and I thought I'll give it a go, [but] it was just so hard to do 
that I sent them back a message saying, This is meant to be easy, 
can I have my money back.' 
Liking and similarity   
8.45 A particular feature of money making scams is the attempt to exploit 
liking and similarity. For example, the scammers describe themselves as 
having been in the same sort of situation as the intended victim: 






'… I literally did not have a penny to my name… my life was a 
mess'. 
'In … I lost my job.' 
'As a child I lived in a caravan and went to school on the local 
council estate.' 
'Of course, like you, I was very sceptical and didn't believe a word 
of it.' 
8.46 The scam communications may also include phrases that suggest to 
recipients that they are liked by the sender (which is also another form 
of personalisation): 
'You have been discreetly recommended by someone who considers 
you a valuable friend.' 
'It is not often that we allow others to join our group, but the 
flagging economy indicates that additional income is needed by many 
people like yourself.' 
Norm activation, exploiting people's desire to be in work and 
to be at home 
8.47 Homeworking scams take advantage of two norms at once. First, it is a 
very strong social norm that it is better to be in employment than not, 
and some of these scams go to considerable lengths to put themselves 
into the context of a normal job opportunity. The text-mining results 
show that words like 'work', 'company/ies', 'business', 'pay', 'start', 
'hours', 'income', and 'job', occur in a way that they do not in other 
scam types.  These schemes often exploit people who would have 
difficulty taking a conventional job, because of age, family 
commitments, or disability. To such people, the idea of work that can be 
done from home often with no experience is therefore highly attractive: 
one advertisement suggests that you could do this work 'sitting at home 
in your pyjamas'. Secondly, quite apart from some people's need to 






associations of comfort, convenience, safety, pleasure and the ability to 
discharge domestic duties. This can be seen in one of our interviews: 
'I'd like to do work from home… so I've been looking round for some 
work to do… so, I've seen these adverts in this magazine, … there's 
loads, Working from Home filling envelopes and I've found out since, 
that every single one of them is a mail box…. I contacted a firm 
called ..., I gave my name on a recorded phone, then they sent a 
letter saying… send £35 and we'll knock it off your first Invoice.  So 
unfortunately, I never heard anything else.' 
8.48 Another feature of some get rich quick scams are the use of false 














Bogus investment scams: What are they? 
8.49 Consumers are contacted by letter, telephone or e-mail and offered the 
opportunity to invest money into things like shares, fine wine, 
gemstones, art or other 'rare' high value items. The promise is that these 
will rocket in value. But what is offered is often over-priced, very high 
risk and difficult to sell on. 
Psychological techniques 
8.50 The leading psychological techniques identified in respect of investment 
scams are: 
• exploiting background knowledge and overconfidence; 
 
• triggering visceral processing by emphasising high rewards. 
 
Exploiting background knowledge and overconfidence 
8.51 Previous research (for example, Consumer Fraud Research Group, 2006) 
suggests that victims of phoney investment schemes are typically people 
with some knowledge of investment, which may contribute to falling 
victim to the scam rather than protecting them as they overestimate 
their abilities to make good decisions in this area. This is reflected in the 
following quotes from victim interviews, although it should be noted that 
these relate to telephone scams rather than scam mailings. 
'I dealt with, as I say, the London Stock Exchange and Brokers in 
this country, and it didn't occur to me that [name of scammer] 
would be any other.'  
'I don't think I had doubts at the time, mainly because they were 
telling me about, as I say, the alternative […] fuel - I've been in the 






Triggering visceral processing by emphasising high rewards 
8.52 Our corpus of written investment scam communications is relatively slim 
because in the most characteristic cases (so called 'boiler room' share 
scams) the approach is made by phone. The high rewards that the 
scammers use to try to blind the victim to the schemes' flaws are not 
the capital sums so much as the rates of return. Some idea can be 
gleaned from the following quotes from postal scams in the investment 
area: 
'Does profit £6,740 (tax free) using £5,000 float appeal?' 
'A chance to make 110 per cent on your money by September.' 
'You could double… triple… maybe quadruple the value of your 
pension.' 
8.53 The high monetary rewards involved in these scams are reflected in the 
terms that occur in them frequently, like 'money', 'cash', 'price', 'bank' 
and 'millionaire'. Their investment context is also heavily emphasised, 
with words like 'profit', 'investment', 'company/ies', 'market', 'share', 
and 'stock'.  Frequently they seek to anticipate and neutralise any 
concern about the unusually high returns being offered, resulting in a 

















Bogus lottery scams: What are they? 
8.54 Consumers receive a letter, e-mail or telephone call telling them that they 
have won a major cash prize in a lottery. They will often be told to 
telephone a sales agent who will ask the victim to send money to cover 
administration, customs and taxes. The winnings do not exist and are 
never received.  
Psychological techniques 
8.55 The psychological techniques used are somewhat different from those in 
other types of prize draw pitch scams. They include: 
• triggering visceral processing by reference to winning very high 
prizes; 
 
• escalating commitment; 
 
• background knowledge and overconfidence; 
 
• perception of authority; 
 
• avoidance of social influence; 
 
• urgency to respond. 
 
Triggering visceral processing by describing very high 
winnings/prizes 
8.56 By their nature bogus lotteries describe winning very large sums of 
money to shut down the victim's broader processing: 
'Dear Winner… You have won the sum of EUR.1.000.000 {One 
Million Euros}.' 
'You have therefore been approved a lump sum payment of 






cash. This is from a total cash prize of EUR € 4,800,000.00 shared 
among the (Five international winners in this category). 
CONGRATULATIONS!' 
'You have therefore been approved for a lump sum payout of 
€785.51000 {SEVEN HUNDRED AND EIGHTY-FIVE THOUSAND 
FIVE HUNDRED AND TEN EUROS!) only in cash.' 
Correspondingly the text mining analysis detects concepts like benefit 
and payment, supported by high frequencies of words like 'money', 
'cash', and 'payment'. 
 
Escalating commitment 
8.57 A key distinguishing feature of this type of scam is that there is often no 
request for money in the initial communication. There is simply a request 
to contact an agent, and it is only when the victim does so that they will 
be asked for the 'processing fee', 'taxes' or 'release fee' which 
represents the scammer's profit. If they send one sum, they may well be 
asked for further, increasing sums. As a result, typical losses in such 
scams can be high, running into thousands of pounds.   
8.58 The scammer's need to get the victim to make contact is evident in the 
text-mining results through the frequent use of words like 'address', 
'telephone', 'contact', and 'claim'; the appeal to authority by terms like 
'security' and 'reference'; and the actual content of the scam by words 
like 'congratulations', 'winner(s)', 'prize' and 'promotion(s)'.   
8.59 The process of escalation, as well as the perception of authority from 
the scammer posing as a bank manager, can be seen in the following 
excerpt from one of our interviews: 
'A notification here on Millions Lottery International it all looks 
genuine… it says that you have to contact to begin your claim … 
you've got to contact your Agent… a Dr Lopez Foreign Services… 
So I phoned him first of all obviously and he said you've got to deal 






he was also very convincing and then he said you have to pay some 
money.  And I said 'Why do you have to pay money because I'm led 
to believe Lotteries don't tax things on things like this', and he said 
'Well if you were a resident of Spain you wouldn't have to pay the 
money'; it seemed feasible you know, I don't know the Spanish laws 
… he said, 'It's because it's in a Security Company', they put it in a 
Security Company in your name and it can't be got out… so I paid 
out… about £780… and then of course the old old story, when 
you've done that they come back to you a few days later and there's 
another reason to give more money.'   
8.60 This victim had doubts all along, but although he challenged what the 
scammers were telling him, discussed the matter with his sons (who 
immediately told him it was a known scam and produced evidence that it 
must be) and even contacted the Spanish Embassy (who also told him it 
was a scam) he went on to make a further two payments and lost a 
total of over £5,000. This can also be seen as 'chasing losses' or a 
'sunk cost' effect.   
Background knowledge and overconfidence 
8.61 Almost every one of the bogus lottery scam communications contains 
material that seems designed to exploit the victim's awareness of 
reputable lotteries. Some purport to involve Spanish lotteries, and there 
is wide public awareness in the UK that there are genuine lotteries in 
Spain (especially the annual 'El Gordo'). Others falsely claim to be part 
of the UK National Lottery, or involve well-known brand names in some 
way or use the names of popular charities – and again it is well known 
that charities commonly do use prize draws for fund-raising. This can 
also be seen as an attempt by the scammer to create a perception of 
authority.  
Perception of authority 
8.62 Although these scams are typically much less florid in their use of 
symbols of authority than the international sweepstake scams, and some 






of the style of official financial communications to try to establish a 
spurious authority. For example: 
'FROM THE DESK OF THE VICE PRESIDENT.' 
'Your fund is now deposited with the BANK and insured in your 
name.' 
'Three (3) certificates are to be issued to you by the Ministry of 
Interior, to back up your winning.' 
'Beneficiary's Declaration.' 
'Foreign Operations Manager.' 
8.63 Adding the figures for pence or cents after an enormous sum, as in the 
examples above, is typical, as is repeating in words a sum given in 
figures. Complex and official-looking claim or ticket numbers are 
frequently cited. 
Avoidance of social influence 
8.64 A number of these scams also stress the need to keep the offer 
confidential, most probably to stop the intended victim talking to family 
and friends who might convince them it was a scam (avoidance of social 
influence) – for example:  
'Any leakage of this winning notification leading in a double claim 
will cause you to forfeit your prize thus we advise you to keep this 
winning notification message confidential away from public notice to 
prevent double claims and impersonation until after 
remittance/payment to you.' 
'…. the release of your winning information to a third party (friends 
and family members inclusive) is absolutely ruled out as this will … 
give room to double claiming by a third party which is against the … 
Promotion Terms and Conditions. You are therefore advised to keep 






family members inclusive) until your winnings have been remitted to 
you'. 
'Due to false practices, we ask that you keep your award information 
strictly from public notice, until your claim has been processed and 
money remitted to your possession as this is part of our security 
protocol to avoid double claiming or unwarranted abuse of this 
program by unscrupulous individuals.' 
Urgency to respond 
8.65 Bogus lottery scams also stress the urgency to respond in order to 
reduce motivation for information processing. Every example of this kind 
of scam contains text like the following: 
'All winning prize must be claimed not later than 08th DEC... After 
this date, the funds will be returned to the MINISTERIO DE 
ECONOMIA Y HACIENDA as unclaimed.' 
'Being one of the lucky winners, we hereby contact you to claim 
your win quickly as this is a free email computer ballot bonanza 
lottery promotion. Failure to claim your winning will result to rollover 
or reversion of your winning sum. We also use this medium to notify 
you that the expiring or lapse date to claim your winning prize is on 
the 16TH DECEMBER …' 
'Note that there exists a periodic condition on all claims process; 
therefore you have limited time to claim your winnings. Failure to 
claim your winnings within the stipulated time frame will lead to the 
forfeiture of your winnings after which your winnings remitted back 
to the United Kingdom National Lottery Headquarters and will then 













Miracle health cure scams: What are they? 
8.66 Consumers receive a mailing or email promising a health 'miracle' such 
as easy weight loss without the need to diet or exercise. Other pills, 
lotions, creams and products will supposedly cure baldness, arthritis, 
cancer, impotency and other ailments. But it is unlikely that they have 
been properly tested or proven medically effective. Some might even be 
dangerous. 
8.67 The advertising often includes fake testimonials from 'satisfied 
customers', unsubstantiated claims about product effectiveness, false 
claims that the product has been clinically proven in trials, and a 
worthless 'money back' guarantee. 
Psychological techniques 
8.68 The most obvious psychological techniques in use in these scams are: 




• triggering visceral processing; 
 
• over-confidence effect. 
 
Social proof  
8.69 Social proof operates in these scams through the use of testimonials 
from supposedly satisfied customers, which in many cases form a large 
proportion of the (frequently bulky and professionally produced) mailings. 
The use of bogus testimonials is almost universal in these scam 
materials, frequently involving 'before' and 'after' statements and/or 







'I lost 64 lbs in 7 weeks – jealous friends accused me of having 
liposuction! – I didn't tell them [product name], is the secret to 
instant weight loss!' 
'Ever since I started taking [product name], my energy levels have 
increased and I am feeling a lot better throughout the day.' 
'All I can say is WOW! In less than a month (like you said) the pain, 
inflammation, and redness is all gone.' 
'For me it's a true miracle because I really thought I'd live my whole 
life in the skin of a 'fat person'. But now I can live the sort of life I 
thought I would never be able to enjoy Thank you so much!' 
8.70 As one of our interviews demonstrates, these fake testimonials can work 
in convincing recipients to respond: 
'It just put out that it worked well, what I wanted and because it 
was a real person (well, I don't know if it was a real person), that 
was saying her story, and when I was reading that I was thinking 
'Gosh that's me.'' and  
'God these could work' and that's what I wanted them for, to lose 
weight and get your libido back at the same time, it was like, 'Oh my 
gosh', and 'This is what you really want'. 
Perception of authority 
8.71 Authority is deployed in these scams through the use of false claims that 
the products are endorsed or supported by medical or scientific 
personnel or evidence. In the text-mining analysis, authority is one of the 
most frequently noted concepts, and 'doctor(s)' one of the most 
frequently occurring words. Real and invented medical jargon ('negative 
calories', 'delayed accumulation', 'the science behind it is called 
osmosis', 'enzymes act by 'delayed action', a well-known phenomenon 
within the pharmaceutical industry') litters the text. In some cases the 
medical or scientific authorities cited are real, though their application to 






false. Pictures of doctors in white coats are common, as are detailed 
reports of supposed clinical trials:  
'Professor [….] and Doctor [….] are 2 of the most respected 
authorities in obesity and weight loss in the world.  They have 
overseen and witnessed every stage of the testing and trials of 
[product name]'. 
'100 per cent of the subjects who participated in the trials 
successfully lost weight, and all were satisfied' – Dr [….], Trial 
Supervisor.' 
'Recently the largest hospital trial of its kind confirmed that users 
lose weight without actually trying.' 
'Independent trials on 100 patients prove that all users lost their fat 
and cellulite.' 
'Researched and tested around the world this method has been 
internationally proven as the easiest, fastest and only permanent 
way to lose weight.' 
'… it was so safe and so successful in its trials and tests that these 
pads are now certified by the United States Government!' 
'This is Certain, Indisputable, Proven, Approved and Recognised by 
the highest and most prestigious scientific authorities in the world!' 
8.72 Again, these claims do work in convincing some people to respond to 
the offer – even though they show scepticism of other kinds of claims:  
'If they've got rather elaborate letters, photographs before and after, 
Mrs Nellie Farnes Barn from Woking has lost forty-eight pounds, 
holding her trousers out like this, I think 'yeah no'.  But when you 
get some with a letter in it, from Dr So-and-So of Stockholm 
University, saying 'this is a completely new product, only just on the 
market' (that's the latest ploy), then because it's got the doctor on 






knowing if they're photographing just a model, but I think maybe this 
Dr Buckler…) and I thought well maybe, I'll try that.' 
Triggering visceral processing 
8.73 Unlike bogus lotteries and get rich quick schemes, miracle cure scams 
are not trying to shut down careful reflection by fascinating the potential 
victim with large sums of money. Rather, their advertising is directed at 
people with chronic, hard to treat, embarrassing or, worst, terminal 
conditions where victims are likely to clutch at any possibility of 
improvement.   
8.74 Text mining shows that words and concepts like 'fat', 'weight' and 
'sexuality' occur commonly in these materials. The commonest scams 
involve supposed cures for obesity, but diabetes, impotence, loss of 
libido, arthritis, baldness and cancer all figure in the corpus of scam 
materials. People suffering from conditions like these are likely to be 
desperate for something that will offer them an improvement – indeed, 
our interviewees use exactly that word. They are likely to have tried 
many different treatment regimes, and thus to be willing to be persuaded 
that something unconventional might work, just because they so much 
want to see an improvement. Examples of the type of claims found in 
miracle cure scams include: 
'For the first time in your life, you'll be able to lose weight 
effortlessly and automatically without changing any of your normal 
foods, cutting down or making any sacrifices or special effort at all.' 
'Don't waste another day being miserable and unhappy with your 
weight problem - the solution is in your hands right now.' 
'Free Yourself of the Swelling, Stiffness and Pain, and Live Your Life 







8.75 Another common feature of miracle cure scams is the use of fake money 
back guarantees, to induce an over-confidence effect in recipients. 
Examples include: 
'You can try it without any risk whatsoever on your part because 
with every order comes a complete money back guarantee.' 
'That's why I'm offering you a cast-iron guarantee, one that will 
allow you to put your doubts aside for the sake of the happier and 
slimmer future…' 













Premium rate prize draw scams: What are they? 
8.76 Consumers receive a letter, text, scratchcard or automated telephone 
message telling them that they have won a major prize and urging them 
to ring or text an expensive premium rate number to find out what they 
can claim. The misleading impression is given that the recipient has won 
a large cash prize or other highly valuable prize. Nearly everyone who 
responds ends up with a low value 'giveaway' item rather than the 
promised major prize.   
Psychological techniques 
8.77 We can see three principal psychological techniques of persuasion at 
work in this kind of scam, all emotional rather than cognitive: 
• triggering visceral processing by reference to a high value prize or 
prize; 
 
• reducing the motivation for information processing by inducing 
scarcity; 
 
• escalating commitment. 
 
Using a high-value prize to promote visceral processing   
8.78 As Table 3 (Study 2) shows, the text mining identified words to do with 
the prize, like 'cash', 'cheque', and 'winner', as very common in this 
kind of scam. The high value prizes referred to, together with the 
impression given that they have been 'lucky' to have won a valuable 
prize, act to dominate the victim's thinking and shut down a more 
critical analysis of exactly what they are likely to receive. 
8.79 Examples of this include phrases such as: 






'I'm delighted to inform you that our computer has drawn you as a 
winner!' 
'Congratulations, you're a guaranteed winner!' 
'Congratulations and well done!' 
8.80 The low cost of claiming the prize – typically between £10 and £20 – 
relative to the alleged high value of the prizes won may also induce 
victims to respond. 
Induced scarcity 
8.81 The scam communications often seek to emphasis both the uniqueness 
of the offer - that the recipient alone has won a major prize – and its 
time limited nature in order to induce a response. This reduces the 
motivation to process the scam content objectively. In practice, nearly 
everyone will receive the same low value award and the promotion will 
run for a number of months. Examples of the type of language used 
include: 
'Congratulations on being chosen [recipient's name].' 
'… this offer is exclusive to you.' 
'I am writing to you in great urgency.' 
'… the award allocated to you … must be claimed immediately'. 
Escalating commitment 
8.82 Even when victims realise that the phone call to a recorded message (to 
find out what prize they can claim) is costing money with each minute, 
they may feel the need to hang on and see what they have won, to 
justify the expense already incurred. This can extend beyond the initial 






'I mean I've had a couple of MP3 Players in the past, which weren't 
particularly good quality, but they worked, so I gave them to my 
daughters ... for the ten quid phone call and the two fifty post and 
package whatever it was, it's like twelve fifty for an MP3 Player that 
I probably could have got for that price somewhere… but I'd rather 
have that, after … spending the ten quid on the phone call, it's 
something that I could have made use of, so I then paid the one 
pound fifty or one ninety-nine whatever it was, postage and 
packaging, insurance.' 
At one level, the victim's response here is quite rational: once the £10 is 
irretrievably spent, the correct question is indeed whether the value of 
the prize is greater than the £2.50 that remains to be paid. However, 
that is a level of sophistication that people rarely apply in other 
contexts, and it is probably better to see this as a kind of 'chasing 














Bogus racing tipster scams: What are they? 
8.83 Consumers receive a glossy mailing from a so-called 'racing pundit' who 
claims to have access to inside information from trainers and owners and 
guarantees large profits by subscribing to a tipster service or syndicate. 
Victims often end up paying hundreds of pounds for a poor or non-
existent service and when they try to get their money back, they find 
out that the pundit's name is made up and the address given is just a 
mailbox. 
Psychological techniques 
8.84 The psychological techniques of persuasion in use in bogus racing tipster 
scams include: 




• background knowledge and overconfidence. 
 
Triggering visceral processing 
8.85 Racing tipster scams typically involve references to very large winnings, 
either as a total or in terms of substantial sums in short periods or 
repeatedly. They also stress the small layout required, and many refer to 
the money worries that the intended victim may be suffering:  r average  
'Join me for just £39 and make £20,000 guaranteed!' 
'Amazing tax-free profits of up to £10,000 per week using the 
bookmakers' money.' 








'Are YOU drowning in a sea of bills?  If I provided a financial life 
jacket would YOU take it? 
'Now you can give up work and become a horse race investing 
millionaire.' 
'What would YOU do if you were earning this sort of money? Enjoy a 
luxury holiday or buy a foreign villa perhaps, maybe early retirement 
abroad, buy a great car or even two great cars?' 
8.86 People are influenced by these sorts of supposed cost/benefit ratios and 
the promise of large winnings to shut down their broader processing.  
Here is one of our interviewees who lost about £6,000, £3,000 paid to 
the so-called tipster, and £3,000 on losing bets made on the basis of the 
tipster's recommendations: 
'This is what you'll win, yes?  and now that's the sort of money he 
wants off you - when I did it about three years ago… it might have 
been two thousand five hundred, so much deposit plus pay the 
balance due when we have made you a clear profit of two hundred 
and fifty thousand pounds; and these are the things what get people, 
you know, 'Ooh, that's it the end of my worries'.  And, without you 
knowing what betting is, he'd put four or five bets on a page - all 
winners, and how much you would have got, if you'd put say fifty 
quid on them, and they amounted to thousands, probably thirty; 
[but] they were past races, perhaps over the past twelve 
months…and on paper it looks really really good and you think 'Ooh, 
if just one of them came in for me, I'd be quite happy, but… I'm still 
waiting for this two hundred and fifty thousand pounds profit.' 
Perception of authority   
8.87 Tipster scams seek to entrain authority processes in a variety of ways.  
Their materials are frequently highly professional and glossy in 
appearance, suggesting that a successful and legitimate business lies 






years of experience and access to inside information to further create a 
perception of authority. For example: 
'I look after the affairs of some of the biggest Gambling Owners in 
the U.K. and one of the most influential owner/gamblers in Eire.' 
'I am personally friendly with many of the top trainers in the land.' 
'I am a racing professional - well known, successful and established 
in racing circles for over 20 years.' 
'Having had 30 years experience in the racing industry I have 
individually built up the most powerful racing team who are now able 
to pass on their wealth of knowledge to you.' 
8.88 They are also often styled after the sort of portfolios that a finance 
company might issue (this is of course in keeping with the rhetoric of 
legitimate gambling firms, which prefer to use terms like 'investment' 
rather than 'betting' to describe their customers' activity). Text mining 
shows that concepts of transaction and trading, and investment, are 
among the most common in this type of scam material, and words like 
'price', 'profit', and 'opportunity' occur frequently. The materials often 
use visual symbols of authority such as fake crests and seals. In 
addition, though, they use racing-specific signs of authority, such as 
tables of past results and winnings in the same style as the racing press 
and references to results being 'proofed' with the racing press.   
Background knowledge and overconfidence   
8.89 The interviewee quoted above claimed to know nothing about betting.  
In general, though, racing tipster scams are aimed at people who believe 
they know something about the betting world – and in particular believe 
(as most horse race gamblers do, at some level) that there is inside 
information available that can enable the punter to beat the bookmaker 
('it was supposed to be stable information' said one of our interviewees), 
and that bookmakers are in some sense the enemy of the punter, so that 
there should be some system available that would outwit them. It is this 






foster and exploit. As the text mining analysis shows, this is reflected in 
the frequent use of words like 'information', 'members', and 
'bookmakers' in the materials. For example: 
'The battle between punter and bookmaker is at last set on 
something approaching a level playing field. Indeed, in many ways, 
the pitch is tilted to the advantage of the person betting.' 
'At last the betting man or woman has a real chance of earning 
money at the same time as enjoying the thrill of the chase.' 
8.90 Another feature of many of these scam mailings is an attempt to imply 
that there are many 'bogus' tipsters out there but this offer is somehow 
genuine.  For example: 
'PLEASE DO NOT BE BLINDED by some of the impersonators that 
you may have come across in our business that try to get in on a 
good thing with no genuine inside information at all.' 
'Being a true pro in my business I am sick to death of hearing stories 
of bogus tipsters with misleading figures and misleading information 
which never turns out to be what you had hoped for.' 
'There are a lot of people in this business pretending to be what 
they're not - and if you've been burned by an 'expert' in the past, 
you'll recognise this all too well. You must not allow these frauds to 
cloud your judgement and deny you your one shot at the big time.' 
'Have you been approached by syndicates in the past? If you have, 
it's a fair bet that you will soon have realised that all you've received 
for your hard-earned cash is a fistful of empty promises and a whole 
lot of wasted time.' 
8.91 Many of these mailings also use fake testimonials (social proof), fake 
money back guarantees and fake references to limited places and special 
membership discounts to create a sense of urgency and reduce the 






9 STUDY THREE: A COMPARISON OF SUSCEPTIBILITY TO 
ERRORS OF JUDGEMENT IN VICTIMS AND NON-VICTIMS OF 
SCAMS 
9.1 Studies 1 and 2 revealed a marked coincidence between the kinds of 
persuasive techniques that could be detected in scam communications, 
and the kinds of errors of judgement that scam victims reported in 
interviews. However, as noted above, this does not necessarily mean 
that scammers are accurately targeting potential victims' vulnerabilities: 
it may simply mean that those who emerge as victims are those who 
happen to be vulnerable to the particular techniques that scammers, as a 
result of cultural processes, happen to use. To disentangle such a 
selection explanation from a more truly causal process, it is necessary to 
use a more experimental approach. 
9.2 Study 3 can be described as a quasi-experiment, in that we sought to 
investigate susceptibility to a wide range of decision errors in samples of 
the general population some, but not all, of whom would have been 
scam victims. The sources of error that were found to be most influential 
in Studies 1 and 2 (triggers for visceral processing and appeals to trust 
and authority) were included, but so were sources of error that were 
found to be less significant in the earlier studies. A postal questionnaire 
approach was used: it included a list of statements that would be typical 
of people who were vulnerable to different kinds of decision error, and 
respondents were asked to indicate how far they agreed with them.  
There were two different samples of participants. One sample came 
from a panel of committed research volunteers, and the other was 
secured by blanket delivery of requests to participate within a 
geographical area chosen to be demographically typical of the UK within 
the constraint of being not too distant from Exeter. Neither of these 
methods is likely to produce a truly representative sample of the UK 
population, but neither has any obvious bias that would distort the 
comparison of victims and non-victims. The two samples are likely to 
have rather different biases, so if they give consistent results, 







9.3 Full details of the method for the study are given in Annexe E, and the 
text of the questionnaires is in Annexe F. The study took place in two 
waves. In Wave 1, we posted questionnaires to members of the 
Participant Panel of the University of Exeter School of Psychology. The 
panel includes contacts of the School who have volunteered to help the 
School in its research. In Wave 2, we hand-delivered questionnaires to 
households in the towns of Taunton and Yeovil, Somerset, chosen to be 
representative of the UK population. Wave 1 and many of the interviews 
for Study 1 were completed and their results analysed before Wave 2 
was started, so the Wave 2 questionnaire was modified in the light of 
the earlier results, but both questionnaires had the same general 
structure.   
9.4 Participants were asked some general questions on scams, including the 
types of scams they had received and whether they had ever responded, 
and were then asked to indicate their feelings about a scam they had 
received or responded to, using a series of questions that probed 
vulnerability to different kinds of errors of judgement. For example, the 
question, 'I responded to the scam in order to feel better' probed for an 
emotional source of error, mood regulation; the question, 'I felt there 
was a strong authority behind the scam' probed for a cognitive source of 
error, reliance on authority. From Wave 1, we got a 49 per cent 
response rate and 103 usable returns (quite a few returns from non-
victims were unusable because people had left large numbers of 
questions unanswered), and from Wave 2, a 15 per cent response rate 
and 116 usable returns. In Wave 1 only, the questionnaires concluded 
with an invitation to take part in an interview, so some of the 
participants from this study also served in Study 1.     
Results 
9.5 Of the participants submitting usable responses, in Wave 1 65 per cent 
recalled being approached by scammers in the past two years, while in 
Wave 2, 73 per cent did. In Wave 1, 11 per cent classified themselves 






Wave 2 were 10 per cent and 3 per cent; because the numbers of near 
victims were so low, they are amalgamated with the victims in the 
analysis of Wave 2, since prior analyses of Wave 2 showed that near 
victims' responses were very similar to those of victims. Figure 2 shows 
the mean scores (on the scale from 0 to 10) of propensity to the 
different kinds of judgement error that we tested, in the three groups for 
Wave 1 and the two groups for Wave 2. Annexe G includes a table 







Figure 2:  Study 3.  Mean scores on scales formed to measure 
propensities to different kinds of errors of judgement  
 
Data are shown separately for Waves 1 and 2 (W1 and W2) where constructs 
were measured in both waves.  The scales used were as follows: 
 
Visceral triggers (positive emotions) 
Cognitive effort 
Scarcity and uniqueness of scam offer 
Liking and similarity 
Need for consistency with future expectations 
Behavioural commitment 
Sunk cost 
Problems with maths 
Trust and authority 
Illusions of control 
General attitude towards scams: Positive 
General attitude towards scams: Negative 
Personal approach 
Need for privacy 
 































































































9.6 Response rates in Wave 2 were low, and in Wave 1 there were a 
considerable number of unusable responses. This implies that there is a 
limit to the extent to which people who have not been scam victims can 
meaningfully answer questions about how scams make them feel. 
9.7 The proportions of respondents who self-reported being victims within a 
24-month period was 11 per cent in Wave 1 and 10 per cent in Wave 2. 
These numbers are about what would be expected from the OFT 
research of 2006, which gave a figure of 6.5 per cent of the population 
falling victim in any year; exact agreement would not be expected given 
that the questions posed were not exactly the same. It would be 
expected that those with experience of, and therefore interest in, scams 
would be more likely to return their questionnaires, and there is a 
potential source of additional bias in the participant panel used for Wave 
1, which contains a higher proportion of older and single people than the 
UK average. However the general agreement with previous OFT figures 
suggest that these biases were not important. 
9.8 Accepting the limitations imposed by the return rates, however, the data 
from the questionnaires are revealing, and a number of useful 
conclusions can be drawn from examination of Figure 2 and the Table in 
Annexe G. 
9.9 Where the same constructs were measured in both waves, similar 
results were obtained. This gives some assurance that non-
representativeness or non-randomness of the samples were not 
distorting the results. 
9.10 With the sole exception of the attempt to measure illusion of control, all 
the constructs we sought to measure formed internally consistent 
scales, despite the fact that we had no opportunity to pre-test the items 
with a large independent population, as would ideally be done. This 
result implies that propensities to commit judgement errors are 








9.11 Mean levels of agreement with all the statements are low, except in the 
case of negative attitude, where high agreement indicates the same kind 
of response as low agreement to the other statements. Virtually all 
responses were below five on a scale from 0 to 10. Respondents are not 
indicating implausible levels of agreement with the probe statements in 
the questionnaire. 
9.12 There are marked differences in response between non-victims and near 
or actual victims. Non-victims' mean levels of agreement are below 1.0 
on many of the scales, indicating that the majority of non-victims report 
no agreement whatsoever with most of the probe statements, whereas 
near and actual victims report modest mean levels of agreement. These 
results thus support our expectation that people who are susceptible to a 
variety of kinds of error of judgement are more likely to fall victim to 
scams, and thus support the general approach we have taken to the 
psychology of scams. 
9.13 There was no evidence that any of the decision error propensities 
distinguished victims and near victims from non-victims more effectively 
than others. In particular, the decision errors that scammers seem to try 
to elicit most frequently (visceral processing and excessive reliance on 
authority) are no more characteristic of victims and near victims than 
any of the others. Of course, there was some evidence in Studies 1 and 
2 that all these kind of judgement errors may play some role in scam 
communications and in victims' responses. But in those studies there 
was clear evidence that some judgement errors play a bigger part in the 
scam process than others. On the evidence of the present data, this is 
not because they are the errors to which victims are most vulnerable.   
9.14 An interesting special case of the last point is that victims report making 
more cognitive effort to understand scams than non-victims. Given that 
falling for a scam is by definition an error, this seems surprising at first 
sight. However it presumably reflects the victim being 'drawn in' to the 
scam: non-victims no doubt include many people who discard scams 
without given them a second glance. Presumably, however, this greater 






which in some types of scam would make it clearer that the offer is not 
what it seems. 
9.15 Although the differences between near victims and actual victims are 
typically not significant on individual scales, there is a clear pattern 
across the scales, with near victims reporting slightly more agreement 
with the probe statements than actual victims. This is contrary to our 
expectations: we thought that near victims would emerge as 
intermediate between non-victims and actual victims. It looks as though 
the experience of having been the victim of a scam does make people 
more cautious ('once bitten, twice shy' victims) – and the near victims 
may be the currently most vulnerable group, since they have the 
propensities to respond as victims but have not yet been warned off by 
bitter experience.   
9.16 Study 3 thus supported our assumption that propensities to errors of 
judgement differ between scam victims and non-victims. However, the 
data suggest that victims have a general vulnerability to persuasive 
techniques, and not just to those that are characteristic of the kind of 
scam they fell victim to. Indeed, it would be easy to combine responses 
to almost all the items on each questionnaire to form a single scale of 
persuadability, which would probably relate closely to the scale proposed 
by Bearden et al (1989).   
9.17 Although Study 3 allowed for a more objective approach than Study 1, 
the data are still only quasi-experimental, so thus cause and effect 
remain uncertain. Because the data was collected retrospectively, it is 
possible that scam victims distort their memories about why they 
reacted. As with any questionnaire study, it is possible that participants 
distort their responses to make a specific social impression on the 
researchers (impression management) or to respond in the way they 
believe the researchers want them to (demand effect). These 
methodological difficulties can only be resolved with a more fully 






10 STUDY FOUR: AN EXPERIMENT WITH A SCAM SIMULATION 
 
10.1 Conceptually, the obvious way to investigate the effectiveness of 
various persuasive techniques in eliciting response to a scam is to send 
out a number of scam mailings with controlled differences in their 
content, and see how many of each kind are returned – with any monies 
sent by respondents being returned. Taken baldly, this approach would 
risk causing serious offence or even harm to members of the public, 
violating the ethical standards expected of researchers, and damaging 
public confidence in both the researchers and the sponsors.   
10.2 In Study 4 we sought ways of coming as close to a straightforward 
experimental design as we could without running those risks.  We used 
two different techniques. In Study 4a, we simply sent members of the 
public a letter that enclosed a simulated prize draw pitch/sweepstake 
scam mailing and a questionnaire that asked for their reactions to it.  
This was in a sense a control condition: we expected it to elicit 'cold' 
responses in which people would tell us what they thought they would 
be likely to do. In Study 4b, we used almost exactly the same materials, 
but altered the packing order, so that people opening the envelope would 
first encounter the simulated scam mailing. Only if they took enough 
interest in it to open it would they find the explanatory letter, which 
asked for reactions in the same way. We hoped that this technique 
would elicit at least some 'hot' responses, reports of how people felt at 
the time of opening, when they were still treating the scam at its face 
value and not as a communication from researchers. We would see 
evidence for that if the responses to the two formats differed.   
10.3 To anticipate a little, it did turn out that responses were quite different in 
the two situations. For clarity, we therefore present the two studies 
separately here. However they were run simultaneously, as a single 
operation, and in particular there were no differences between the 
populations to whom the two sets of materials were sent. 
10.4 In both parts of the study, we varied three aspects of the content of the 






research as well as the work of other authors in this field, both described 
earlier in this report: 
• whether a visceral trigger was present or not 
 
• whether the scam content looked very official or not 
 
• whether the prize to win was very large, or only moderate. 
  
10.5 In addition, we also noted whether participants reported that they had 
previously responded to a scam or not (responders vs. non-responders).  
All combinations of these four independent variables were used, so that 
we could look for interactions between them. 
10.6 We used two kinds of response measures: 
• whether or not people responded to the mailing (for this measure, we 
could not use the responder vs. non-responder independent variable, 
since we did not know in advance which recipients had previously 
responded to a scam) 
 
• measures of the way in which people responded to the mailing, 
derived from the questionnaire responses. 
Methods 
10.7 A total of 10,000 scam simulations and questionnaires were sent out, 
5,000 in the format for Study 4a and 5,000 in the format for Study 4b.  
Half of each type were sent to each of two mailing lists, obtained 
commercially: a general public sample, expected to be typical of UK 
consumers, and a sample of people who were described as having 
participated in postal lotteries. 
10.8 Eight different scam formats were generated, by varying the three 
content factors outlined above. Figure 3 shows an example. The letters 
inviting participation were slightly different in Studies 4a and 4b, and 
samples can be found at Annexe H. The questionnaire was the same in 















10.9 The questionnaire included 14 items that asked the respondents to rate 
their reactions to the scam. We examined the correlations between the 
responses between these items using factor analysis (details are shown 
in Annexe J). The results of the factor analysis showed that the 
questionnaire responses could be efficiently summarized in terms of the 
respondents' average responses to two groups of items, one of which 
was concerned with their intention and likelihood of responding to a 
scam like the one they had been sent, and the other of which was 
concerned with how the scam made them feel. We refer to these two 
scales below as the 'intention to respond' scale and the 'dislike of the 
scam' scale. The second scale is referred to as measuring ‘dislike’ 
because feelings about the scams were always evaluative and we scored 
them in the direction that a higher scale value corresponded to a more 
negative evaluation. 
10.10 In both studies, the mailing included a Freepost envelope for return of 
the questionnaire. 
Comparison of return rates in Studies 4a and 4b 
10.11 In study 4a, a total of 422 usable responses were received.  53.6 per 
cent were from women; 0.2 per cent from respondents between 18 and 
25 years of age; 3.1 per cent from people between 25 and 35 years of 
age; 14.9 per cent from 35 to 45 year olds; 27.3 per cent from 45 to 55 
year olds; 34.2 per cent from 55 to 65 year olds; and 20.3 per cent 
from people older than 65. 14.7 per cent reported that they had 
previously responded to a scam.   
10.12 In study 4b, 525 usable responses were received.  55.8 per cent were 
from women; 0.4 per cent from people between 18 and 25 years of age; 
3.8 per cent from respondents aged between 25 to 35 years old; 13.8 
per cent from 35 to 45 year olds; 25.2 per cent from 45 to 55 year olds; 
37.4 per cent from 55 to 65 year olds; and 19.4 per cent from people 
older than 65. 16.1 per cent said that they had previously responded to 






10.13 The difference in the numbers responding in the two studies was highly 
significant (2-tailed binomial test, P<0.01), but the age and gender 
distributions were virtually identical, as were the likelihoods that 
respondents had previously responded to a scam. Furthermore, the 
pattern of response between the eight different scam types did not differ 
significantly between plan types. Overall, most responses (148) were 
received to the least pressing version of the scam (no official markings, 
low prize, no visceral triggering), with numbers of responses to the other 
types varying from 109 to 128; however, the differences in response 
rates did not reach statistical significance. 
Results of Study 4a: 'Cold' responses to scams 
10.14 Figures 4 and 5 shows the pattern of responses on the 'intention to 
respond' and 'dislike of the scam' scales for the respondents in Study 4a 
who received the package which presented itself immediately as a 
research enquiry. The significance of differences between groups was 
tested by analysis of variance, and details of this analysis are included in 







Figure 4: Study 4a 



















never responded responded once or more in the past
 
Mean scores of intention to respond to a scam as a function of the type of scam simulation 
received, among people who received the scam simulation enclosed in a letter asking them to 
participate in research.  Scam types are designated by a 3-letter code where the first letter 
indicates whether the prize was Low (L) or High (H), the second letter indicates that symbols of 
Official status were not used (N) or used (O), and the final letter indicates that attempts to 
arouse visceral processing were not used (N) or used (V). 
 
10.15 As regards intention to respond, it can be seen that by far the biggest 
difference is between those who had responded to a scam in the past, 
and those who had not, with those who had responded previously more 
likely to respond again (though bearing in mind that the maximum value 
on the scale was 10, they still reported that they were relatively unlikely 
to respond). However, there were also other differences. Higher prizes 
elicited a higher mean intention to respond, though this effect was 
largely confined to those who had responded in the past. Statistically, it 
also appeared that providing cues to visceral processing increased 
intention to respond somewhat, but only if cues to official status were 
not also provided, and most strongly among those who had previously 
responded. Compared with the effect of the size of prize, however, this 






Figure 5: Study 4a 
 






















never responded responded once or more in the past
 
Mean scores of dislike of the scam situation as a function of the type of scam simulation used, 
among people who received the scam simulation enclosed in a letter asking them to participate 
in research.  Simulation types are coded in the same way as for Figure 4. 
 
10.16 As regards dislike of the scam, there was no clear pattern of difference 
between the scam types. With all scam types, however, those who had 
previously responded to a scam showed a somewhat lower dislike of the 
scam situation. 
Results of Study 4b: 'Hot' responses to scams 
10.17 Figures 6 and 7 show the pattern of responses on the 'intention to 
respond' and 'dislike of the scam' scales for the respondents in Study 4b 
who received the package which on first sight looked more like a real 
scam mailing. Again, the significance of differences between groups was 
tested by analysis of variance, and details of this analysis are included in 







Figure 6: Study 4b 
 



















never responded responded once or more in the past
 
Mean scores of intention to respond to a scam as a function of the type of scam simulation 
used, among people who received the scam simulation with the letter asking them to participate 
in research initially hidden.  Simulation types are coded in the same way as for Figure 4. 
 
10.18 As in Study 4a, the biggest difference was between those who did and 
did not report that they had previously responded to a scam 
communication. However the pattern of differences between the scam 
types was quite different from that seen in Study 4a. There was no 
overall effect of size of prize, but especially in those who had previously 
responded, the content cues – official status and visceral elicitation – 
seemed to interact, so that the highest intentions to respond occurred 






Figure 7: Study 4b   
 






















never responded responded once or more in the past
 
Mean scores of dislike of the scam situation as a function of the type of scam simulation used, 
among people who received the scam simulation with the letter asking them to participate in 
research initially hidden.  Simulation types are coded in the same way as for Figure 4. 
 
10.19 As regards dislike of the scam, as in Study 4a there was no clear pattern 
of different responses to different types of scam simulation. However 
once again those who reported that they had never responded to a scam 
scored consistently higher on the dislike scale than those who said that 
they had responded before.   
Conclusions 
10.20 The most striking result from these studies was the consistent difference 
between those who report that they have, and have not, previously 
responded to a scam of some sort. Regardless of whether people were 
making a 'Hot' or a 'Cold' response, and regardless of the detailed 
content of the scam simulation, previous responders showed a higher 






than those who said they had never responded. This confirms the 
impression from our earlier studies and from other research that there is 
a sub-population who are particularly vulnerable to scams and hence to 
becoming repeat victims (for example, previous OFT research found that 
a victim had a 30 per cent chance of falling for another scam within the 
following 12 months). In the present study, 15.5 per cent of all 
respondents said they had responded to a scam at some time in the 
past, and this is reasonably consistent with other estimates of the 
proportion of the population likely to be vulnerable. 
10.21 The 'Hot' and 'Cold' responses differ in what they suggest about the 
factors likely to be important in determining whether people will respond 
to a particular scam or not. In the 'Cold' responses, there was a clear 
effect of the size of prize offered, and this indicates that, when 
reflecting on scam response, people think they would be likely to be 
affected by this factor. But this effect was not seen in the 'Hot' 
responses, where the significant effects were due to the content of the 
scam communication. The pattern of those effects was not entirely 
clear, very probably reflecting the fact that manipulating cues for visceral 
processing and official status is not as straightforward as manipulating 
the stated prize money. It is more than likely that those variables do in 
fact interact, and that scammers manipulate them in a hit or miss way 
until they strike on a combination of messages which comes across as 
convincing.  Where the 'Hot' and 'Cold' responses differ, it seems most 
probable that the 'Hot' responses are the more authentic indication of 
behaviour towards a real scam. The 'Cold' responses can only tell us 
what people think, on reflection, would be a successful scam offer; the 
'Hot' responses come closer to what actually causes them to pause 
before consigning a scam mailing to the waste bin. 
10.22 The fact that the 'Hot' and 'Cold' results differed suggests that is worth 
the effort to try to obtain a 'Hot' response when investigating scam 
effectiveness. That is not a surprising conclusion, though it is one that 
will inevitably bring an increased risk of conflict between the 
requirements for valid research and the requirements of researchers' 
ethical codes. The way in which the scam simulation was delivered had 






content, but also on the likelihood that people would respond to the 
mailing, and there were more 'Hot' than 'Cold' responses. No doubt 
some of the mailings were discarded without even being opened, and 
since the envelopes used were identical in all cases, differences in the 
content could have no effect on relative rates of this kind of immediate 
discarding (real scam mailings, of course, are often delivered in 
envelopes that allude to their content, such as a reference to a prize win 
notification, presumably to try to reduce immediate discard rates).  
Where the recipient opened the envelope at all, however, it seems that 
something that looked like a typical scam offer was less likely to be 
discarded than a letter inviting people to take part in research. This has 
implications for future research methodology, but it also emphasizes the 
fundamental issue of concern in our research: to at least a minority of 
the population, scam offers are attractive. Our mock scam, based on 
samples that could only have led to the recipients losing money, was 
more effective at gaining attention than our polite (but probably dull-
looking) letter asking for cost-free help with a project for the public 







11 GENERAL CONCLUSIONS 
11.1 The present research started with the basic question of why so many 
people, so often, react to completely worthless scam offers. Why are 
3.2 million people in the UK not able to detect scam content and so 
collectively lose more than £3.5 billion every year? Why do some scam 
victims even react repeatedly so that some of them lose their entire 
financial resources as well as their psychological health? 
11.2 Our approach has been to regard falling for a scam not as an anomaly 
but as a result of the normal processes that govern human economic 
choices. We rely on a battery of cognitive and social heuristics to make 
choices that will, most of the time, give good enough results. But by the 
standard of rational choice theory, these heuristics will lead to decision 
errors. On the basis of our research, the characterisation of falling for a 
scam as a decision error seems to be well supported, and the persuasive 
techniques used by scammers seem to be calculated to induce known 
categories of error. 
11.3 Recognising scams as persuasive communications, and a scam response 
as an error of judgement, brings in an armoury of theoretical and 
empirical literature that can be used to supplement the thin and patchy 
research that has been carried out directly on scams. It is already clear, 
however, that it would be a mistake to assume that persuasive 
techniques appeal only to emotional or motivational processes, or that 
errors of judgement are only cognitive in origin. The array of 
psychological processes that we identified in Sections 3 and 4 of this 
report as possibly underlying scam susceptibility was almost unhelpfully 
large.  Our research accordingly tested a broad variety of potential 
psychological processes underlying responses to scam communications.  
Although it remains likely that every one of these processes plays some 
part, sometimes, in someone's vulnerability, on the basis of the present 
findings, we can reduce the list of main drivers of falling for a scam to a 







11.4 Different kinds of scam do exploit different error tendencies to some 
extent, but the similarities between scams in their content and 
persuasive techniques are more striking than their differences – and they 
do not exploit all kinds of decision error equally. The greatest and most 
consistent emphasis, both in the hundreds of scam communications we 
analysed and in our interviews with scam victims, was on appeals to 
trust and authority (that is, scammers use, and victims fall for, cues that 
make the offer look like a legitimate one being made by a reliable official 
institution or established reputable large-scale business), and on visceral 
triggers with relation to positive future reference points (that is, 
scammers use triggers that make potential victims focus on the huge 
prizes or benefits on offer, and imagine positive future emotional states). 
In our experimental survey, when we tried to elicit 'Hot' responses to a 
simulated scam mailing (Study 4b), those variables were again found to 
have some effect on the way people responded. Any theory of scams 
and scam response will involve multiple, interactive processes of 
different kinds, but it seems that the complexity needed to build an 
adequate theory is less than might be feared. 
11.5 Authority and visceral appeals do not of course exhaust either the 
content of scam communications or the causes of decision error among 
victims, and a number of other interesting error-inducing processes 
emerged from the interviews of Study 1, were confirmed in the 
questionnaire responses of Study 3, and could be seen to be being 
exploited in the text-mining in Study 2.   
• The influence of background knowledge. Scam victims often have 
significant knowledge about the subject of the scam content, and 
this can increase rather than decrease the risk of becoming a victim. 
For example, background knowledge about stocks and share 
investing may increase the likelihood that one will fall into the trap of 
an investment scam. 
 
• Cues and associated feelings of scarcity. Scam communications are 
frequently personally addressed to victims and the 'offers' they make 
are subject to time limits. The scarcity cues used in scam 






urgent and unique one, which is personally addressed to them. This 
reduces their motivation to process the scam content objectively. 
 
• Induction of behavioural commitment. Scammers ask their potential 
victims to make small steps of compliance to draw them in, and after 
that the victims feel committed in a variety of ways. 
 
• The disproportionate relation between the size of the alleged prize 
and the cost of trying to obtain it. Scam victims focus on the 
relatively small amount of money they have to send in order to get 
the alleged big prize; other researchers, for example, Shadel and 
Schweitzer-Pak (2007) call this phenomenon 'phantom fixation'. 
 
• Privacy. Scam victims keep their decisions private and hide them 
from family and friends; indeed to some extent they hide them from 
their more rational selves. 
 
• Self-regulation. Scam victims report being less able to regulate and 
resist emotions associated with scam offers, again indicating an 
economic mind that is in a certain sense divided against itself. This 
creates an extra vulnerability in those who are socially isolated, 
because social networks often induce us to regulate our emotions 
when we otherwise might not; in turn, this sheds light on the 
privacy-seeking of those who are on the way to becoming scam 
victims, which seems to be a way of preventing their social networks 
acting on them. 
 
11.6 The present research suggests that the psychological reasons for 
responding to scams involve a mixture of cognitive and motivational 
processes. From a motivational perspective, the most important findings 
are that people respond to scams because they (a) they feel that the 
scam is an unusually good offer, (b) cues in the scam content trigger 
positive emotions with a future reference point, and (c) they are less 
able than others to regulate and control emotions such as greed and 
excitement. From a cognitive perspective the most important 






(because victims feel they have experience and background knowledge 
in this specific area) and (b) the difference between the financial input 
and the potential output of the scam (size of prize relative to payment 
required).   
11.7 Some of the psychological processes we identified as contributing to 
falling for a scam were to be expected, on the basis either of previous 
literature, or plain common sense. Some were less predictable, though 
reasonable in retrospect. For example, it was striking how some scam 
victims kept their decision to respond private and avoided speaking 
about it with family members or friends. It was almost as if with some 
part of their minds, they knew that what they were doing was unwise, 
and they feared the confirmation of that that another person would have 
offered.   
11.8 Another counter-intuitive result is that scam victims often have better 
than average background knowledge in the area of the scam content. 
For example, from our interview material, it seems that people with 
experience of playing legitimate prize draws and lotteries may be more 
likely to fall for a scam in this area than people with less knowledge and 
experience in this field.   
11.9 Nor did we expect to find, as we did in Study 3, that scam victims 
report that they put more cognitive effort into analysing scam content 
than non-victims. This contradicts the intuitive suggestion that people 
fall victim to scams because they invest too little cognitive energy in 
investigating their content, and thus overlook potential information (for 
example, in the small print) that might betray the scam. We presume this 
reflects the victim being 'drawn in' to the scam whilst non-victims 
include many people who discard scams without given them a second 
glance.    
11.10 Finally, from the interviews it was clear that some people viewed 
responding to a scam as taking a long-odds gamble: they recognised that 
there was something wrong with the offer, but the size of the possible 






off-chance that they might succeed. These unexpected processes would 
repay further, more detailed investigation.   
11.11 Although in one sense responding to a scam becomes a normal 
behaviour within our approach, in another sense it remains exceptional.  
In our questionnaire surveys (Study 3), scam victims seem to be people 
who are slightly but consistently more likely than the population at large 
to fall into decision errors, and in our experiments (Study 4), people who 
reported having previously responded to a scam were consistently more 
likely to show interest in responding again, and showed less dislike of 
the whole scam situation. It seems that there is a minority of people 
who are particularly vulnerable to scams. Though a minority, it is not a 
small minority; depending on how it is assessed, it includes something 
between 10 per cent and 20 per cent of the population. Furthermore, 
Study 3 suggests that the vulnerability is not specific to the persuasive 
techniques most characteristic of current common mass marketed 
scams, though it does include them. It follows that new scams may 
emerge in future that exploit different persuasive techniques. 
11.12 People who show above average vulnerability to scams do not seem to 
be in general poor decision-makers, for example some of those victims 
we interviewed had had successful careers in business or the 
professions. They simply seem to be towards one end of the normal 
range of persuadability. To describe openness to persuasion as a 
vulnerability is not to say that all persuadability is bad: in normal social 
exchanges it is sensible, indeed essential, to be open to some kinds of 
persuasion, such as reciprocation. But some people seem to be unduly 
open to persuasion, or perhaps unduly undiscriminating about who they 
allow to persuade them. Such people need in some way to better protect 
themselves against their openness to conviction by others whose 
intentions cannot be assumed to be well-disposed.   
11.13 The existence of individual differences in general persuadability throws 
some light on the fact that some people become 'chronic' or serial scam 
victims: it would not be surprising to find that such victims are 






complete explanation of chronic victimhood as other factors such as 
cognitive impairment are likely to be of some relevance. 
11.14 The fact that, despite differences of emphasis and content, all types of 
scam communication covered by this research seem to have a number of 
important features in common, gives some hope that people can be 







12 IMPLICATIONS FOR POLICY AND PRACTICE 
 
12.1 How can our improved understanding of the psychology of scams play a 
part in reducing the damage that scams do? Our suggestions here are 
tentative, because practice always has to be tempered by practical 
concerns. In addition, some of our ideas are based on relatively detailed 
points from our data, which really require confirmation in follow-up 
studies before too much is built on them. 
12.2 Obviously tackling mass marketed scams is partly a matter of 
enforcement and disruption at the level of the scammer (source) or 
means of delivery of the scam. This is largely outside our sphere of 
expertise, and we concentrate here on measures that might be taken to 
reduce scams by educating the public and thereby changing people's 
response to scams. However one aspect of the present results may have 
application at the level of scam delivery. As noted in Section 7, the 
word-level text mining does suggest that the content of scams in 
general, and each particular kind of scam, can be recognised with fair 
accuracy by relatively crude word-counting procedures, and this offers 
possibilities for automatic scam elimination at least from the electronic 
mail stream. 
12.3 The likely existence of a subset of the population with enhanced scam 
vulnerability is both a problem and an opportunity from a public 
education point of view. It is a problem in that it suggests that a high 
proportion of any advertising effort will be wasted on people who are 
relatively unlikely ever to fall for a scam. It is an opportunity in that if the 
more vulnerable group can be identified – or can be encouraged to self-
identify – more precise educational material can be focused on them. 
12.4 We have seen that falling for a scam involves both motivational and 
cognitive processes. Previous research on fraud (for example, Cialdini, 
1984/2007) and scam responding (for example, Shadel & Schweitzer-
Pak, 2007) has mainly focussed on motivational processes (for example, 
liking and similarity, emotional commitment, need for consistency). The 
cognitive processes that we looked for were suggested by more general 






Hardt et al., 2008). The present results suggest that responses to scam 
communications could be understood more fully by integrating 
motivational and cognitive processes, and therefore that counter-
measures need to involve both kinds of process. 
12.5 Not all potential errors of judgement are equally involved in falling for a 
scam, and for efficiency, public education campaigns need to focus on 
those that seem to be ubiquitous. These are appeals to trust and 
authority, and the clouding of sensible decision-making by the offer of 
huge rewards.  Publicity could usefully emphasise just how easy it is to 
produce an official looking document, and (though this is already the 
topic of much publicity) just how implausible it is that anyone would be 
offering huge sums in return for no effort. In addition, Study 2 showed 
that there are reliable features of scams that are not to do with 
persuasion as such, but with the practical needs of the scammer. So 
people should be put on the alert for communications that spend a lot of 
time telling you how to send money, or persuading you to make contact.  
These are of course characteristics of more legitimate direct marketing 
as well as scams, but they seem to occur with an exceptional intensity 
in scam communications. 
12.6 The fact that scam victims and near-victims report processing scam 
communications more thoroughly than non-victims suggests that efforts 
to persuade people to read scam materials more thoroughly or carefully 
are unnecessary and could even be counter-productive. Of course, if 
people get as far as the small print, they may well recognise a scam as a 
'bad buy'. But that is not what non-victims do: Rather, they discard 
scams virtually unread. The most effective education strategy may be to 
help potential victims recognise scams at a glance. Much effort in scam 
prevention has already focused on trying to educate potential victims to 
detect these 'scam alerts' or warning signs. They range from the simple 
implausibility either of the offer (for example, a multi-million pound win 
in a foreign lottery you never entered or claims that a miracle product 
can make you lose large amounts of weight with no effort, dieting or 
exercise) or of the means of securing it (for example, wiring money to 
cover 'taxes and fees' by money transfer to claim your lottery win or 






transfer large sums of money sitting in an account in a Third World 
country), to technical features of an email or phishing web site, as 
discussed by authors such as Furnell (2004) or James (2005, chapter 3).  
12.7 Kumaraguru et al. (2007) argue that current methods of teaching people 
to detect such scam cues are ineffective, but they also demonstrate 
experimentally that better methods are available. For example, research 
by Fischer et al. (2008c) found making consumers focus on potential 
losses (giving them a loss decision frame) reduces their tendency to 
selectively process only information that is consistent with the decision 
they have begun to form. So in a scam context, it should be helpful to 
encourage people to approach unsolicited communications with the 
question, 'How much could I lose here?' rather than, 'What's in this for 
me?' They would then be much more likely to look for reasons why they 
should not respond to the scam, instead of looking for reasons why they 
should. Future research is warranted to investigate the effectiveness of 
anti-scam education, and there is a basis of theoretical and laboratory 
work on which new education strategies could be built. 
12.8 At least some responses to scams seem to be driven by the victim's 
interpretation of the situation as a long-odds gamble – it is probably no 
good, but it is worth a small punt. It would be worth considering an 
awareness raising campaign that emphasises that no-one ever wins 
against a scammer: it is not like a genuine lottery, because there is no 
real prize. Allied to this is the evidence that victims are often acting 
against their own better judgement: with some part of their minds they 
recognise a scam for what it is. Publicity could perhaps stress that, if 
you think it might be a scam, it almost certainly is – your gut instinct is 
almost invariable right. It could also emphasise that as well as a loss to 
yourself you are possibly contributing to organised crime, and certainly 
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A LITERATURE REVIEW ON THE PSYCHOLOGY OF SCAMS 
A.1 The following is a short overview of the most important and – in our 
view – most interesting papers in the scientific literature that refer to 
scams in any way. This overview is followed by a critical analysis of the 
psychological processes that have been invoked to explain behaviour in 
relation to scams. A full list of references to the scientific literature is 
given.  
Scope of the available literature 
A.2 Overall, we found only about 30 scientific articles that explicitly 
mentioned scams within the authoritative, peer-reviewed, journal 
literature. In contrast, a Google search for web pages about scams 
produced 1.4 million hits. Unpublished reports, books, internet sources 
and cited references that do not discuss scams explicitly but do deal 
with closely related matters add to the stock of reported research on 
scams, but clearly systematic research has lagged far behind both the 
intense public interest in the subject, and lay commentary on it. 
A.3 Empirical research on scamming is particularly scarce and of low quality.  
Even among the articles we did find in the scientific literature, many just 
rely on information about the general psychology of fraud, and adapt this 
knowledge theoretically to the more recent problem of mass marketed 
scamming, without carrying out any new data collection.  
A.4 The most substantial evidence on the nature of scams and their victims 
comes from a series of reports commissioned by the American 
Association of Retired Persons in the 1990s (AARP 1996abc). These 
focused on older victims, and on telephone scams (the medium to which 
the population of interest to AARP was most vulnerable at the time). 
However, their large scale and the good geographical and social spread 
of their sampling mean that they are still the most reliable source of 
published data available. The main findings were that overall 14 per cent 
of all the survey respondents who had been contacted by telemarketing 
fraudsters had responded to the scam. Forty per cent reported that the 






scam approach, and 64 per cent said that they did not know any 
organisation that they could approach for help with identifying scam 
approaches. Fifty six per cent of victims of telemarketing were over the 
age of 50 years. 
A.5 The OFT has also published research into the prevalence and impact of 
mass marketed scams on the UK public. The research included initial 
interviews with more than 11,200 people and 1,900 detailed follow-up 
interviews with people who reported they had been a victim of a scam, 
or knew someone who had been a victim, or target of a scam. The 
research found that nearly half of the UK adult population has been 
targeted by a scam and that every year one in 15 people (3.2 million 
adults) in the UK fall victim to a scam at a total annual cost of 
£3.5billion. Older consumers were more likely to be targeted by a scam, 
with 25 per cent of those targeted being over the age of 65, and 24 per 
cent between 55-64 years old. There was, however, a spread of actual 
victims across the age ranges. Older victims (aged 55 and over) were 
likely to lose nearly twice as much per scam compared to younger age 
groups. Of those who fell for the scams, 32 per cent said it was because 
of the legitimate and professional appearance of the marketing, 30 per 
cent said they were caught off guard, and 13 per cent because of the 
excitement at the prospect of getting a good deal or winning a prize.   
A.6 These results show the importance of systematic research and 
information review about the psychological processes associated with 
scam approaches as well as the responses and decision making 
processes of scam victims. 
A.7 The survey that follows includes the most relevant and best quality 
articles relating to the psychology of scams we have been able to find. It 
should give an impression about the status of the field, namely that the 
professional and empirical literature on scamming is thin and fragmented. 
Not only are there few articles in total, fewer than five per cent of the 
scientific articles we did find had been published in high rank peer 







Scams as communications 
A.8 In this section, we briefly summarise the most relevant findings from the 
scientific literature, categorising the research reports by the classic 
elements of communication – source, medium, message and receiver.   
Source factors 
A.9 As scamming is an unlawful activity, information about the perpetrators 
and their behaviour is inevitably hard to come by.  In two linked papers, 
Duffield and Grabosky (2001) and Grabosky and Duffield (2001) claim to 
identify some psychological correlates of fraud offending, but scamming 
(which they call 'mass market fraud') is only one of four categories of 
offence that they consider. Furthermore, their analysis is theoretically 
rather than empirically based. They conclude that modern media and 
internet technology helps the perpetrator to avoid seeing the situation 
from the victims' point of view. Together with the lack of social norms, 
these effects make it easier for the perpetrators to cope with their crime 
and to reduce their feelings of guilt and empathy for the victims.  
Despite their limitations, these two articles are the best starting point we 
have for a consideration of source factors in scam communication, so 
we will return to consider them further in the 'Psychological Processes' 
section below. 
A.10 We have found no systematic empirical investigations of the 
motivations, behaviour or criminal careers of scammers. The nearest to 
usable empirical information about scammers come from 'confessional' 
books in which former scammers purports to reveal the tricks of the 
trade and also to give an insight into the mind of a scammer. An 
example is the book by 'SpammerX' (2004), which concludes that 
spammers are driven by feelings of 'adrenaline rush, money, danger, and 
avoidance of local, federal, and international law enforcement agencies'.  
Sending out scam e-mails and waiting for the responses is a kind of 
psychological 'kick' to many perpetrators, and could be very appealing 






A.11 An issue that would be worth investigating through such literature, 
despite the need to treat its claims with caution, is the relationship 
between scamming and hacking (see also Kilger, Arkin, & Stutzman, 
2004). Clearly some hackers have become scammers, and scammers 
have borrowed tricks from the hacking world (see Mitnick & Simon, 
2002).  But hacking is usually thought of as an individual activity, with 
social support if any coming over the internet. In contrast, confessional 
sources suggest that scamming may be undertaken in more social 
situations, and some of the more elaborate scams clearly require teams 
of several people to carry them out. Indeed Furnell (2004) claims that 
the rise of phishing has brought organised crime into the spamming 
world.  
A.12 There is better information about the technical devices used by 
scammers, especially in relation to the internet, but it is more closely 
related to other literature on the medium of scam communications so is 
considered below.  
Medium factors 
A.13 This is the largest category of literature, but it focuses entirely on a 
single medium, namely the internet. The Office of Fair Trading has an 
enforcement remit to tackle scams disseminated via the internet, text 
message, face-to-face, phone, or post (that is, non-broadcast media), 
but the characteristics of the latter two media receive very little 
attention in the literature, even though the significant empirical work of 
the AARP (1996abc) was based around telephone rather than internet 
scamming. 
A.14 As regards the internet, a whole category of articles has been found in 
computer technology and information service journals. This is an 
extensive literature and we have only included samples of it, because it 
is only marginally relevant to the present research project. The articles 
are mainly technical, characterising spam and other internet offences (for 
example, Grimes, 2004; Hinde 2001, 2002; Sasse 2004), describing 
how it works in terms of the technology of the internet (for example 






al, 2007; Kerremans et al, 2005), internet and data management (for 
example, Hinde 2003; Simpson 2003) or legal and regulatory issues (for 
example, Ayoade & Kosuge, 2002; Davidson, 2007; Kraut et al 2005; 
Kumaraguru et al, 2007; Rogers 2006). Papers of this kind typically 
have little if any explicit psychological content. Inevitably, however, they 
depend on an implicit psychology of the internet user, and making that 
explicit might be a worth while source of hypotheses at least. For 
example, Grimes (2004) argues that anti-spam measures on the internet 
will only work if they place zero burden on legitimate or casual email 
use; this is implicitly saying that consumers set a very low value, in 
terms of the effort or inconvenience they are prepared to suffer, on 
avoiding exposure to spam (which inevitably includes a proportion of 
scam messages).   
A.15 Kumaraguru et al (2007) take a different approach, seeking ways of 
training users to detect and avoid responding to phishing messages 
rather than blocking every possible spam message by technological 
means. The implicit psychology of the user in this case is of a technically 
unsophisticated person who can be taught rules of thumb to reduce risk 
– but is little influenced by the standard security notices that banks and 
other authorities send out to warn people of the risks of phishing 
attacks. 
Message factors 
A.16 The most basic kind of message information is what kind of scam is 
being attempted – that is, what is being offered to the potential victim.  
Langenderfer and Shimp (2001) argued that scammers use what 
Loewenstein (1996), in an influential paper on decision errors, has called 
viscerally oriented rewards. These are rewards for which the victim is 
likely to have a very high motivation, either chronically or aroused by the 
scam message. The obvious examples are money, sex, anxiety and pain, 
though scams may also exploit strong emotions like pity by references to 
political, natural or personal disasters. So scam messages address basic 
needs such as greed, anxiety, or physical pain (for example, by falsely 






appearing to ask for money in order to offer a ‘cure’ to an arthritis 
sufferer who suffers from severe physical pain).   
A.17 Langenderfer and Shimp (2001) argue that under conditions of high 
visceral influence the mechanisms of people's decision making change, 
making it less likely that clues to the scam status of a message ('scam 
alerts') will be noticed. For example, ‘miracle’ health product scams 
often claim that they can help the potential victim to alleviate pain, a 
direct offer of a viscerally-related reward. The aim is that the victim’s 
pre-existing pain and the associated motivation to reduce it will override 
caution and prevent the scam being detected. Cues within these health-
related scam communications that, for example, directly address the 
motivation to be free from pain, additionally reduce rational thought and 
caution in decision making processes and associated decision-relevant 
information seeking. 
A.18 Langenderfer and Shimp point out that a frequent aspect of scam 
message content is an emphasis on the urgency or uniqueness of the 
opportunity that is being offered. These are of course techniques that 
are used in legitimate marketing as well, and are widely believed to be 
effective, though empirical studies of their effectiveness are rare.  
Examples include experiments by Worchel, Lee and Adewole (1975), 
who found the desirability of cookies was maximal when they were 
perceived to be scarce due to high demand, by Lynn (1989) in which he 
manipulated the perceived scarcity of art prints and wine and found that 
it had a positive and significant affect on the items' desirability, and by 
Verhallen and Robben (1994) who found that scarcity and preference 
were positively correlated only for popular items, and only where the 
scarcity was a result of limited availability due to market conditions, so 
that supply could be seen to be genuinely limited.  
A.19 It can be argued that urgency and uniqueness claims are always on the 
edge of being deceptive, even when genuine goods are being offered at 
a fair price, since the seller is almost certain to return to the market with 
a similar offer in future: their purpose is always to encourage the buyer 
towards a decision sooner and perhaps after less consideration than s/he 






A.20 Riquelme & Wang (2004) argue that many websites within legitimate 
commerce contain biases, which they regard as unintentional, that may 
mislead consumers to the advantage of the advertiser, and inducing a 
false sense of urgency would certainly qualify as such a bias. In general 
consumers are sensitive to the implausibility of uniqueness claims: Shirai 
and Bettman (2005) found that if consumers evaluated a deal they were 
being offered as though the same or a similar deal would be offered 
soon, the judged attractiveness of the present deal was lower than if 
they thought that the interval before the deal was offered again was 
longer.  
Techniques of persuasion 
A.21 Rusch (1999) argues, from his perspective as a prosecutor at the US 
Department of Justice, that internet scammers use social engineering 
techniques that are typical of traditional fraud. He concludes therefore 
that social psychology holds the key to understanding internet 
scammers' techniques. He makes a number of interesting suggestions 
about how it might work, soundly based in the research literature on 
persuasive communication. In particular, he focuses on three core social 
psychological topics as aids to understanding scam messages and how 
they work. These are:  
• the contrast between central (logical and systematic) and peripheral 
(emotional and superficial) routes to persuasion, with the fraudster 
necessarily relying on peripheral routes, for example by stirring up 
strong emotions such as excitement or fear at the beginning of an 
interaction; 
• attitudes and beliefs. Rusch sweeps a number of possible effects 
together here, including the scammers' tendency to demean their 
victims, and the victims' tendency to focus on the apparent 







• persuasion and influence techniques. Here Rusch draws up a long 
list of techniques: Authority, Scarcity, Liking and Similarity, 
Reciprocation, Commitment and Consistency, Social Proof. 
A.22 Rusch then proceeds to argue that different kinds of internet fraud 
provide evidence of these various processes at work. The ones that he 
invokes most often, however, are the false assertion of authority; the 
creation of an impression of scarcity (an almost inevitable feature of 
auctions and therefore a ready tool in the hands of the fraudulent user of 
internet auction sites) and reciprocation, in which something is given to 
the victim who then, even though it was unsolicited, feels a sense of 
obligation which is sufficient to keep the interaction going. 
Mythic content 
A.23 Cukier, Nesselroth, and Cody (2007) and Kienpointner (2006) both 
carried through analyses of the content of  'Nigerian Scam Letters'. 
Cukier et al applied Rusch's analysis of social psychological processes of 
persuasion, but also invoked literary and anthropological sources to 
identify the common myths and plot motifs that the scam letters used.  
They looked at 111 such letters and concluded that the Nigerian letters 
are a specific and distinct genre of scam mailings.  They found that key 
elements are 'rich narrative appeals to strong emotions like greed, guilt 
and lust', and that the scammers used 'archetypical myths of windfall 
fortunes'. Specifically, the letters address feelings of greed, charity, 
heroism and other associated strong emotional cues. The authors 
recognised many 'elements and motifs from the 'rags to riches' myth, 
which permeates many cultures'. In these letters, the 'hero has a quest 
or task to overcome against all odds and is aided by supernatural agent 
such as the fairy god mother or a human sidekick'. These themes are 
mostly frameworked by stories similar to a fairytale or ideas like the 
American dream. The authors also found that most victims react to 
these mailings because of greed. The desire to get rich quickly makes 








A.24 A major issue about the Recipient of the scam communication is whether 
there are reliable individual differences in vulnerability. Almost all authors 
agree that such differences exist at the demographic level, with the 
elderly, less well educated, and socially isolated being particularly 
vulnerable. Scammers are often held to share these beliefs and to target 
their messages at vulnerable groups, though clearly much internet 
scamming is essentially untargeted, because of its very low costs to the 
scammer. 
A.25 Such demographic factors have been documented empirically. For 
example, Grimes et al (2007) report that older internet users suffer a 
double extra vulnerability to scams – they receive as much spam email 
as younger users despite lower internet use, and they are more likely to 
make purchases as a result of spam. The main reasons for this finding 
might lie in the fact that (a) older people have less experience with the 
internet as a medium, (b) are cognitively less able to detect typical scam 
attributes, and (c) may suffer from cognitive impairments that may 
reduce their motivational and cognitive abilities to deeply elaborate scam 
messages. 
A.26 Is it possible to go beyond these broad demographic differences in 
vulnerability to a more psychological level, which might be more 
illuminating from the point of view of understanding the mechanisms 
through which people fall for scams? An older article by Bearden et al 
(1989) – important partly because the senior author is a highly respected 
consumer psychologist and partly because the article was published in 
the most influential journal in the field – discusses how susceptibility to 
interpersonal influence attempts in general can be measured, and 
establishes a scale that is reliable, valid, and practical to use. The 
authors proposed that susceptibility to interpersonal (social) influence is 
a basic trait (personality characteristic) that may vary across different 
people and is associated to other personality characteristics (such as for 
example, conformity or self-esteem). Bearden et al. (1989) defined 
consumer susceptibility to interpersonal influence as 'the need to identify 






the acquisition and use of products and brands, the willingness to 
conform to the expectations of others regarding purchase decisions, 
and/or the tendency to learn about products and services by observing 
others or seeking information from others'. The authors showed that the 
constructed measure differentiates between individuals who are highly 
susceptible to fall for scams versus people who are less prone to 
respond.  
A.27 Obviously, scams and frauds of all kinds, are interpersonal influence 
attempts par excellence, but although Bearden et al's article has been 
highly influential, it has been followed up almost entirely in the context 
of legitimate marketing. It does seem reasonable, however, to conclude 
that susceptibility to scams will vary depending on the recipient's 
personality, over and above the obvious contextual or situational impact 
factors such as age and previous experience. Relevant kinds of 
experience include how used the person is to the media via which the 
scam communication is delivered, and how much background knowledge 
they have about the scam message content.  
A.28 As regards Internet scams, two lines of evidence suggest that people's 
experience with the internet and their style of interacting with it may 
influence their vulnerability. Rodgers and Chen (2007), in a large sample 
survey, found that the more elevated people's motives for using the 
internet, the more negative their responses to spam. Rodgers and Chen 
view spam as a special form of internet advertising, and they argue that 
internet advertising is distinctive because the recipient interacts more 
actively with the advertisement than with other media. Secondly, in a 
paper produced for the UK government Foresight programme, Dutton 
and Shepherd (2004) counter-intuitively propose that familiarity with the 
medium by which a scam arrives may make one more rather than less 
vulnerable. They found that trust in the internet is higher among frequent 
users compared to non-frequent users of the internet. This means that 
people who have experience with the internet may be more prone to fall 
into the trap of scamming than people with low internet experience.  
This would be an overconfidence effect, and could be linked to a number 
of other situations that have been studied in the decision-making 






demonstrated experimentally (for example Camerer & Lovallo, 1999). 
From a broad body of research we know that overconfidence in decision 
alternatives and associated information leads to biases in decision 
making and information search (Fischer et al., 2008). For example, 
people tend to seek out more confirmatory information when they are 
very confident that their decision is correct. This tendency leads to an 
information search bias that has been found to reduce the quality of 
decision outcomes (Kray & Galinsky, 2003).  
A.29 Related to scamming, people with high experience of the internet 
medium tend to be overconfident with information that has been 
received via this medium (because they have much experience with it 
and thus they trust in it much more). As a consequence of this 
overconfidence they tend to neglect information that is inconsistent with 
their preliminary standpoint or behavioural reaction (see also Fischer et 
al., 2005 who showed that people mainly seek for information which 
supports their own standpoint, and then systematically regard this as 
higher quality information compared to information which questions their 
standpoint). As a result, people fall for scams because they are 
overconfident in their preliminary preferences (that is, to react to the 
scam) and thus neglect inconsistent (warning) information that would 
help them to recognise the fraud intention. 
Psychological processes in scam response - introduction 
A.30 Dutton and Shepherd's proposal of overconfidence effects introduces 
the second theme in research on Recipient factors, namely the 
psychological processes that might be involved in falling for a scam.  
Empirically, this is an under-developed area. The most substantial 
theoretical contribution is the paper by Langenderfer and Shimp (2001), 
already referred to. They take the list of influence techniques proposed 
by Rusch (1999), and consider in much more detail how they might 
work at the level of the recipient of the scam communication.  We will 
discuss their proposals further below, but in brief they seek to marry 
ideas about visceral influences on decision making (Loewenstein, 1996) 
with an influential theory of persuasive communication, the Elaboration 






together the two key approaches to the psychology of scams. They 
argue that the effect of many variables that determine the effectiveness 
of scams will depend critically on whether or not the scammer, by using 
that variable, succeeds in arousing a state of high visceral involvement 
(that is, in a state of experienced strong emotions and associated 
motivations) in the potential victim. If so, cognitive resources (that is, 
individuals' conscious thoughts) are likely to be directed wholly to the 
supposed reward, with a consequent loss of self-control and of the 
ability to respond to warning cues, even in people who would not 
otherwise be vulnerable. In our opinion, this model is rather compelling 
and helpful in the explanation of why people fall for scam 
communications. In particular, the combination of affective 
(motivational) and cognitive factors is a substantial development in the 
scarce literature on the psychology of scamming. 
The effects of being scammed 
A.31 The final area of research into Recipient factors concerns the 
psychological consequences of having been scammed.  While noting that 
investigations of victims of white-collar crimes are generally rare, Schicor 
et al (1994) investigated the reactions of victims of a major telephone 
investment scam in the US, and summarised their findings in three 
words: Anger, Disappointment and Disgust, and in so far as these 
reactions are turned inwards by victims, they are likely to reduce the 
probability that people will report the fact that they have been scammed. 
From mood regulation theories (for example, Jonas et al., 2006) we 
know that people want to alleviate their negative emotional state by 
neglecting or avoiding information that might increase (or at least does 
not help to reduce) this negative affective state. Thus, not reporting the 
scam might be a way of avoiding further thinking about being defrauded. 
A.32 Snyder (1986) concludes, in the context of gambling swindles (mostly 
investigated in the context of betting), that victims generalise their 
feelings of success - that is, they feel generally successful as gamblers -  
when objectively the success belongs to particular bets. This works to 
the victim's detriment. Also, the Ego is an important factor; victims have 






attaining social prestige for winning. These key variables hinder people 
from detecting fraud in gambling offers, in Snyder's view. Snyder 
concluded that people mostly become victims because (a) they 
generalise success in one area of their life (for example their job) to the 
gambling context, (b) they get involved by the idea of winning with low 
risk, and (c) their ego makes them vulnerable (for example prestige, self-
esteem). It would be interesting to investigate whether these findings 
also can be transferred to victims of lottery scams. 
Psychological processes involved in responding to scams 
A.33 Because of the importance for the present research of understanding the 
psychological processes involved in responding to scams, we draw out 
in this final section of the review the main themes that have emerged in 
the survey of the literature above. 
Internet technology reduces empathy and perspective taking 
A.34 Internet technology helps the scam perpetrator to avoid face to face 
contact with his or her victims (Duffield & Grabowski, 2001). 
Psychological research on pro-social and anti-social behaviour (for 
example Batson, 1998) revealed that immediate visual contact increases 
feelings of empathy, which reduces individuals' tendency to be 
aggressive towards other people and increases individuals' tendency to 
be pro-social. In the case of scamming, the distance that internet 
technology allows between the sender and the receiver of a message 
prevents the emergence of empathy, so that the perpetrator is never 
likely to see things from the perspective of the victim, making it all the 
easier to go on and cheat them. These processes are very likely to 
generalize to other forms of distance communication such as postal 
scam mailings. 
Sensation seeking 
A.35 Sensation seeking is a cognitive and affective psychological state that 
can explain both why victims fall for scams as well as why perpetrators 






A.36 In psychological terms these feelings and experiences can be subsumed 
under the concept of sensation seeking (Zuckerman, 1994), which 
accounts for people who engage in risky behaviour in order to increase 
their physiological and related psychological arousal state. Sensation 
seeking can be measured by a standardised scale (Zuckerman, 1994) 
and represents a trait (that is, personality characteristic) that is regarded 
to be stable over time. Previous research has shown that sensation 
seeking is responsible for a broad variety of negative, risk-taking, and 
mindless behaviours. With regard to potential scam victims, sending 
money and waiting for a potential response ('the big prize') might be 
very highly arousing for people scoring high on the trait of sensation 
seeking. 
Visceral influences 
A.37 Scam perpetrators often address basic human desires and needs (such 
as greed, fear, avoidance of physical pain, or to feel liked or loved). This 
can provoke basic visceral reactions and thus reduce individuals' 
motivation to deeply process the content of a scam message 
(Langenderfer & Shimp, 2001). Thus, important cues that may be 
specific to scams (and thus help distinguish scam messages from non-
scam messages) are not detected and falling for the scam becomes more 
probable. In addition, we know from previous research that the quality of 
decision making is reduced when people are in a state of strong 
motivational and visceral psychological processes. People in such a 
psychological state simply do not elaborate pros and cons of a decision 
and neglect possible shortcomings in decision alternatives and decision-
related ramifications. Finally, addressing visceral reactions in scam 
recipients is also associated with a psychological state of being 'out of 
control'. For example, people in the psychological state of strong buying 
desire often neglect the negative implications associated with their 
buying decision (such as increased debts, etc). Similar processes might 






Lack of self control 
A.38 Lack of self-control is one of the best documented causes of non-optimal 
choice and errors of judgement (for example Thaler & Shifrin, 1981; 
Baumeister, Vohs & Tice, 2007). These authors have shown that self-
control is a limited resource that can be depleted by tasks that require 
self-control (such as suppressing emotions or controlling what one is 
attending to). As soon as this resource for self-control is depleted, 
individuals are worse in decision making and controlling their emotions. 
So far the applied transition to scam research has not been made in this 
area. Therefore, it would be up to future research to investigate lack of 
control and ego-depletion as a possible cause for becoming a scam 
victim. 
Lack of motivation 
A.39 Scam victims are often found to be in a state of low motivation to 
process information thoroughly (for example, Langenderfer & Shimp, 
2001). This decreased motivation might derive from (a) cognitive 
impairments (for example, caused by dementia) and (b) by specific 
content in scam messages (for example, scam messages address basic 
human drives and desires, which can reduce the ability and motivation of 
deeper thinking). As a consequence, specific attributes that help to 
distinguish scam messages from non-scam messages are disregarded, 
inducing errors of judgement. Counter-intuitively this tendency for 
reduced motivation to adequately process decision-relevant information 
should be increased for people with high rather than low financial 
resources. They simply mind less about losing £10 or £20 'in the game'.  
Reduced cognitive abilities 
A.40 Many elderly people suffer, to varying degrees of severity, from reduced 
cognitive abilities and thus should have a higher probability of falling 
victim to a scam. Research carried out by the OFT (Research on impact 
of mass marketed scams, 2006) suggests that older people are more 
likely to be targeted by scams, but they are not more prone to falling 






greater reluctance of older scam victims to admit to being scammed.  
However, on a quantitative basis, the OFT research suggested that older 
people lose nearly twice as much money per scam compared to younger 
age groups. The reason for this somewhat unexpected finding might be 
that among the target group of elder people, there are those that are 
classified by the OFT as 'chronic scam victims'. These are people who 
repeatedly respond to scam communications (many of these chronic 
responders suffer from reduced cognitive abilities). Cognitive abilities are 
necessary to make good decisions, such as distinguishing typical scam 
attributes from non-scam attributes (for example, Langenderfer & Shimp, 
2001). However, since cognitive processes are psychologically distinct 
from motivational and visceral ones, we have pointed them out 
separately. In particular, people with lowered cognitive abilities will be 
vulnerable to scams even if high visceral influence is not aroused. 
Norm activation 
A.41 Scam content often activates specific norms, such as the norm to help 
or the norm to be a good citizen. Norm arousal is a classic means of 
persuasion. For example, some West African advance fee scam offers 
describe a person in need (for example, an impoverished and orphaned 
child) who needs a specific amount of money to be able to support their 
siblings. These types of scam offers just activate a basic human norm to 
help other people (see also Batson, 1998). This argument is expanded 
further by Doob & Ecker, 1970, who research stigma and compliance. 
By activating this helping norm, the probability increases that people will 
respond to scams and lose money. 
False consensus effect 
A.42 Scammers make recipients believe that they have something in common 
with them (for example, some physical, psychological, intellectual or 
personal history-related attribute). Thus, the receiver of the scam 
message tends to overestimate the reliability and validity of the scam 
message as well as to overestimate the trustworthiness of the scam 
source, leading to errors in decision (see also Cukier et al., 2007). For 






potential scam victim is already personally known to the sender due to 
para-psychological, spiritual or esoteric abilities that the scammer claims. 
This technique has the potential to increase the probability that people 
fall for the scam due to the false consensus effect. 
Authority 
A.43 People tend to obey authorities, even if they are not present in a specific 
situation (see also Milgram, 1965). Classic studies showed that authority 
influence can even bring people to hurt another person severely. The 
communication medium might increase the perception of authority 
(especially for older people), for example envelopes may refer to an 
'Official Notice' or 'Important Documents' enclosed, texts are written in 
machine-type letters and official looking seals and logo’s can be used to 
increase the perceived underlying authority of a scam. The impact of 
authority on psychological and behavioural responding is located within 
the area of social influence, which is a classic social psychological 
domain and a major contributory source to the psychology of persuasive 
communication. 
Altercasting 
A.44 Source credibility theory includes demonstration of the effect of 
'Altercasting', in which one person places another in a role, by 
themselves taking up the complementary role (Pratkanis et al., 2004). 
Scammers take up roles to cause their victims to act from 
complementary roles, for example they may act as dependants, causing 
victims to act as protectors, or act as a ‘friend’ causing a friendship 
response. The authority effect discussed above similarly works via 
altercasting, in that the victim's response will be according to the social 
role appropriate in response to authority. 
Liking and similarity 
A.45 People tend to like people who like them. Scam offers, which include 
phrases that suggest to recipients that they are liked by the sender, 






offers which do not include such content (see also Cukier et al., 2007). 
For example, the scammer might communicate that they are in the same 
economic, social, professional or private position (for example, have a 
specific similar health problem) as the potential victims, which can 
induce an increased liking and empathy for the scammer. In addition, 
scammers also normally make compliments towards their potential 
victims, so that they feel unique and special. 
Reciprocation 
A.46 If people are given something then they feel a strong inclination to give 
something back. Scammers can use this basic human tendency (for 
example, by providing a small gift or by making it appear they are 
bending the rules in the recipient's favour) to successfully pitch their 
scams. The theory of reciprocal concessions for inducing compliance 
supports the presence of this process (Cialdini et al., 1975). 
Commitment and consistency 
A.47 People tend to appreciate consistency both in their own behaviour as 
well as in the behaviour and reactions of other people. Consistency 
provides them with a sense of control and thus facilitates a sense of 
ability to explain and predict the world (see control theory by Brem, 
1964). Scams which persuade recipients to respond in a first instance 
(perhaps without requiring any money to be paid) make them more 
willing to react in a second instance (where scammers then ask for 
money). A similar effect has been explored by Cialdini et al (1978), who 
refer to it as the 'low-ball' sales technique. 
Social proof 
A.48 In situations of uncertainty people tend to look to other people in order 
to define reality. Scam messages, which contain cues of social proof (for 
example text passages that argue that other people already reacted or 
benefited from the scam offer such as fake testimonials) have a higher 
probability to be successful than scams that do not include this 






Mood regulation and phantom fixation 
A.49 Scams trigger basic human needs and desires, which are mostly 
associated with positive emotions. Hence, many scam victims might 
respond in order to reduce negative mood or to increase positive mood. 
Scammers aim to create a fixation in the victim on the offer or prize 
which is the bait. They do this by engaging the victim in imagining the 
item/money/etc, so that it becomes a specific 'phantom fixation' for the 
victim, as explored by Horvitz & Pratkanis (2002).  
Positive illusions 
A.50 People tend to overestimate their abilities (above-average effect), the 
prosperity of their future (positive illusion about the own future) and their 
abilities to carry out control over their life and environment (illusion of 
control, see also Taylor & Brown, 1988). Scam victims might comply 
with scam messages because they overestimate their abilities to detect 
fraud, because they experience a high level of control over the whole 
situation (that is, they overestimate the probability for positive outcomes 
associated with the scam response; or they overestimate their own 
abilities to detect scam from non-scam communications), and/or tend to 
attribute positive future outcomes to complying with the scam message. 
Self-regulation 
A.51 People who respond to scam communications tend to be less able to 
self-regulate their emotional responses (Langenderfer & Shimp, 2007). 
From self-regulation theory (ego-depletion accounts) we know that self-
regulation and self-control is a limited resource that is reduced when 
people have recently had to exert self-control; the capacity for self 
control is also a personality characteristic (that is, some people are 
better, some people are worse in exerting self-control). In particular 
people with low levels of trait self-control as well as people who are in a 
psychological state of exhaustion (ego-depletion) should be less able to 
suppress their emotional reactions towards scam content and thus more 
inclined to react to scam messages. In addition, the negative effects of 






have a greater impact on people who are not integrated into social 
networks. Social networks induce social norms (social rules) and provide 
a source for social comparison. Even in a state of reduced self-control, 
available social networks (and associated social reference points) might 
help to decide what offer is genuine and what is not in the context of 
scam communications. 
Approaches to consumer education  
A.52 Given that the essence of scams is that they are dishonest, scam  
communications do contain clues about their status. Much effort in scam 
prevention has focused on trying to educate potential victims to detect 
these 'scam alerts' or warning signs. They range from the simple 
implausibility either of the offer (for example a multi-million pound prize 
in a lottery you never entered) or of the means of securing it (for 
example disclosing your bank account password and PIN number to a 
website in response to a phishing email when banks constantly say that 
they will never ask for information in that way), to technical features of 
an email or phishing web site, as discussed by authors such as Furnell 
(2004) or James (2005). Kumaraguru et al. (2007) argue that current 
methods of teaching people to detect such cues, such as sending out 
security notices, are ineffective, but demonstrate experimentally that 
inserting training emails into the normal email stream was effective in 
raising people's awareness of scams and of reliable defensive 
techniques. In a more general context, research by Fischer et al. (2008) 
found making consumers focus on potential losses (loss decision frame) 
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B STUDY ONE: DETAILS OF THE INTERVIEW METHOD  
B.1 We interviewed 30 people, from many different places in the UK. All 
were recruited on the basis that they self-identified as scam victims.  
They were recruited by media advertising, from people who had 
approached the OFT or Consumer Direct to complain about scams, and 
through the first batch of questionnaires (Study 3A). All participants 
received £50 for participation in the interviews. All interviews were 
conducted by a researcher who was experienced in conducting one-to-
one interviews on sensitive topics. 
B.2 Most of the interviewees clearly were scam victims. However, as 
expected, in the course of the interviews it emerged that some of them 
(a total of seven) were either non-victims or marginal victims. Of these, 
two were relatives of victims, not victims themselves; two believed on 
reasonable grounds that they had spotted a scam in time to prevent loss, 
though in fact they did lose money (one filled his details in ready to pay 
on-line for a presumably fraudulent product, but didn't press the 'submit' 
button, while the other cancelled his standing order after a free trial; in 
both cases money was in fact taken); and the remaining three must be 
seen as non-victims by the scammers, since although they were 
deceived, they did not in fact lose any money.   
B.3 Most interviews lasted about one hour. The interviews were semi-
structured. Interviewees were encouraged to tell the story in their own 
words. The interviewer's role was to check her understanding and to 
encourage a deeper picture to emerge. The interviewer attempted to 
focus the conversation on the time before the interviewee gave the 
scammer the money or information, but naturally the interviews also 
included content about the interviewee's feelings afterwards. In addition, 
a number of questions were asked of each interviewee where they 
seemed appropriate. These were: Did you have any doubts at the time? 
Did it seem urgent - that the offer would expire? Did it seem a big step 
or a small step? Would you have felt able to talk to anyone about it? (Did 
you feel it was a private matter? Are there people you would certainly 
not have told?) Do you have any thoughts on how you might have been 






aware in general, before this happened, that there are such things as 
trick letters/scams being sent to people? (If it was a premium rate phone 
scam, that there are expensive rate phone numbers from which the 
scammer makes a profit?) Was there any one thing about it, which really 
tipped the balance and led to you being scammed? (Or if they nearly fell 
for it, what tipped the balance in their favour). What advice would you 
give to others? 
B.4 All interviews were audio-taped and afterwards transcribed in full by an 
independent person, then corrected by the interviewer. All information 
that could identify the interviewee was removed at this stage. The 
interview transcripts were analysed by a combination of top-down, 
meaning-based and bottom-up, word-based, analyses. Both analysis 
methods focused on the interviews of the 25 participants who had 
actually lost money in a scam, and in particular only their statements / 
words and phrases contributed to the text-mining analyses. In the top-
down (thematic) analysis, a researcher who was experienced with 
conducting qualitative interviews reviewed the interview transcripts to 
pin-point recurring psychological themes around participants' behaviour 
(cf. Braun & Clarke, 2006), focusing on why they did or did not become 
a scam victim. In the bottom-up (text-mining) analysis, the words most 
frequently mentioned were extracted from the raw interview 
transcriptions (after deletion of the interviewer's questions). These 
words were combined into psychologically-meaningful categories by the 
two independent raters; discrepancies were solved by discussion. The 
categories used were related to the kinds of errors of judgement that 






C STUDY ONE: FURTHER DETAILS FROM THE ANALYSIS OF 
INTERVIEW TRANSCRIPTS  
C.1 The text-mining procedure identified the following top 20 mentioned 
words: money (N = 381 occurrences across 23 interviews), people (N 
= 329), number (N = 161), phone (N = 146), letter (N = 127), work 
(103), pay (101), name (88), company (84), pound (77), call (76), bank 
(74), address (N = 68), scam (N = 59), contact (N = 56), information 
(N = 55), cheque (N = 55), telephone (N = 51), ring (N = 48), home 






Table C.1  Study 1: Top 40 Most frequently mentioned single 
words from the analysis of interview transcripts (ignoring filler 
words such as is, the, and, etc.)  
 Word Rank Frequency Interviews 
 money 1 381 23 
 people 2 329 25 
 number 3 161 21 
 phone 4 146 21 
 letter 5 127 20 
 Work 6 103 15 
 Pay 7 101 17 
 name 8 88 22 
 company 9 84 14 
 pound 10 77 15 
 Call 11 76 16 
 Bank 12 74 13 
 address 13 68 15 
 Scam 14 59 18 
 contact 15 56 16 
 information 16 55 16 






 telephone 18 51 14 
 Ring 19 48 17 
 home 20 48 10 
 amount 21 47 17 
 e-mail 22 47 8 
 Start 23 44 15 
 Quid 24 44 11 
 person 25 40 16 
 order 26 40 9 
 Wife 27 39 11 
 Mind 28 37 16 
 internet 29 37 14 
 paper 30 37 12 
 website 31 37 8 
 google 32 36 3 
 Deal 33 35 13 
 shares 34 35 3 
 chance 35 32 11 
 Prize 36 32 8 






 lottery 38 32 7 
 office 39 31 12 







D STUDY TWO: DETAILS OF METHOD USED FOR TEXT 
MINING ANALYSIS OF SCAM MATERIALS 
D.1 Text mining procedures conduct a deep structural and semantic analysis 
with scam text and so enable us to identify typical phrases of more or 
less successful scams, categorize different scam contents, and thus 
assess the psychological quality of recurring scam content.  
D.2 More specifically, text mining refers generally to the process of deriving 
high quality information from text (for example, large amounts of 
documents, customers' feedback, interview transcripts or open-ended 
responses). High quality information is typically derived through the 
dividing of patterns and trends through means such as statistical pattern 
learning. Text mining usually involves the process of structuring the 
input text (usually parsing, along with the addition of some derived 
linguistic features and the removal of others, and subsequent insertion 
into a data base), deriving patterns within the structured data, and finally 
evaluation and interpretation of the output. High quality text mining 
tasks include text categorisation, text clustering, concept extraction, 
sentiment analysis, document summarisation, and entity relation 
modelling (i.e. learning relations between named entities). Text mining 
also can be used to explore the relationships between the content of 
documents and information stored in categorical or numeric variables 
such as the gender or the age of the respondent.  
D.3 Unweighted overall analysis. All 583 scam communications, from all 10 
subcategories of scam, were used in a single analysis, without regard to 
what type of scam they came from. Multiple occurrences of all words 
were counted. Assuming that the scam communications received by the 
OFT constitute an unbiased sample of the scam materials received by 
the public, this analysis will allow us to reach conclusions about the 






Table D.1  Study 2: Most frequently occurring words 
in scam communication materials, across the entire 
corpus of communications regardless of type 
(unweighted) 
Word Rank Frequency Documents 
prize 1 3942 358 
cheque 2 2597 363 
cash 3 2314 373 
money 4 2063 364 
winner 5 1849 331 
form 6 1695 388 
number 7 1592 394 
order 8 1380 329 
time 9 1374 302 
payment 10 1288 330 
claim 11 1253 290 
amount 12 1122 341 
document 13 1087 247 
return 14 1041 347 
date 15 987 373 






Table D.1  Study 2: Most frequently occurring words 
in scam communication materials, across the entire 
corpus of communications regardless of type 
(unweighted) 
Word Rank Frequency Documents 
life 17 870 147 
fee 18 810 220 
information 19 790 274 
game 20 781 130 
letter 21 763 266 
official 22 751 231 
delivery 23 705 203 
reply 24 696 266 
envelope 25 689 281 
bank 26 686 205 
service 27 652 252 
entry 28 647 183 
funds 29 641 202 
opportunity 30 610 217 
card 31 602 221 






Table D.1  Study 2: Most frequently occurring words 
in scam communication materials, across the entire 
corpus of communications regardless of type 
(unweighted) 
Word Rank Frequency Documents 
awards 33 590 162 
£10000 34 581 94 
sum 35 579 256 
office 36 574 218 
offer 37 564 215 
guarantee 38 550 199 
contact 39 520 257 
signature 40 508 262 
person 41 499 203 
box 42 496 187 
recipient 43 496 157 
profit 44 494 50 
company 45 462 186 
request 46 450 177 
bet 47 447 38 






Table D.1  Study 2: Most frequently occurring words 
in scam communication materials, across the entire 
corpus of communications regardless of type 
(unweighted) 
Word Rank Frequency Documents 
pay 49 437 205 
work 50 434 120 
luck 51 431 82 
mail 52 429 187 
place 53 429 170 
property 54 427 82 
report 55 424 124 
conditions 56 423 174 
processing 57 417 195 
record 58 413 156 
chance 59 411 164 
secret 60 407 76 
results 61 402 188 
account 62 397 170 
rules 63 392 143 






Table D.1  Study 2: Most frequently occurring words 
in scam communication materials, across the entire 
corpus of communications regardless of type 
(unweighted) 
Word Rank Frequency Documents 
home 65 377 157 
notification 66 376 172 
status 67 371 184 
benefit 68 371 154 
receipt 69 370 195 
help 70 368 134 
bonus 71 366 85 
release 72 361 145 
code 73 349 153 
call 74 348 153 
page 75 344 174 
value 76 342 146 
gift 77 338 102 
question 78 337 141 
success 79 326 85 






Table D.1  Study 2: Most frequently occurring words 
in scam communication materials, across the entire 
corpus of communications regardless of type 
(unweighted) 
Word Rank Frequency Documents 
terms 81 324 144 
members 82 320 139 
winnings 83 320 119 
lottery 84 320 104 
option 85 318 121 
details 86 316 189 
message 87 316 131 
costs 88 310 158 
acceptance 89 309 115 
telephone 90 300 171 
security 91 299 183 
response 92 299 171 
credit 93 298 172 
transfer 94 298 113 
100% 95 292 139 






Table D.1  Study 2: Most frequently occurring words 
in scam communication materials, across the entire 
corpus of communications regardless of type 
(unweighted) 
Word Rank Frequency Documents 
program 97 285 98 
sign 98 273 167 
change 99 272 133 
file 100 269 148 
products 101 269 95 
procedures 102 268 144 
proof 103 267 121 
agent 104 266 93 
congratulations 105 265 187 
price 106 262 104 
certificate 107 260 105 
promotion 108 259 121 
department 109 258 117 
hours 110 258 105 
customer 111 255 105 






Table D.1  Study 2: Most frequently occurring words 
in scam communication materials, across the entire 
corpus of communications regardless of type 
(unweighted) 
Word Rank Frequency Documents 
individual 113 251 118 
answer 114 249 126 
postal order 115 245 165 
event 116 243 94 
instructions 117 242 148 
racing 118 239 28 
confirmation 119 235 132 
hand 120 235 108 
documentation 121 235 86 
set 122 234 128 
world 123 232 109 
selection 124 231 72 
problems 125 227 103 
act 126 224 159 
horse 127 224 38 






Table D.1  Study 2: Most frequently occurring words 
in scam communication materials, across the entire 
corpus of communications regardless of type 
(unweighted) 
Word Rank Frequency Documents 
start 129 221 106 
business 130 220 78 
friend 131 218 106 
happiness 132 218 55 
future 133 217 107 
eligibility 134 217 84 
delay 135 213 144 
access 136 213 120 
book 137 212 44 
fortune 138 211 75 
tick 139 210 115 
identification 140 204 96 
participation 141 202 101 
candidate 142 201 62 
process 143 200 91 






Table D.1  Study 2: Most frequently occurring words 
in scam communication materials, across the entire 
corpus of communications regardless of type 
(unweighted) 
Word Rank Frequency Documents 
charge 145 198 121 
manager 146 197 124 
weight 147 197 30 
purchase 148 194 111 
risk 149 194 96 
judges 150 194 43 
period 151 191 111 
contest 152 191 70 
reason 153 190 101 
share 154 189 90 
sponsors 155 188 69 
control 156 187 87 
road 157 186 92 
play 158 186 88 
investment 159 185 69 






Table D.1  Study 2: Most frequently occurring words 
in scam communication materials, across the entire 
corpus of communications regardless of type 
(unweighted) 
Word Rank Frequency Documents 
clients 161 183 62 
registration 162 181 64 
£20000 163 181 35 
birth 164 179 106 
phone 165 174 102 
accordance 166 173 90 
line 167 169 93 
allocation 168 169 68 
items 169 168 72 
income 170 168 57 
postage 171 166 104 
priority 172 163 77 
membership 173 163 32 
payout 174 162 80 
disbursement 175 160 55 






Table D.1  Study 2: Most frequently occurring words 
in scam communication materials, across the entire 
corpus of communications regardless of type 
(unweighted) 
Word Rank Frequency Documents 
verification 177 157 83 
dispatch 178 153 81 
distribution 179 153 67 
fat 180 153 16 
visa 181 152 123 
choice 182 152 101 
working 183 151 75 
turn 184 151 69 
words 185 150 89 
double 186 146 80 
£10 187 145 66 
writing 188 144 98 
stamp 189 144 71 
tiebreaker 190 144 21 
regulations 191 143 71 






Table D.1  Study 2: Most frequently occurring words 
in scam communication materials, across the entire 
corpus of communications regardless of type 
(unweighted) 
Word Rank Frequency Documents 
advantage 193 142 95 
city 194 142 73 
reference 195 141 98 
package 196 140 42 
dreams =197 137 67 
advice =197 137 67 
country 198 135 88 







D.4 Weighted overall analysis. All 587 scam communications within all 10 
subcategories of scam types were again used to perform this analysis.  
However the different frequencies within each scam subtype were 
controlled by weighting the obtained word frequencies by the number of 
available scam communications within each category. Each of the 10 
categories (for example investment scams, bogus lottery scams) 
received a weight of 1. Each document within a category gets a weight 
of (1/n), that is, for example: if there are 46 documents within a 
category, the weight of each document is (1/46). A weighted concept 
score of 10 would mean that this concept occurs in every document in 
every category. This analysis allows for the possibility that the scam 
communications received by OFT do not constitute an unbiased sample 
of the scam materials received by the public, and allows us to reach 
conclusions about the typical discourse of scam communications 
abstracted from the prevalence of particular types of scam. 
Table D.2  Study 2: Most frequently occurring 
words in scam communication materials, 
across the entire corpus of communications 
regardless of type (weighted) 
Word Rank  
money 1  
cash 2  
offer 3  
cheque 4  
guarantee 5  
life 6  






Table D.2  Study 2: Most frequently occurring 
words in scam communication materials, 
across the entire corpus of communications 
regardless of type (weighted) 
Word Rank  
pay 8  
order 9  
prize 10  
return 11  
claim 12  
payment 13  
risk 14  
bank 15  
amount 16  
letter 17  
sum 18  
time 19  
work 20  
system 21  
price 22  






Table D.2  Study 2: Most frequently occurring 
words in scam communication materials, 
across the entire corpus of communications 
regardless of type (weighted) 
Word Rank  
form 24  
envelope 25  
call 26  
chance 27  
results 28  
account 29  
profit 30  
address 31  
contact 32  
home 33  
number 34  
winners 35  
winner 36  
100% 37  
opportunity 38  






Table D.2  Study 2: Most frequently occurring 
words in scam communication materials, 
across the entire corpus of communications 
regardless of type (weighted) 
Word Rank  
card 40  
cost 41  
problems 42  
success 43  
security 44  
awards 45  
investment 46  
delivery 47  
service 48  
winnings 49  
congratulations 50  
office 51  
proof 52  
fund 53  
start 54  






Table D.2  Study 2: Most frequently occurring 
words in scam communication materials, 
across the entire corpus of communications 
regardless of type (weighted) 
Word Rank  
business 56  
instructions 57  
members 58  
entry 59  
signature 60  
document 61  
value 62  
charge 63  
trial 64  
person 65  
reply 66  
credit 67  
doubt 68  
hours 69  
share 70  






Table D.2  Study 2: Most frequently occurring 
words in scam communication materials, 
across the entire corpus of communications 
regardless of type (weighted) 
Word Rank  
company 72  
access 73  
benefit 74  
companies 75  
report 76  
sign 77  
code 78  
refund 79  
income 80  
help 81  
name 82  
energy 83  
option 84  
loss 85  
terms 86  






Table D.2  Study 2: Most frequently occurring 
words in scam communication materials, 
across the entire corpus of communications 
regardless of type (weighted) 
Word Rank  
notification 88  
transfer 89  
manager 90  
advantage 91  
lottery 92  
fee 93  
mail 94  
choice 95  
response 96  
friend 97  
reason 98  
answer 99  
health 100  
deadline 101  
horse 102  






Table D.2  Study 2: Most frequently occurring 
words in scam communication materials, 
across the entire corpus of communications 
regardless of type (weighted) 
Word Rank  
product 104  
bet 105  
power 106  
gift 107  
processing 108  
effects 109  
agent 110  
membership 111  
property 112  
department 113  
luck 114  
game 115  
millionaire 116  
participation 117  
confidence 118  






Table D.2  Study 2: Most frequently occurring 
words in scam communication materials, 
across the entire corpus of communications 
regardless of type (weighted) 
Word Rank  
racing 120  
tel 121  
reference 122  
body 123  
email 124  
advice 125  
fax 126  
attention 127  
questions 128  
clients 129  
happiness 130  
costs 131  
batch 132  
request 133  
control 134  






Table D.2  Study 2: Most frequently occurring 
words in scam communication materials, 
across the entire corpus of communications 
regardless of type (weighted) 
Word Rank  
future 136  
confirmation 137  
fat 138  
doctors 139  
capsules 140  
weight_ 141  
race 142  
bookmakers 143  
living 144  
events 145  
purchase 146  
play 147  
visa 148  
book 149  
family 150  






Table D.2  Study 2: Most frequently occurring 
words in scam communication materials, 
across the entire corpus of communications 
regardless of type (weighted) 
Word Rank  
postage 152  
tax 153  
bonus 154  
program 155  
allocation 156  
blood 157  
diets 158  
exercise 159  
treatment 160  
promotions 161  
destiny 162  
working 163  
contacts 164  
products 165  
fortune 166  






Table D.2  Study 2: Most frequently occurring 
words in scam communication materials, 
across the entire corpus of communications 
regardless of type (weighted) 
Word Rank  
customer 168  
stakes 169  
beneficiary 170  
catalogue 171  
voucher 172  
payout 173  
documentation 174  
knowledge 175  
gambles 176  
quality 177  
job 178  
identification 179  
pain 180  
drugs 181  
pound 182  






Table D.2  Study 2: Most frequently occurring 
words in scam communication materials, 
across the entire corpus of communications 
regardless of type (weighted) 
Word Rank  
promotion 184  
acceptance 185  
country 186  
£10000 187  
certificate 188  
writing 189  
birth 190  
eyes 191  
car 192  
investors 193  
story 194  
market 195  
stock 196  
madrid 197  
record 198  






Table D.2  Study 2: Most frequently occurring 
words in scam communication materials, 
across the entire corpus of communications 
regardless of type (weighted) 
Word Rank  
spain 200  
 
D.5 Subcategory analysis. The scam communications in each of the 
subcategories were analysed separately and the results compared 
between subcategories. In this analysis, the number of documents 
containing each word was counted, not the total number of occurrences. 
This analysis allows us to look at the different content of different types 
of scam. 
 
Table D.3  20 Most frequently occurring 
words in Advance fee ('419') scams 
Word Rank  Frequency 
fund 1 116 
bank 2 112 
money 3 97 
account 4 79 
name 5 57 
kin 6 55 






call 8 47 
address 9 39 
investment 10 39 
transaction 11 39 
death 12 38 
business 13 37 
country 14 37 
information 15 36 
transfer 16 36 
deceased 17 35 
friend 18 34 
details 19 31 







Table D.4  20 Most frequently 
occurring words in International 
sweepstake scams 
Word Rank  Frequency 
prize 1 2004 
cash 2 1652 
form 3 959 
cheque 4 913 
payment 5 773 
fee 6 715 
return 7 702 
amount 8 670 
winner 9 625 
document 10 581 
claim 11 544 
order 12 491 
entry 13 477 
official 14 460 
money 15 441 
office 16 438 






awards 18 409 
recipient 19 372 
record 20 352 
 
Table D.5  20 Most frequently 
occurring words in Fake clairvoyant 
scams 
Word Rank  Frequency 
life 1 484 
money 2 423 
luck 3 361 
secret 4 273 
cheque 5 219 
power 6 218 
happiness 7 188 
people 8 186 
help 9 179 
sum 10 156 
games 11 147 
events 12 146 






gift 14 142 
change 15 123 
fortune 16 119 
card 17 118 
problems 18 116 
future 19 113 







Table D.6  20 Most frequently 
occurring words in Prize draw pitch 
scams 
Word Rank  Frequency 
prize 1 1533 
cheque 2 1385 
order 3 831 
winner 4 818 
£10000 5 483 
document 6 421 
game 7 414 
form 8 400 
payment 9 319 
claim 10 272 
reply 11 260 
delivery 12 248 
official 13 234 
conditions 14 227 
request 15 217 
return 16 216 






rules 18 202 
bank 19 196 
guarantee 20 179 
 
Table D.7  20 Most frequently occurring 
words in 'Get rich quick' scams 
Word Rank  Frequency 
money 1 202 
work 2 185 
system 3 151 
success 4 141 
home 5 114 
business 6 93 
pay 7 85 
life 8 83 
cash 9 72 
profit 10 65 
product 11 65 
opportunity 12 63 






working 14 57 
order 15 55 
email 16 53 
companies 17 51 
agent 18 51 
hours 19 50 







Table D.8  20 Most frequently occurring 
words in Bogus investment scams 
Word Rank  Frequency 
money 1 103 
market 2 65 
trading 3 40 
investment 4 36 
trade 5 30 
system 6 30 
hours 7 27 
profit 8 25 
life 9 25 
share 10 24 
property 11 24 
stock 12 22 
cash 13 22 
work 14 21 
bank 15 21 
story 16 16 






report 18 15 
home 19 15 
price 20 14 
 
Table D.9  20 Most frequently occurring 
words in Bogus lottery scams 
Word Rank  Frequency 
prize 1 199 
number 2 180 
agent 3 145 
lottery 4 133 
address 5 129 
fax 6 125 
program 7 125 
money 8 122 
fund 9 118 
claim 10 117 
promotions 11 114 
cash 12 100 






batch 14 97 
contact 15 97 
bank 16 97 
email 17 94 
company 18 84 
tel 19 77 







Table D.10  20 Most frequently 
occurring words in 'Miracle' health 
cure scams 
Word Rank  Frequency 
weight 1 161 
fat 2 142 
body 3 99 
diets 4 96 
life 5 73 
capsules 6 72 
sugar 7 69 
time 8 64 
trial 9 64 
treatment 10 64 
blood 11 63 
exercise 12 58 
offer 13 54 
results 14 52 
health 15 50 
doctors 16 48 






foods 18 45 
erection 19 44 
order 20 43 
 
Table D.11  20 Most frequently 
occurring words in Premium rate prize 
draw scams 
Word Rank  Frequency 
cash 1 285 
claim 2 238 
number 3 135 
call 4 121 
awards 5 120 
prize 6 118 
code 7 97 
address 8 79 
form 9 74 
name 10 62 
winners 11 60 
cheque 12 54 






promotion 14 47 
allocation 15 40 
camera 16 39 
delivery 17 38 
value 18 37 
holiday 19 34 







Table D.12  20 Most frequently 
occurring words in Bogus racing tipster 
scams 
Word Rank  Frequency 
money 1 465 
bet 2 389 
profit 3 382 
information 4 266 
racing 5 236 
time 6 229 
service 7 214 
winners 8 203 
horse 9 188 
offer 10 161 
book 11 158 
system 12 149 
opportunity 13 123 
membership 14 120 
race 15 110 
clients 16 108 






results 18 98 
guarantee 19 91 
members 20 88 
 
D.6 For each analysis, the gross frequencies of words are reported in full; for 
the unweighted overall analysis and the subcategory analysis, 
frequencies of concepts to which the words could be assimilated are 
also presented (conceptual grouping cannot be done in a weighted 
analysis). Two independent raters sorted all significantly identified words 
into categories corresponding to key concepts, with disagreements being 
resolved by discussion. The categories were chosen partly on the basis 
of an inspection of the frequent words, but they were also influenced by 
the analysis in Section 4 of this report of the kinds of errors of 
judgement that might be relevant to scam compliance. Category names 
were largely based on these analyses. 






triggers Induced scarcity Overconfidence Size of prize 
Regret  
effect 
act 100 per cent advantage access information allocation acceptance 
action account advice candidate system amount decision 
answer administration beneficiary code  awards delay 
book agent benefit congratulations  bonus investment 
call bank bet contest  cash trial 












triggers Induced scarcity Overconfidence Size of prize 
Regret  
effect 
completion centre body eligibility  delivery  
contact certificate chance entry  double  
deadline clients change group  funds  
despatch commission choice holder  income  
envelope committee destiny individual  money  
form company doubt letter  price  
instructions computer dreams lottery  prize  
mail conditions energy members  profit  
order confirmation event message  share  
pay control experience notification  stake  
payment corporate fat offer  sum  
phone customer fortune participation  value  
postal order department friend people  £10  
refund disbursement future person  £100  
reminder distribution game priority  £10000  
reply document gift promotion  £20  












triggers Induced scarcity Overconfidence Size of prize 
Regret  
effect 
response entitlement happiness recipient  £30000  
return government health score    
sign guarantee help selection    
start identification home tiebreaker    
step insurance house winner    
telephone judges life     
tick management living     
 manager luck     
 membership mind     
 method news     
 office opportunity     
 official option     
 participants play     
 payout power     
 procedures problems     
 process racing     












triggers Induced scarcity Overconfidence Size of prize 
Regret  
effect 
 proof risk     
 property secret     
 receipt success     
 reference weight     
 registration winnings     
 regulations world     
 release      
 report      
 research      
 results      
 rights      
 rules      
 security      
 service      
 signature      
 sponsors      












triggers Induced scarcity Overconfidence Size of prize 
Regret  
effect 
 transfer      
 verification      
 voucher      
 
D.7 Web graphs were also constructed to illustrate the frequencies of co-
occurrences of words and concepts, but only apparently important data 








E STUDY THREE: DETAILS OF METHOD  
Participants and design 
E.1 The study took place in two waves. In Wave 1, we sent out our 
questionnaire to 300 potential participants from the Participant Panel of 
the University of Exeter School of Psychology. The panel includes local 
residents and other contacts of the School (including parents of students 
and former students) who have expressed a willingness to assist the 
School in its research. In Wave 2, we hand-delivered questionnaires to 
1000 households in the towns of Taunton, and Yeovil, Somerset.  
Wards within these towns were chosen from 2001 census data to have 
age and gender distributions close to the UK national averages and 
within those wards areas of typical housing were selected by the 
distributors by direct observation. A letter explaining the purpose and 
nature of the research, and a Freepost reply envelope, were enclosed 
with all questionnaires. In Wave 1, 148 completed questionnaires were 
returned; of these, 45 had to be excluded, because the dependent 
measures were not completed (mostly these came from respondents 
who reported no scam experience), leaving a usable sample of 103. In 
Wave 2, 153 responses were received, of which 116 were usable. 
Materials and procedure 
E.2 Copies of the questionnaires are attached in Annexe F.  Wave 1 and 
many of the interviews for Study 1 were completed and their results 
analysed before Wave 2 was started, so the Wave 2 questionnaire was 
modified in the light of the earlier results. However both questionnaires 
had the same general structure. Participants were first asked some 
general questions on scams, including open questions about the types of 
scams they had received. Next, before answering the dependent 
measures on underlying psychological processes, participants received 
the following instruction: 'If you have ever responded (or nearly 
responded) to a scam, please indicate how you felt when responding to 
it, by circling one of the numbers. If you have never responded to a 
scam, then please indicate generally how you felt about a specific scam 






items designed to probe vulnerability to different kinds of errors of 
judgement, using a scale from 0 (not at all) to 10 (definitely). The error 
propensities examined in the questionnaires are shown in Table E.1; for 
the wording of the items concerned, see Annexe F. In Wave 1 only, the 
questionnaires concluded with an invitation to take part in an interview.   
Data analysis   
E.3 On the basis of their replies to the questions about scam experience, 
participants were classified as victims or non-victims; in Wave 1 only, an 
additional category of near-victims was included. Wherever the 
Cronbach's α value for the items relating to a particular error propensity 
reached satisfactory levels (α>=.65), the items were treated as a scale 
and responses to them collapsed to their mean values before analysis.  
The α value for cognitive effort did not reach this criterion for Wave 2, 
but in the light of the Wave 1 result the scale was used in this case.  
Scores on the resultant scales were then analysed by one-way analyses 
of variance taking the victim classification as the sole independent 
variable. If significant differences were found, post hoc tests were used 








Table E.1  Study 3: The judgement error propensities investigated, the 
number of items used (n) and internal consistencies of the scales as assessed 
by Cronbach's coefficient (α)  
Wave 1 Wave 2 
Error propensity 





Visceral triggers (positive emotions) 3 .87 8 .66 All new items 
Cognitive effort 3 .70 4 .37a minor 
Scarcity and uniqueness of scam offer 3 .85    
Liking and similarity 3 .81    
Need for consistency with future 
expectations 
1 n/a    
Behavioural commitment 3 .73    
Sunk cost 1 n/a    
Problems with maths   2 .66  
Trust and authority 4 .87 4 .85 minor 
Illusions of control 2 .33b    
General attitude towards scams: Positive 1     
General attitude towards scams: Negative 1     
Personal approach   1 n/a  
Need for privacy   1 n/a  
aUnacceptably low α value, but scale formed in light of results from Wave 1 






F STUDY THREE: TEXT OF THE QUESTIONNAIRES  







SOCIAL, ECONOMIC AND ORGANIZATIONAL 
RESEARCH GROUP 
SCHOOL OF PSYCHOLOGY 
 
Washington Singer Laboratories 
Exeter EX4 4QG 
United Kingdom 
 
Telephone +44 (0)1392  
School Office  +44 (0)1392  
Fax +44 (0)1392  
Email s.for examplelea@exeter.ac.uk 
Web www.exeter.ac.uk/~SEGLea 
 
2 January 2008 
 
Dear Participant Panel Member, 
 
A Happy New Year!  Once again we are writing to ask for you help with some research.  
We have been asked by the UK government's Office of Fair Trading (OFT) to carry out 
some studies into why people fall for scam mailings. You know the kind of thing we 
mean, and you have probably received them – for example letters telling you that you 
have won millions of Euros in the Spanish lottery (which you never entered in the first 
place) and all you have to do is send off £100 to claim it…  and of course you never 
get the millions of Euros, and nor do you ever see your £100 again.   
 
We say 'of course', but the fact is that every year, millions of people fall for scams like 
this.  You don't have to be old, or confused, or stupid to be caught out by them. And 






£3.5 billion to scammers every year, and some of them lose their life savings and the 
roof over their heads.   
 
To help us understand what is going on here, we would like you to answer some simple 
questions about scams you may have received in the last few months or years. We'd 
like as many people as possible to fill in the questionnaire.  In addition, though, we are 
very keen to arrange some interviews with people who have actually fallen for one of 
these scams, or who came quite close to doing so.  Looking back, it often seems so 
obvious that a scam was too good to be true, but at the time it didn't seem like that – 
we want to know what it was that tricked you, or what it was that stopped you just in 
time.  If you are able to give us an interview, and we select you for one, we will pay 
you £50. 
 
Thank you very much for your help on this important issue. Please try to answer all 
questions as accurately as possible, but if your memory is hazy, remember that 
incomplete information will be more use to us than none at all.  We assure you that all 
your answers are strictly confidential and will be used only for scientific purposes, and 
unless you volunteer for an interview, we will not even know your identity.  You can 
return the questionnaire and interview invitation in the FREEPOST envelope provided, 
which doesn't need a stamp.  If you'd like to know more about the project, please 




Stephen Lea Peter Fischer 






THE SCAMS QUESTIONNAIRE 
 
ITEM 1: Have you been approached by scammers in the last 24 months?   
NO       YES 
ITEM 2: If you answered ITEM 1 with YES then please indicate what type of scam have 
you been offered (e.g., Spanish lottery, preparing a bank account for some kind of 
heritage, etc.).  Write down as many as you can remember 
___________________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________ 
ITEM 3: Did you react to a scam within the last 24 months (e.g., answering the scam 
or asking for further details)? 
NO        NEARLY      YES 
ITEM 4: If you answered ITEM 3 with YES or NEARLY then please indicate how you 




ITEM 5: If you responded a scam in the last couple of months, please indicate why you 










ITEM 6: Are you willing to take part in an interview (for which you will be paid £50) 
about a time when you fell for a scam, or nearly fell for one? 
NO          YES 
If you answer YES, please fill in the separate sheet and include it in the FREEPOST 
envelope, or send it to us separately if you prefer. 
ITEMS 7a-z: If you have ever responded (or nearly responded) to a scam, please 
indicate how you felt when responding to it, by circling one of the numbers. If you have 
never responded to a scam, then please indicate generally how you felt about a specific 
scam offers you remember receiving. 
 
(a) I was convinced that 
the scam was a really 
worthwhile offer 
 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
 Not at all Definitely 
(b) I felt very lucky to 
get this offer. 
 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
 Not at all Definitely 
(c) I felt high control 
over the scam offer. 
 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
 Not at all Definitely 
(d) I just believed what 
they told me in the 
scam. 
 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
 Not at all Definitely 
(e) I felt obliged to 
answer the scam. 
 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 






(f) I felt I was being very 
effective by responding 
to the scam. 
 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
 Not at all Definitely 
(g) I felt very lucky to 
get this offer. 
 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
 Not at all Definitely 
(h) I felt very positive 
about my personal 
future when I responded 
to the scam. 
 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
 Not at all Definitely 
(i) I responded to the 
scam in order to feel 
better. 
 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
 Not at all Definitely 
(j) I felt there was a 
strong authority behind 
the scam. 
 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
 Not at all Definitely 
(k) I felt that responding 
to the scam would make 
me more successful 
than other people 
 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
 Not at all Definitely 
(l) I felt high 
commitment towards 
the scammers. 
 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
 Not at all Definitely 
(m) I felt that the 
scammers liked me, so I 
responded. 
 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 






(n) Other people also 
received this scam offer, 
so I felt that it must be 
genuine. 
 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
 Not at all Definitely 
(o) I felt that the 
scammers were like me. 
 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
 Not at all Definitely 
(p) I felt that the 
scammers had the same 
attitudes as me. 
 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
 Not at all Definitely 
(q) I responded to the 
scam because I felt that 
I have to be consistent 
with my  expectations 
for my life. 
 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
 Not at all Definitely 
(r) Often I feel that 
scams offer me 
something which is 
scarce. 
 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
 Not at all Definitely 
(s) I felt that the 
scammers had given me 
something interesting, 
so I felt I should respond 
 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
 Not at all Definitely 
(t) I felt that I had 
invested a lot in the 
scam (e.g., reading 
time), so I responded. 
 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 






(u) Scams give me a 
feeling of being in 
control of my life 
 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
 Not at all Definitely 
(v) Generally, I feel very 
positive about scam 
offers. 
 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
 Not at all Definitely 
(w) Generally, I feel very 
negative about scam 
offers. 
 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
 Not at all Definitely 
(x) I tend to read most 
scam offers very 
thoroughly. 
 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
 Not at all Definitely 
(y) I tend to be very 
interested in scam 
offers. 
 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
 Not at all Definitely 
(z) For me it is an 
intellectual challenge to 
detect whether a scam 
offer is real or not. 
 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
 Not at all Definitely 
 
THANK YOU VERY MUCH FOR YOUR HELP.  NOW PLEASE PUT THE COMPLETED 
QUESTIONNAIRE IN THE FREEPOST ENVELOPE PROVIDED, AND POST IT BACK TO 
US.  NO STAMP IS NEEDED 
THERE IS AN INVITATION TO TAKE PART IN AN INTERVIEW (FOR WHICH YOU WILL 









PSYCHOLOGY OF SCAMS 
INTERVIEW INVITATION 
 
SOCIAL, ECONOMIC AND ORGANIZATIONAL 
RESEARCH GROUP 
SCHOOL OF PSYCHOLOGY 
 
Washington Singer Laboratories 
Exeter EX4 4QG 
United Kingdom 
 
Telephone +44 (0)1392  
School Office  +44 (0)1392  




If you are willing to give us an interview about your experience with scams, please 












Your experience with scams (please tick the one that best describes it): 
I never receive scam mailings .......................................................................  
I have received them but have never come near responding..............................  
I have come near to falling for a scam ...........................................................  
I have fallen for a scam and lost money as a result..........................................  
If you are selected for an interview, you will be paid £50. 
NOW PLEASE RETURN THIS FORM TO US.  YOU CAN RETURN IT IN THE SAME 
ENVELOPE, OR SEND IT SEPARATELY TO THE SAME FREEPOST ADDRESS – NO 






STUDY 3: WAVE 2 QUESTIONNAIRE 
 
1 May 2008 
Dear Sir or Madam, 
We have been asked by the UK government's Office of Fair Trading (OFT) to carry out 
some research into why people fall for scam mailings, and e-mails.  You know the kind 
of thing we mean, and you have probably received them – for example letters telling 
you that you have won millions of Euros in the Spanish lottery (which you never 
entered in the first place) and all you have to do is send off  some money to claim it. Or 
mailshots telling you that you have won a large cash prize and asking you to send a 
small processing fee, call a premium rate number, or order from a catalogue to receive 
it...and of course you never get the lottery win or cash prize, and nor do you ever see 
your  money again.   
We say 'of course', but the fact is that every year, millions of people fall for scams like 
these. You don’t have to be old, or confused, or gullible to be caught out by them. And 
there are big sums of money involved: OFT reckons that people in the UK lose a total of 
£3.5 billion to scammers every year, and some of them lose their life savings and the 
roof over their heads.   
To help us understand what is going on here, we would like you to answer some simple 
questions about scams you may have received in the last few months or years. We'd 
like as many people as possible to fill in the questionnaire. Please feel free to copy it 
and send us responses from more people. Looking back, it often seems so obvious that 
a scam was too good to be true, but at the time it didn’t seem like that – we want to 
know what it was that tricked you, or what it was that stopped you just in time. If the 
OFT has a better understanding of what makes people fall for scams it can look at 
ways to prevent the problem either through education or other effective campaigns. 
Thank you very much for your help on this important issue. Please try to answer all 
questions as accurately as possible, but if your memory is hazy, remember that 
incomplete information will be more use to us than none at all. We assure you that all 







will not even know your identity. You can return the questionnaire in the FREEPOST 
envelope provided, which doesn't need a stamp. If you'd like to know more about the 
project, please please don't hesitate to contact Peter Fischer (phone 01392, email 
@exeter.ac.uk).   
Yours sincerely 
Stephen Lea Peter Fischer 






THE SCAMS QUESTIONNAIRE 
ITEM 1: Have you been approached by scammers in the last 24 months by letter or e-
mail?   
NO       YES 
ITEM 2: If you answered ITEM 1 with YES then please indicate what type of scam have 
you been offered (e.g., Spanish lottery, prize draw win, sweepstake, miracle health 
cure, get-rich-quick scheme, foreign money-making offer, fake psychic, etc.).  Please 




ITEM 3: Did you reply back in any way to a scam within the last 24 months (e.g., 
answering the scam, phoning, asking for further details or visiting a web-site)? 
NO        NEARLY      YES 
ITEM 4: If you answered ITEM 3 with YES or NEARLY then please indicate how you 
answered the scam approach.  Did you send any money or personal information, and if 












ITEM 5: If you responded to a scam in the last couple of years, please indicate why you 




ITEMS 6a-z: If you have ever responded (or nearly responded) to a scam, please 
indicate how you felt at the time, by circling one of the numbers. You may have found 
out that it was a scam later; please answer this questionnaire about the time when you 
responded (or nearly did). If you have never responded to a scam, then please indicate 
generally how you felt about a specific scam offer you remember receiving. 
(a) I was convinced that the 
offer or deal was really 
worthwhile  
Not at all                                              Definitely 
0     1      2      3      4      5      6      7      8      9    10
  
(b) It would have been hard 
to throw this letter away / 
delete this e-mail  
Not at all                                               Definitely 
0     1      2      3      4      5      6      7      8      9    10
  
(c) I believed in my abilities 
to make good judgments. 
0     1      2     3  4     5    6     7        8       9    10 
Not at all                                        Definitely 
(d) I just believed what they 
told me. 
0     1      2     3  4     5    6     7        8       9    10 
Not at all                                        Definitely 
(e) I have a lot of 
background knowledge of 
the topic  of the scam  
0     1      2     3  4     5    6     7        8       9    10 






(f) Other people were 
apparently taking up this 
offer 
0     1      2     3  4     5    6     7        8       9    10 
Not at all                                        Definitely  
(g) I am very interested in 
the topic the scam was 
about. 
0     1      2     3  4     5    6     7        8       9    10 
Not at all                                        Definitely  
(h) It was an intellectual 
challenge to decide whether 
the deal was worthwhile. 
0     1      2     3  4     5    6     7        8       9    10 
Not at all                                        Definitely  
(i) Responding to an offer 
can make me feel better 
0     1      2     3  4     5    6     7        8       9    10 
Not at all                                        Definitely  
(j) I felt there was a strong 
authority behind the letter, 
text, or e-mail 
0     1      2     3  4     5    6     7        8       9    10 
Not at all                                        Definitely  
(k) I felt or I was personally 
addressed by the letter or e-
mail. 
0     1      2     3  4     5    6     7        8       9    10 
Not at all                                        Definitely  
(l) I felt a high level of 
commitment towards the 
sender of the letter, text or 
e-mail. 
0     1      2     3  4     5    6     7        8       9    10 
Not at all                                        Definitely  
(m) I felt that the sender of 
the letter, text or e-mail 
liked me. 
0     1      2     3  4     5    6     7        8       9    10 






(n) The sender of the letter, 
text or e-mail impressed me 
as being very reliable 
0     1      2     3  4     5    6     7        8       9    10 
Not at all                                        Definitely  
(o) I don't tend to read the 
small print. 
0     1      2     3  4     5    6     7        8       9    10 
Not at all                                        Definitely  
(p) I felt that the sender had 
the same attitudes as me. 
0     1      2     3  4     5    6     7        8       9    10 
Not at all                                        Definitely  
(q) I am more intelligent 
than the average person 
0     1      2     3  4     5    6     7        8       9    10 
Not at all                                        Definitely  
(r) The amount of money & 
time they were asking for 
was small 
0     1      2     3  4     5    6     7        8       9    10 
Not at all                                        Definitely  
(s) I am more successful in 
my job than the average 
person. 
0     1      2     3  4     5    6     7        8       9    10 
Not at all                                        Definitely  
(t) I felt that I had invested a 
lot in dealings with the offer 
(e.g., reading time),  
0     1      2     3  4     5    6     7        8       9    10 
Not at all                                        Definitely  
(u) Sometimes I am rather 
greedy. 
0     1      2     3  4     5    6     7        8       9    10 






(v) The law would be able to 
sort my situation if I was 
defrauded 
0     1      2     3  4     5    6     7        8       9    10 
Not at all                                        Definitely  
(w) I believe in following my 
gut feelings. 
0     1      2     3  4     5    6     7        8       9    10 
Not at all                                        Definitely  
(x) Sometimes I have 
problems with judging 
probabilities. 
0     1      2     3  4     5    6     7        8       9    10 
Not at all                                        Definitely  
(y) Sometimes, I struggle to 
imagine big numbers. 
0     1      2     3  4     5    6     7        8       9    10 
Not at all                                        Definitely  
(z) I am normally cautious 
when I take financial 
decisions. 
0     1      2     3  4     5    6     7        8       9    10 
Not at all                                        Definitely 
(zz) It would have felt 
uncomfortable to talk to 
other people about this offer  
Not at all                                              Definitely 
0     1      2      3      4      5      6      7      8      9    10 
 
THANK YOU VERY MUCH FOR YOUR HELP.  NOW PLEASE PUT THE COMPLETED 
QUESTIONNAIRE IN THE FREEPOST ENVELOPE PROVIDED, AND POST IT BACK TO 






G STUDY THREE: TESTS OF THE SIGNIFICANCE OF GROUP 
DIFFERENCES IN QUESTIONNAIRE RESPONSES  
Table G.1 summarises the results of tests of the significance of differences in 







Table G.1  Study 3: Significance of difference between victim status groups.  
Note that the near-victim classification was not used in the analysis of Wave 
2 results. 
 
Error propensity Overall significance Significance of post 
hoc tests 
 



















Visceral triggers (positive 
emotions) 
      
Wave 1 18.14**
* 
2, 100 .27 *** NS *** 
Wave 2 19.56**
* 
1, 83 .19   *** 
Cognitive effort       
Wave 1 6.65** 2,100 .12 *** NS .06 
Wave 2 7.68** 1, 82 .09   ** 




2, 100 .28 *** .08 *** 
Liking and similarity 19.94**
* 
2, 99 .29 *** NS *** 












2, 99 .37 *** NS *** 
Sunk cost 11.95**
* 
2, 95 .20 *** .08 * 
Problems with maths 9.83** 1, 83 .11   ** 
Trust and authority       
Wave 1 41.96**
* 
2, 100 .46 *** NS *** 
Wave 2 45.48**
* 
1, 83 .35   *** 
Illusions of control <2.24      
General attitude towards 
scams:  
      
Positive 7.21*** 2, 99 .13 *** *** NS 
Negative 4.93** 2, 99 .09 ** NS NS 
Personal approach 2.97 1, 83 .04   .09 
Need for privacy 6.60** 1, 79 .08   ** 
 







H STUDY FOUR: TEXT OF THE LETTER INVITING 
PARTICIPATION IN STUDY 4B 
 
 School of Psychology 
  Social, Economic and Organizational Research Group 
 
Washington Singer Laboratories 
Exeter EX4 4QG 
United Kingdom 
 
Telephone +44 (0)1392  
School Office  +44 (0)1392  










You have just read a letter that was supposedly from '[] Organization'. In fact, this 
company does not exist, and this letter is from the University of Exeter University. We 
are a team of researchers at the University and are currently working with the Office of 
Fair Trading. 
 
Every year, millions of people fall for postal scams very like the one you have just read. 
And there are big sums of money involved: The Office of Fair Trading estimates that 
people in the UK lose a total of £3.5 billion to scammers every year – and sadly some 
of them lose their life savings and the roof over their heads.  You do not have to be old, 
confused or gullible to be caught out by them - the OFT knows of victims from all 
walks of life, including ex-police officers and vicars!  
 
We are trying to help the OFT understand the techniques used by the scammers, so 
that they can educate and protect people better. Your receipt of this letter actually 
forms part of our study.  We apologise for not obtaining your permission before sending 
it.  In order to find out how real scam letters are unfortunately so effective, we needed 
people who were not forewarned. As we hope you will understand, an experiment 
about how easy it is for scammers to get people to comply with their wishes would not 








Because you weren't told exactly what was going on at the beginning, you have the 
opportunity at this point to withhold your data from the study. If this is what you 
prefer, please simply throw this away, which will have the same effect as if we had not 
sent it to you in the first place. 
 
In order to help the OFT, we want to find out more about the effect that scam letters 
have on people.  So we've enclosed a short questionnaire about this, and a Freepost 
envelope. This is an anonymous questionnaire, so we won't know who has sent them 
to us. If you are willing to take the time to fill this in, we would be very grateful. 
Hopefully we can help others learn not to fall for these scams, and your experience 
could help with this.  
 
We obtained your name and address from the Electoral Register, and if you would 
prefer not to give these details to people in future you can contact …………….. 
 
You may have experienced some unpleasant effects from our letter, and if you have, 
we trust these will have been short-lived. It is possible that you were hoping to win 
some money, and feel disappointed, or that the letter was a source of confusion. You 
may have experienced a sense of not being in control. You may be annoyed with us for 
sending this letter to you and asking for research information. If the scam letter caught 
you out, you may be feeling foolish. If you are experiencing any troubling results of 
receiving our letter, we would like you to ring us or write to us, or contact by e-mail, 
because if our letter has troubled you, we should help put this right.  
 
Possibly, you will be better placed, because of this letter, to be able to detect when 
someone is attempting to gain money from you fraudulently. You may be able to spread 
the word of how to avoid these scams amongst your contacts. 
 
You are very welcome to contact us – address and phone number above – if you want 











I STUDY FOUR: QUESTIONNAIRE USED IN BOTH STUDY 4A 
AND 4B 
Now would you tell us how well each statement describes your feelings when 
you first read the pretend scam. Please put a tick in one box in each row.  Don't 





    M
iddling 
    Extrem
ely 
 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
I felt very positive about responding to the 
letter. 
 
           
Reading the letter made me think about a 
positive future with all that money. 
           
I thought the letter was very boring. 
 
           
The letter made me feel that I'd really like to 
have that much money, so I wanted to 
respond 
           
The thought of the winnings really gave me a 
'kick'. 
           
I really didn't even think about the offer made 
in the letter. 
           
The size of the prize really intrigued me. 
 






I felt very negative about responding to the 
letter. 
           
I thought this was a chance to get a big prize 
for doing almost nothing. 
           
I believed that the letter came from an official 
institution. 
           
I was very doubtful about the content of the 
letter 
           
The content of the letter really sounded very 
official. 
           
The letter seemed very unreliable to me. 
 
           
I thought in detail about what I could do with 
all that money. 
           
 
Now just two questions about you, please circle your answer 
Sex                 M      F 
Age                18-25                25-35               35-45                 45-55                  
55-65              65+ 
Thank you very much for your help !! Now please put the questionnaire in the 







J STUDY FOUR: RESULTS OF FACTOR ANALYSES OF 
RESPONSES TO THE QUESTIONNAIRE ITEMS 
Principal axis factoring was used.  The following initial eigen values were found: 
 Total Variance Explained 





  Total 
per cent of 
Variance 
Cumulative 
per cent Total 
per cent of 
Variance 
Cumulative 
per cent Total 
1 5.569 39.779 39.779 5.154 36.812 36.812 5.096 
2 2.137 15.265 55.044 1.551 11.075 47.888 2.073 
3 .931 6.653 61.697         
4 .821 5.867 67.564         
5 .764 5.457 73.020         
6 .710 5.072 78.092         
7 .586 4.185 82.277         
8 .549 3.920 86.197         
9 .443 3.164 89.361         
10 .394 2.817 92.178         
11 .319 2.281 94.459         
12 .314 2.246 96.705         
13 .272 1.942 98.648         
14 .189 1.352 100.000         
Extraction Method: Principal Axis Factoring. a  When factors are correlated, sums of squared loadings 






This pattern of results strongly suggests that two factors should be retained.  
Accordingly, two factors were used and the factor analysis was followed by 
Oblimin rotation using Kaiser normalization. The following structure matrix was 
obtained, reporting only factor loadings that exceeded 0.300: 
Structure Matrix 
 Item Factor 
  1 2 
Made me feel I'd really like to have that much money, so I wanted to respond .864   
The thought of the winnings really gave me a 'kick' .847   
This was a chance to get a big prize for doing almost nothing .809   
Reading it made me think about positive future with all that money .807   
The size of the prize really intrigued me .783   
I thought in detail about what I could do with all that money .739   
I believed the letter came from an official institution .667   
Felt very positive about responding to the letter .589   
The content of the letter really sounded very official .486   
I was very doubtful about the content of the letter   .759 
The letter seemed very unreliable to me   .666 
Felt very negative about responding to the letter   .586 
I really didn't even think about the offer made in the letter   .434 
I thought the letter was very boring   .413 
 






K STUDY FOUR: TESTS OF THE SIGNIFICANCE OF GROUP 
DIFFERENCES IN RETURN RATES AND QUESTIONNAIRE 
REPONSES  
Study 4a: Cold responses to scams 
K.1 Figures 4 and 5 in the main text show the pattern of responses on the 
'intention to respond' and 'dislike of the scam' scales for the 
respondents in Study 4a who received the package which presented 
itself immediately as a research enquiry. The significance of differences 
between groups was tested by analysis of variance. A 2 (visceral cue: 
yes vs. no) x 2 (trust cue/official: yes vs. no) x 2 (prize cue: yes vs. no) 
x 2 (previous scam responder: yes vs. no) ANOVA revealed a significant 
main effect for 'responder', F(1, 399) = 70.06, p < .001, ω2 = .15, 
indicating that previous responders (M = 2.97, SD = 2.84) reported a 
stronger intention to respond than previous non-responders (M = 0.83, 
SD = 1.32). Moreover, we found a significant main effect for 'prize', 
F(1, 399) = 7.67, p < .01, ω2 = .02, indicating that a high prize (M = 
1.35, SD = 2.14) offered in the scam led to stronger response 
intentions than a low prize (M = 1.06, SD = 1.54). 
K.2 In addition, we observed a significant interaction for the factors 'prize 
cue' and 'responder', F(1, 399) = 11.02, p = .001, ω2 = .03. Follow-
up analyses did not show any significant simple effects. However, this 
interaction in tendency means that a high prize makes people who have 
responded in the past more likely to respond (but not people who have 
never responded). Also, we observed a significant interaction for the 
factors 'visceral cue' and 'trust cue', F(1, 399) = 6.93, p < .01, ω2 = 
.02. Follow-up analyses did not show any significant simple effects. 
However, this interaction in tendency means that for people who have 
responded in the past, with a low prize an official-looking letter is less 
effective, but with a high prize, an official-looking letter is more 
effective. No further differential meaningful effects were observed for 






Results of Study 4b: Hot responses to scams 
K.3 Figures 6 and 7 in the main text show the pattern of responses on the 
'intention to respond' and 'dislike of the scam' scales for the 
respondents in Study 4b who received the package which on first sight 
looked more like a real scam mailing. Again, the significance of 
differences between groups was tested by analysis of variance. A 2 
(visceral cue: yes vs. no) x 2 (trust cue/official: yes vs. no) x 2 (prize 
cue: yes vs. no) x 2 (previous scam responder: yes vs. no) ANOVA 
revealed a significant main effect for 'scam victim', F(1, 497) = 62.77, 
p < .001, ω2 = .11, indicating that previous responders (M = 3.00, SD 
= 2.50) reported a stronger intention to respond than previous non-
responders (M = 1.09, SD = 1.85). 
K.4 Moreover, we observed a significant two-way interaction between the 
factors 'visceral cue' and 'trust cue', F(1, 497) = 7.03, p < .01, ω2 = 
.01. Given no trust cue (non-official looking scam), no difference 
occurred between the condition with (M = 1.74, SD = 2.38) and 
without (M = 1.53, SD = 1.98) an additional visceral cue, F < 1. 
However, where a trust cue existed, participants with an additional 
visceral cue (M = 1.51, SD = 2.28) reported stronger response 
intentions than participants without an additional visceral cue (M = 
0.86, SD = 1.60), F(1, 497) = 6.86, p < .01, ω2 = .03.  
K.5 Moreover, this latter two-way-interaction was qualified by a significant 
three-way interaction between the factors 'visceral cue', 'trust cue', and 
'previous responder', F(1, 497) = 7.68, p < .01, ω2 = .02, indicating 
that the effect for the two-way interaction between 'visceral cue' and 
'trust cue' is more pronounced for previous responders than non-
responders. Concretely, for non-responders we found just a main effect 
for 'trust cue', F(1, 425) = 7.65, p < .01, ω2 = .02, indicating that 
less official looking scams (M = 1.34, SD = 2.03) led to more response 
intentions than official looking ones (M = 0.84, SD = 1.62). In 
contrast, this main effect was not found for previous responders. 
However, for previous responders we found a significant two-way 
interaction between 'visceral cue' and 'trust cue', F(1, 80) = 5.33, p = 






K.6 Follow-up analyses of all participants’ data clarified that without an 
additional visceral cue non-official looking scams (M = 3.59, SD = 
2.50) led to marginally stronger response intentions than official looking 
scams (M = 2.09, SD = 2.62), F(1, 36) = 3.25, p = .08, ω2 = .08. 
However, as soon as a visceral cue was provided, the difference 
between official looking scams (M = 3.58, SD = 2.54) and non-official 
looking scams vanished (M = 2.58, SD = 2.24), F(1, 44) = 2.01, p = 
.16, ω2 = .04. In other words: previous responders [are not particularly 
susceptible to official looking scams in themselves. However, as soon as 
a visceral trigger comes into play, scams with a trust cue (that is, official 
looking scams) make previous responders more willing to respond again. 
No further significant main effects or interactions were observed. In 
addition, no differential meaningful effects were observed for emotional 
dislike of the scam. 
